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Abstract  
Population Structure and Social  Change:  
Labor,  Care, and Regional  Dispari t ies  in Aging Japan  
(人口構造と社会変動： 
高齢化する日本における雇用、介護と地域格差) 
 
The history of human kind is a history of economic development 
based on population growth. For millenniums, economic development 
was premised on growth and expansion. During the last two centuries, 
however, all the developed countries have completed the demographic 
transition and birth rates have fallen almost everywhere in the world. For 
the first time in history, the population decreased in places not affected 
by wars, disease or famines. While, the debate on whether population 
decline is harmful or beneficial for the modern world is ongoing, the 
negative impact of skewed population structure is more obvious.   
Unlike European industrialized states, Japan has gone through the 
demographic transition in a fairly short period of time. This makes all the 
changes accompanied by shifts in population structure more pronounced 
than anywhere else. Furthermore, due to very low birth-rates, changes in 
population structure and population aging have progressed more than 
anywhere else. Researching how Japanese society is being transformed 
under the influence of demographic change is the main objective of my 
dissertation. 
In this dissertation I analyze various aspects of social change in Japan 
caused by rapid population aging. Japan pursues a path that no country 
went through before, which makes Japan‟s experience a valuable source 
of knowledge for other countries.  
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I start by analyzing the demographic determinants of population 
aging (life expectancy vs birth-rates). Both factors contribute to 
population aging, but decreasing birth-rates also affect the size of the 
household and are not accompanied by an increase of productive life-
span. There is no consensus about what factor contributes more to aging 
in Japan. Actually, recent studies tend to emphasize the role of longevity. 
Based on data from National Census, I assess the importance of each 
factor. I argue that the role of the birth rates is more important not only 
because of its immediate effect on the size of young population, but also 
because of its long-term consequences for population structure.  
The next issue discussed is the influence of the changing population 
structure on the labor environment and its relation to labor dualism. The 
impact of demographic change on labor environment is a very important 
issue, because labor market instability and labor dualism are responsible 
for increasing social and income inequality in Japan. The relation of 
selected demographic indicators to labor environment indicators, like the 
job-offers-to-seekers ratio and irregular workers ratio is analyzed in this 
section. Contrary to predictions by some researchers, the labor shortages 
and competition between the enterprises to secure human resources 
have not become distinctive features of Japan‟s economy. On the other 
hand, growing labor costs due to the shift towards older ages within 
corporate population pyramid encouraged the enterprises to look for 
new means of cost reduction: moving production offshore, limiting 
employment, employment dualism.  
In the following section I discuss how the demographic change 
caused by low birth rates changes the structure of Japan‟s household. 
Due to the fact that traditionally the family was the main source of 
support and socializing opportunities in Japan, the impact of the shrinking 
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household is very significant. Traditional living arrangements are 
transformed as more and more people chose or are forced to live alone. 
A similar situation applies to old-age care practices in Japan. The 
stereotypes of Japanese elderly cared for by their family or elderly in 
Japan being rich are changing as they lose connection with reality. 
Traditional safety net of family support tends to weaken especially in 
places where it is required the most. This gives space for new 
developments, like emigration of Japanese pensioners overseas. 
 Finally, I analyze how demographic change is contributing to 
regional disparities. The arguments have been made by some researchers 
that population decrease will help Japan to resolve its overpopulation 
problem and allow more living space for the citizens. However, the data 
presented in this section shows that overpopulation still continues in 
overpopulated areas as depopulation progresses in the areas with low 
levels of population density, contributing to further increase in regional 
inequality in Japan. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Aging as an Achievement 
Most developed countries are now facing the problem of aging 
population and some of them – declining population. The average age of 
human population in the developed world has been increasing steadily, 
and this is as a result of improved living standards, absence of famines or 
epidemics and improved health care.  Aging of the population is first of all 
a victory for humanity. As developed nations managed to deal with 
infectious diseases and epidemics and new living standards (i.e. 
canalization, electrification) became widely accessible, child mortality 
decreased and people enjoyed longer and healthier lives. Therefore 
aging was certainly one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century.  
 
Furthermore, as advocates of the “demographic trap theory” argued, 
having fewer children allowed people to concentrate more on work and 
be more mobile, which helped many nations to develop prosperous 
societies over relatively short periods of time.  Being a leader of economic 
and industrial progress in Asia since the Meiji era, Japan was also leading 
in terms of average life expectancy, first of all due to improvement in 
child-mortality rates and success in fighting infectious disease (Figure 1.1). 
A turning point in Japan‟s demographics is the two decades after World 
War II, when child-mortality rates and birth-rates both declined and 
Japan‟s population started aging.   
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During the last three decades a lot of scientific research has been 
done in the field of population studies. Yet, none of the social or 
economic disciplines succeeded in explaining the mechanism responsible 
for falling birth-rates in developed nations and understand the influence 
of changes in population structure on the society and vice-a-versa.  
 
The main objective of the present work is to present relevant data and 
analysis of the demographic change in contemporary Japan and by 
doing so to contribute to interdisciplinary understanding of the problem. 
The problems addressed are: the question of demographic determinants 
of aging (what causes population shift?); labor market problems (how do 
changes in population structure affect employment?); household patterns 
and old age care (his is the Japanese family and welfare system affected 
by aging?); and the problem of regional disparities (how does the 
situation differ across the regions? Why might such differences be 
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Figure 1.1: Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Male Female
Source: MHLW 2010, Average Life Expectancy of the Japanese – Life Tables
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dangerous for society?). Finally, Japan‟s experience is a valuable source 
of evidence for the demographic theory. Examples from Japan will show 
how the society behaves in new demographic setting. 
 
Demography, Economy, Sociology, Welfare and Politics as well as 
other disciplines are involved in the debate. For instance, many 
researchers (Wada 2007, Ishii 2008, Veron 2008, Kyogoku and Takahashi 
2008) emphasize the role of increasing life-expectancy as the 
demographic factor behind aging. I argue that the role of falling birth 
rates is at least as important and is growing. Unlike other researches that 
tend to analyze the influence of each factor (life-expectancy and birth-
rates) in a particular time point, I analyzed data from 1970 to 2050 to show 
how important the role of birth-rates is.  
 
The question of demographic determinants of aging is a question of 
demography, but it has many implications for other fields. Economical 
aspects of demographic aging, or more precisely, changes in population 
age structure, are most obvious in the labor market. Despite the fact that 
baby boomers still have not reached pensionable age, skewed 
population structure has already affected the labor market of Japan. I 
argue that it is skewed population structure, caused by falling birth-rates 
and not increased life-expectancy that promotes changes on the labor 
market and creates demand for irregular employees.  
 
Economic and demographic problems are also closely related to 
social problems. My argument is that the sole fact that people live alone 
longer periods of their lives would not be problematic as long as they are 
able to maintain a decent living standard and receive pension and 
welfare benefits they have earned during their lives. I show that this is not 
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the case in Japan and that the demographic change affected seriously 
the social issue of loneliness and poverty.  
 
Last but not least is the problem of regional differences, which is a 
political problem, but is also influenced by demography. I argue that the 
problem of overpopulation in certain regions of Japan will not be resolved 
by overall decrease in the population, like some would suggest. 
Furthermore, Japan‟s future depends on how wisely it will deal with the 
issue of regional inequality. A detailed description of each chapter and its 
contribution is summarized in section 1.4 Objectives, Structure and 
Contribution.  
 
1.2 Aging as a Challenge - Background 
Demographic aging is one of the greatest challenges Japan is facing 
today. Japan‟s case is particularly interesting, because here, 
demographic change occurred faster than anywhere else. Thus, its effect 
on the society is more obvious. In other words, the demographic change 
in Japan is not only problematic because of highest life-expectancy and 
one of the lowest birth-rates, but first of all, because of the speed of the 
change (Figure 1.2). Japan's population is aging much faster than 
advanced Western European countries or the USA. The elderly in Japan 
accounted for only 7.1 percent of the total population in 1970, but by 
1994, it had almost doubled to 14.1 percent. Today about 22.8% of the 
total population is over age 65.  
 
5 
 
 
 
As for the relationship of older population to the population of 
productive age, in 1960 there was one elderly person for 11 people of 
productive age, while in 2005 there were only about three persons to 
support one elderly person. The aging ratio will continue to rise further and 
by 2050, the ratio is estimated to be one elderly person for every 1.3 
people of productive age. Even if the age we now consider to be “old-
age” is raised to let‟s say over 75, the ratio will be one elderly person to 2.2 
persons of productive age (Figure 1.3). 
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Figure 1.2: Accelerating Speed of Demographic Aging Across the World
Time taken for number of persons over 65 to increase from 7 to 14% of population 
Source: United Nations, The Aging of Populations and its Economic and Social 
Implication, 1956; United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2008
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In terms of demographic change, the 20th century can be divided into 
four periods of demographic transition: 1st stage - up to 1945, when crude 
death rates (CDR) decreased faster than crude birth rates (CBR) and 
stimulated population growth; 2nd stage – the period between 1945 and 
1960, when actual fertility transition completed and Japan‟s population 
started aging; 3rd stage, the period of population bonus and high 
economic growth from 1960 to roughly 1975; and the period since 1975 
until now – the period of below-replacement birth rates and hyper-aging 
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society.  The present paper deals mostly with the last period, first of all 
because no other country has experienced the demographic 
developments that are occurring in Japan now, and second, because 
many of the interrelations between the hyper-aging population and social 
change are yet to be understood.  
 
With highest life expectancy and lowest birth rates, Japan is leader of 
demographic developments (Figure 1.4).  
 
 
 
There are several reasons why research on Japan‟s demography is 
important right now. First, Japan is entering a new era, when population is 
decreasing in absence of war, famines and infectious diseases. Such 
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Figure 1.4: Changes in Population Age Composition
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Source: NIPSSR 2010, Japan's Statistics, (Chapter 2: Population)
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demographic change is unprecedented and understanding its 
implications is essential to ensure social stability and sustainability of the 
welfare system. Unlike previous cases of population decline in world history, 
the decline of population in Japan is characterized by rapid population 
aging and skewed population structure on all the steps of the population 
pyramid.  Aging and decreasing population create a number of 
challenges for Japanese society, primarily sustainability of the welfare and 
pension systems (Suzuki 2008). However, the effects of changing 
population structure also come out in unexpected areas, for instance 
employment.   
 
Japan is pursuing a path that no country has traveled before and 
therefore it will need to find its own solutions to meet social and economic 
issues related to demographic change. As a pioneer in the field of a 
hyper-aged society, Japan anticipates the issues that are most likely to 
show up over time in other countries with aging population. Although the 
solutions that Japan developed so far and might develop during 
upcoming years cannot be copied exactly by other countries, Japanese 
experience will be of the greatest value as a source of knowledge in the 
fields of newest demographic developments. A big objective of the 
present work is to gather that knowledge and reveal the links between 
recent social developments in Japan and demographic change. 
 
 
1.3 Population Aging is a Multidimensional Issue  
As will be discussed throughout the paper, no sphere of Japanese 
society remains untouched by changing demographics. Of course each 
and every social change cannot be explained only by population aging. 
However, it is obvious that declining birth-rates, life expectancy gains, and 
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migration are in combination very powerful factors that affect the future 
of Japan‟s internal arrangements as well as its position in the international 
arena. Interconnections of different developments related to population 
structure are very complex and often counterintuitive. For instance, low 
birth-rates do not create labor-shortages as predicted by many, but they 
influence many other aspects of social life, like family size, household 
patterns, education system and, in the long run, demand. Aging labor-
force raises the problem of labor cost and also gives rise to the debate on 
immigration policy and social inequality.  Changing household patterns – 
is a cultural issue, but it is also related to problem of social ties and political 
debate over welfare issues. Drawing on official statistical data, including 
among others National Census, National Livelihood Survey, and Basic 
Survey on Wage Structure, I analyze interconnection of the developments, 
where the effect of population structure changes is most immediate: 
labor market, welfare, regional disparities.  What makes this kind of 
research important is that humanity for centuries lived under the premise 
of economic and population growth. Because the demographic 
developments we see in the 20th century are unprecedented, they 
represent a challenge not only to Japanese society, but to the whole 
concept of human progress we experienced until now. Fundamentally 
new ways of social progress under conditions of shrinking economies and 
shrinking populations need to be found (Korotayev et al. 2006).  
 
1.4 Objectives, Contribution and Structure of the Dissertation 
The present paper consists of 8 chapters: Introduction, State of 
Knowledge, five main body chapters, Conclusion and Appendix. 
  
The paper starts with a review of knowledge (Chapter 2) on 
population and its relation to society, economy and politics. Chapter 2 
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summarizes and analyzes briefly ancient ideas on population size and 
structure and presents a comprehensive review of modern theories, 
including demographic transition, youth-bulge, and demographic trap 
theories. Following that is an overview of the present day debate in the 
field of demography and its connection to socio-economic problems. This 
section traces how demographical thought evolved from considering 
only population size to including population age structure and how the 
preoccupation of thinkers was switching from overpopulation to 
depopulation and vice-a-versa. Special attention is devoted to the 
predictions concerning population growth that did not come true and to 
the questions that have not been resolved and are widely discussed now: 
causes of demographic aging, labor issues, sustainability of welfare 
systems, and regional depopulation. 
 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to evaluate the importance of various 
demographic determinants of the population aging process. There are 
two reasons why this is important. First, before considering the impact of 
an aging population on a given society it is necessary to understand what 
the causes of aging are. The second reason is very important when 
considering the ideas of “aging-optimists”, who argue that the problem of 
the aging society is too much exaggerated, that aging happens as a 
result of the longer and healthier lives of the citizens who are going to 
contribute to the economy long after reaching age 65. Of course, these 
arguments are valid under 2 conditions: 1) aging of the population is 
mostly caused by increased life-expectancy; 2) healthy life expectancy 
(as well as the time the individual is going to belong to the productive 
group) is increasing along with life expectancy. The main purpose of the 
chapter dealing with demographic determinants of aging – is to verify 
whether the conditions above are true and determine the most important 
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factors that contribute to population aging. In order to do this, the data 
on expected total fertility (TFR), age specific fertility rates (ATFR) and life 
expectancy rates is taken from National Census (MIAC 1970-2005) and 
Population Projections for Japan (NIPSSR 2006) and used to create a 
component-cohort simulation to show what Japan‟s population pyramids 
would look like if: Case 1) birth-rates did not change since 1970 and Case 
2) life-expectancy did not change since 1970. By comparing the results it is 
possible to determine which factor contributed and will contribute to the 
aging process more. Component-cohort approach to population 
projection was used as the most accurate method currently available 
(Preston 2001). Unlike precedent models that relied on average age and 
often did not take into account population structure, component-cohort 
approach accounts for population in every age group, sex distribution, 
TFR, age-specific TFR (ASTFR) and gives entirely accurate projections as 
long as all the other variables‟ stimates are correct. The results produced 
by this analysis provide the context for assessing potential influence of 
demographic change on Japanese society. The contribution of this 
chapter is to show the importance of birth-rates in population structure in 
the long run and to argue that no increase in healthy life-expectancy will 
be able to compensate for the increasing ratio of older cohorts. 
 
Next, I go on to discussion of interrelations between labor markets and 
population structure in Japan. Chapter 4 analyzes how changing 
population structure, in particular changing age-structure of the 
economically active part of the population affects employment in Japan. 
This section contributes to the whole dissertation by establishing links 
between the demographic factors (birth-rates and increasing 
preponderance of older workers in regular employment) and demand for 
young workers on the labor market. Some researchers have predicted 
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that aging population will cause very serious labor shortages and that the 
problem of unemployment will very soon fade away, as the government 
and enterprises will face a new challenge of securing manpower. These 
predictions of labor shortages are analyzed and speculations are made 
on why those predictions did not quite come true in Japan. Then, based 
on the data from Basic Survey on Wage Structure (MHLW 2008a), General 
Survey on Part-time Workers (MHLW 2006) and National Census (MIAC 
1970-2005) the relationship between aging population and irregular 
employment is analyzed. Special attention is paid to the problem of 
inequality between regular and irregular workers as seen through the lens 
of demographic change. I argue that we should think of labor market 
dualism not as a result of overprotection of older cohorts, but as a result of 
combination of two factors – demographic change and increase in the 
numbers of those who are supposed to be “overprotected”. Finally, some 
recent examples of enterprises seeking to cut expenditures at the expense 
of employment stability are discussed.  The main objectives of this section 
are to find out how the labor market is affected by changing 
demographics and how instable employment in turn affects 
demographics.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the influence of population aging on household 
patterns. In Japan, industrialization and subsequent migration to the big 
cities played a vital role in changing the shape of a common household. 
As migration of young people to the metropolitan areas progressed, the 
number of people living in 3-generation households gradually declined. 
The role of migration and industrialization was widely recognised but the 
role of changing population structure received less attention. In this 
chapter I make an attempt to fill the gap and show the relationship 
between aging and changes in household patterns. I emphasize the role 
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of decreased birth-rates in shrinking the number of household members. 
The problem of lonely people and old lonely people is discussed based on 
the data from Latest Demographic Statistics (NIPSSR 2010) National 
Census (MIAC 197-2005) and National Livelihood Survey (MHLW 2009d). 
The main questions of this section are 1) how does aging change 
household patterns? And 2) why does it matter? People spend much 
longer parts of their lives living alone in comparison to the preceding 
generations and this undermines many social norms established long ago. 
Another issue that is raised for discussion in this chapter is the widely held 
assumption that Japanese elderly are rich and can buy themselves all 
kinds of services or goods they need. Despite the fact it is true that old-
aged people in Japan enjoy high life standards, the issue of inequality 
among the elderly should not be underestimated. The issue of unequal 
distribution of wealth among the elderly, and the issue of poverty among 
1-person households is discussed. This chapter is rather an illustration of 
what social and economic problems are brought in by the changes in 
population structure. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the problem of old-age care. It is another 
illustration of socio-economic problems caused by demographic change 
in another dimension. Traditionally old-age care in Japan was considered 
to be responsibility of the closest kin, namely children. However, the 
current demographic situation is such that many elderly live away from 
their children or do not have any children at all. This is one of the most 
important issues of demographic aging. Data from Survey of Households 
Requiring Care (MHLW 2006b) and Life Security Survey (JILI 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010) is used to illustrate how aging population changes the 
situation in old-age care sector. Arguments have been made that along 
with life-expectancy increase, the overall health of the population also 
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improved and that less people will need care services in the future, so the 
problem of elderly care is exaggerated. The aim of this section is to verify 
whether this assumption is plausible. Another issue discussed here is the 
emergence of unregistered elderly homes that often do not conform to 
industry standards and provide low quality services to those elderly who 
have nowhere else to go and the emergence of the practice of going 
abroad to spend the rest of one‟s life in a place that is cheaper to live.    
 
Chapter 7 deals with demographical change in Japan in the light of 
regional disparities. The main finding of this section is that unlike what 
some researchers argue, population distribution across the country has 
little to do with overall population growth. This debate is particularly 
important for Japan, because it is overpopulated and overcrowded with 
limited land and natural resources. It is thus absolutely plausible to assume 
that a decrease in population should be welcomed as allowing more 
living space even if the total GDP would decrease. Japan‟s population 
has been declining since 2005 and the working population started to 
decline even earlier. One of the questions of this section is did decrease in 
population decrease population density? If so, where did the population 
density decrease? Using cluster analysis, the various regions of Japan are 
divided into groups based on birth-rates, aging ratio and population 
growth. The main objective is to reveal what differences exist between 
different regions of Japan and how those differences are affected by 
variation in demographics. The contribution of this chapter is that it shows 
that decrease in the population is not going to have any positive 
implications like for instance better environment or more affordable and 
better living conditions because population decrease is very uneven 
across the regions.   
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The last Chapter summarizes the arguments and findings presented in 
the previous sections. As mentioned throughout the paper, aging of the 
population and its influence on society is a multidimensional issue. The 
objective of this chapter is to summarize the discussion on how different 
elements of the demographic change interact one with another and how 
they change the social norms of Japan‟s society.  Chapter 8 is followed 
by the Appendix, which contains an atlas of population of Japan and a 
list of references. 
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Chapter 2 
State of Knowledge: Population Doctrines and Theories 
Population studies are often blamed for not having a comprehensive 
general theory that could explain factors behind population growth and 
predict consequences of demographical change for a given society 
(Burch 2003).  However, the ideas about what population size is best and 
whether we do have to care about population growth were discussed 
ever in ancient times.  Since the population was always growing except 
for fairly limited periods of wars and disease all early reflections on the 
issue of population are focused on population growth. We may hope that 
the theories for particular cases as well as empirical evidence may be 
gathered into a general theory of population growth, but it might well turn 
out that Marx (1970) was right in saying that absolute population theory is 
only for animals and plants. 
 
2.1 Ancient Population Doctrines 
Debates about whether rapid population growth is good or bad for 
the state can be traced back to ancient Greece. Aristotle and Plato 
discussed the best population size for city-states.  Their conclusion was that 
population of the city has to be large enough to protect from invasions 
but not too large so that it is easy to administrate and ensure effective 
participation of citizens in public life.  Plato emphasized the role of 
education saying that quality is more important than quantity. Aristotle 
concluded that immigration and emigration policies should be 
implemented depending on the current situation. He also linked 
overpopulation to poverty and advocated abortions as a mean of birth 
control (Aristotle 1986, Ellis 1986, Knight 2007).  
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In ancient China Confucius argued that too rapid population growth 
can reduce output per worker, decreasing life quality. He also noted that 
wars and famines check population increase (Neurath 1994).  He argued 
the population should only grow to the extent the resources allow and the 
government was responsible for maintaining the balance between 
population and resources (Tang 1995).   
 
In ancient Rome pro-natalist views dominated, Cicero postulated 
that population growth was a must as the empire needed more 
population to administrate its vast territories (Neurath 1994).  On the other 
hand, Christian philosopher Tertullian described famines and wars as 
consequences of overpopulation, although he also criticized unwise 
spending and luxury (Heer 1966). 
 
Very soon Christian position on population control went back to the 
“be fruitful and multiply” principle, with St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas describing marriage and procreation as one of the ideal ways to 
serve God along with celibacy. A Christian writer Williams (1999) declared 
that connecting overpopulation and poverty was nonsense and provided 
evidence that high population growth could be accompanied by 
seamless economic development.  
 
During years 1600~1800 mercantilist ideas were very influential in 
Europe. Mercantilist theory was that increasing national wealth depends 
on a growing population in order to produce resources and promote 
trade. Encouraging a large working population was one of the nine-points 
that Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick claimed to be the way to success and 
prosperity (Ekelund 1997). 
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2.2 Classic Population Doctrines 
Throughout the 16th and 17th century populations of European states 
grew faster than before. This again gave rise to speculations about 
overpopulation. Niccolò Machiavelli drew attention to floods, plague and 
famines that might result as a consequence of uncontrolled population 
growth (Montevecchi 1972).  
 
But perhaps one of the most influential and controversial works was 
published by Thomas Malthus in 1798. He argued that populations grow at 
a geometrical rate and thus it will eventually overgrow agricultural output 
that grows at arithmetical rate. This would lead to “positive checks” such 
as wars, famines to take control over population growth. It was up to the 
people to understand the limits of nature and use “preventative checks” 
such as moral restraint to prevent wars and famines (Malthus 1798, 
Peterson 1999).  
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Many ideas of Malthus were restated in Paul R. Ehrlich‟s “Population 
Bomb” where he compares population growth to cancer. Since he 
published this book, overpopulation has been cited as the main cause for 
many problems, including environmental pollution, high unemployment, 
poverty and famine. Although many predictions by Machiavelli, Malthus 
and Ehrlich did not come true, it is worth admitting that these works 
constituted an attempt to show that radical population change can have 
very serious consequences for humanity.    
 
The Marxist perspective on population growth was more flexible and 
thus more difficult to confirm or disprove. According to Marx, every society 
at any point in history has its own rules of population growth. In capitalist 
societies, the results of uncontrolled population growth are 
overpopulation and poverty. On the other hand, in socialist societies 
every new member is accepted and integrated flawlessly into the 
economy (Marx 1970, 1992; Blackledge 2006).  
 
2.3 Contemporary Population Doctrines 
2.3.1 Demographic Transition Theory 
In the 20th century demographic transition theory became dominant. 
It was based on data on birth and death rate trends in industrialized 
European states. The theory emphasized the importance of economic 
and social development and argued that there are 3 stages of 
demographic transformation that all industrialized countries are destined 
to go through. The First stage is a situation when high fertility is balanced 
by high mortality, thus this stage is characterized by low or no population 
increase. In the Second stage the mortality decreases due to 
advancements in life quality, hygiene and medical services, but fertility 
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rate remains high, stimulating rapid population growth. By the end of the 
second stage, fertility decreases as well, but not as fast as mortality. The 
third stage is characterized by low fertility and low mortality, causing slow 
or no population growth at all (Caldwell 1976; Saito 1996; Oded 2005).  
 
 
 
The theory of demographic transition explains these three stages in 
terms of industrialization and urbanization. It was criticized for assuming 
that less developed nations will necessarily go through the transition as 
they develop and for assuming that population change can have an 
effect on economic development and vice versa (Handwerker 1986; 
Caldwell 2006).  
0
10
0
10
20
30
40
Fiure 2.2: The Demographic Transition
Birth Rates Death Rates Population Size
I II III IV
Vital rates per 1000 persons Population in billions
21 
 
 
Japan completed its demographic transition with the decline in birth 
rates in the post-war period. Japan‟s demographic transition was 
considered a miracle that could not be explained by the established 
demographic transition theory (Ohbuchi 1976; Taeuber 1962). 
 
As we can see, all population doctrines can be divided into two 
groups: ones that advocate rapid population growth and others that see 
such growth as problematic. The demographic transition theory implies 
that society aims to stabilize its population, and will respond with 
adequate fertility to rising or falling death rates. So all these doctrines are 
only concerned with population growth and population size. Such 
properties as age structure are ignored, which can be understood, as 
population pyramid had its triangular shape for centuries.  Until the 20th 
century, population aging was as difficult to anticipate as it was difficult to 
anticipate a flat tire for societies that used chariots with wooden wheels. 
However, there seems to be a serious drawback of the demographic 
transition theory: given that any given society responds to lower mortality 
with lower fertility, the proportions of young to old should also change in 
favor of the old. 
 
2.3.2 Easterlin Relative Cohort Size Hypothesis 
Economist Richard Easterlin (Easterlin 1987; Macunovich 1998) has 
formulated a controversial theory about chances we get in a society. 
According to Easterlin, these life chances are by large determined by the 
relative size of the cohort we belong to. For example, if a person is a 
member of a small generation, he/she will experience less competition 
and chances to become successful and to fulfill all aspirations are greater 
(Pampel and Peters, 1995). On the other hand, there is less space under 
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the sun for members of large cohorts, so they have to compete, and the 
odds of becoming successful are lower unless the economy is growing to 
keep pace.  
 
But of greater importance to this research are Easterlin‟s assumptions 
about fertility. According to Relative Cohort theory, the standard of living 
people experience in late childhood is the base from which they will 
evaluate their life chances. Thus, if it is possible to improve life chances as 
adults, people will be more likely to marry and have many children. Simply 
put, if your life is becoming better in comparison to what it was when you 
were 10~18 years old, and if you feel like there are chances that the life of 
your children will be better as well, you are likely to have a family and 
children soon (Easterlin, Macdonald, Macunovich, 1990).  
 
This part of Easterlin‟s theory actually applies very well to the situation 
in Japan. Japanese society is so developed that it is hard to imagine 
continuous rapid improvement in the future, on the other hand, recent 
economic downturns have caused many problems and raised concerns 
of Japanese people about their prospects. However, the part of the 
theory that argues smaller cohorts will have greater chances during the 
life course can be criticized on the basis that, despite the fact that cohort 
sizes have declined in Japan, unemployment and poverty rates have 
grown.   
 
According to the theory, as birth rates decline, the employment 
prospects should be better and wages should go up (Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff 1987, Kotlikoff 2005), but this is far from what is happening in 
Japan (Genda 2003, 2005). And it certainly cannot be argued that 
people born 20 years ago in 1990 and are now entering the labor market 
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are better off than those who were born in 1970 and entered labor market 
around year 1990 even though there is a two-fold relative difference 
between these cohorts‟ sizes.  
 
 2.3.3 Demographic Trap Theory and Youth Bulge Theory 
A country is considered to be caught in demographic trap when it 
goes through 3rd stage of demographic transition and its population is 
growing rapidly due to a high birth rate and low death rate. In the end of 
the 3rd stage the country‟s level of health care reaches levels high enough 
to decrease mortality rates, but fertility remains low. The fruits of economic 
growth end up consumed by ever growing dependent young population 
instead of being spent for development and the country cannot 
complete the demographic transition. Instead the population continues 
to grow rapidly and can possibly trigger famines, poverty and wars as 
predicted by Malthus (King and Elliott, 1993). The theory is criticized based 
on the fact that famines and wars occur in places where food is actually 
available but is not accessible due to political or logistic reasons (Sen 
1989).  
 
A study by Population Action International (PAI 2007) shows a strong 
correlation between countries prone to civil unrest and armed conflicts 
and countries with large ratio of young people. According to the PAI 
between 1970 and 1999, 80% of conflicts occurred in countries where 60% 
of the population or more were under 30 years old. Some demographers 
refer to this phenomenon as “youth bulge” and emphasize its potential to 
destabilize countries in the developing world with high ration of young 
citizens (Goldstone 1991; Fuller 1995, 2004). The theory argues that 
developing countries undergoing demographic transition are especially 
susceptible to armed conflicts (Heinsohn 2003). The theory is criticized on 
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number of points, first being that all societies before demographic 
transition have youth bulges but not all are subject to social unrest and 
conflicts. Another problem is that the theory does not take into account 
other factors that might cause social unrest – like poverty, unemployment 
and corruption that is common for the countries where most of today‟s 
armed conflicts occur (Dhillon 2008).  
 
Both demographic trap and youth bulge theory consider not only 
the population size but population structure as an important factor that 
may influence economic development of the state.   
 
Following the youth bulge theory, it is possible to assume that if 
increase in the young-age cohorts may lead to social unrest, then maybe 
increase in working-age cohorts may also influence the society in some 
way, for example increase economic growth.  Similarly, demographic trap 
theory implies that economic resources might end up used for supporting 
dependent cohorts, but these cohorts do not have necessarily to be 
young, it can be any group that is not involved in economy and requires 
financial support – like unemployed, military or old-age.  
 
2.4 Focus Shift - Aging Population  
In 20th century, all the developed countries have completed 
demographical transition. In fact, many researchers pointed to the 
existence of a 4th stage of demographic transition, when the birth rates 
continue to fall while life expectancy continues to grow, causing rapid 
aging of the population (Kotlikoff 2005, Myrskyla et al. 2009). Changes in 
demographic regimes during the 20th century shifted focus of population 
research from overpopulation problems to problems of aging and 
population decline (OECD 1988b, 1996).  
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Unlike youth-bulge, aging of the population is a fairly new 
phenomenon. It is difficult to predict how it may change the society, 
because it never happened in the past and the data that may support or 
disprove some of the assumptions about population aging is not readily 
available.  
 
Author of “Global issues”, Seitz (2007), draws an analogy between 
growing youth population and growing old population and claims that 
aging population is affecting society in a number of ways.  First is 
increased burden on social security. The ratio of working-age people to 
retired people declines and puts a strain on pension system. 
Governmental health care costs also increase as population ages.  
 
Seitz notes that carrying for the aged is a big concern in Japan, 
where population ages faster than anywhere else. He also argues that 
when a country has a low birth rate, and the number of young people 
entering the labor market is reduced, the result will be conflicts over 
immigration policies. However, if population aging and population 
decline are gradual they can be handled in a timely manner. Very rapid 
aging of the population and its consequences are much more difficult to 
address (Seitz 2007; McFalls 1991, 2005; Kotlikoff 2005).  
 
Ideas were also expressed that decreased growth in labor supply 
could lead to lower unemployment and to increase in real wages due to 
cohort size effects (OECD1986) and to capital-deepening investment 
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987). But evidence from most countries with 
shrinking labor force has not proved this to be true so far. In fact, in Japan 
unemployment and underemployment are on the rise and real wages 
26 
 
have actually decreased, especially if reduced bonuses and non-regular 
workers wages are taken into account. 
 
In May 1995 a meeting of OECD ministers was called to discuss the 
impacts of demographic aging on the member countries. One year later 
a book was published by OECD (1996, De Carbon 1997) describing 
challenges that the aging societies are going to face, providing 
hypothesis for demographic development for future generations and 
suggesting possible solutions to mitigate the problem. The projections of 
population growth expressed in the book are very optimistic and suggest 
that most OECD countries will reach near replacement levels of births by 
2030. Authors argued that 1) most social security system are already 
facing crisis, which will worsen after 2010 when the baby-boom cohorts 
will head for retirement; 2) pensions and social security systems need to be 
reformed, because keeping status quo will cause deficit and eventually 
cause the systems to collapse (OECD 1988a).  
 
Another issue that was discussed was that of health. The author 
shows that it is yet unknown if increase in life-time expectancy is 
correlated with increase in healthy life time expectancy (Grundy 2006, 
Olshansky 2001, Carnes 2003). This is a very important issue, because 
healthy life-time expectancy may limit the extent to which pensionable 
age can be pushed and also has a direct impact on health related 
expenditures.  It is estimated that at age 70 health related costs are 
double, and at age 80 are four times as high as average age costs 
(MHLW 2006f).  In this regard, OECD (2006) and many European 
demographers (Kohner 2002) argue for gradual increase of pensionable 
age and abandonment of early retirement practices. 
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Year 1989 can be defined as a starting point when preoccupation 
about population aging and low birth rates became obvious in Japan. In 
1989 total fertility rate (TFR) fell to 1.57 and the 1990 rate was even lower 
(1.53). Yanagishita (1992) analyzed current trends and compiled it in a 
provocatively titled book “Japan‟s declining fertility: “1.53 shock”“. TFR at 
1.53 meant an annual population growth of only 0.33%. If nothing 
changed, the population would eventually start to decline after 2010. 
Now we know the population started to decline even earlier – in 2005, but 
in early 90s the idea was that TFR only declines because of postponed 
marriage age, and many including government officials argued TFRs will 
go back to “normal” levels in a matter of few years. Japan began to feel 
the effects of such low birth rates as early as 1990. The main problems 
during early 90s were a shortage of young workers and rising health care 
costs for the older population (Furuta 1993).  
 
In 1990, the government started a survey aiming to monitor the 
concerns of the population about demographic problems. The result was 
that most people still considered 2 as an ideal number of children. The 
ideal number of children did not change significantly, while actual 
practices did. About 40% found falling birth rates to be a problem 
because of aging and 65% answered that government has to take 
measures to increase birth rates. Among other findings, Yanagisita points 
to the fact that the reasons for not having the ideal number of children 
are the economic cost of child-rearing, lack of adequate housing and 
lack of child-care facilities and child-care leave.    
 
Since 1989, scholars worked to find out how aging of population will 
affect different aspects of the society: social security, health, employment, 
inequality. Others have tried to disprove the fatalistic prognoses and 
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argued that the problem is not as bad as it is thought to be, or perhaps, is 
not a problem at all.   
 
2.5 Is Aging Really a Problem? 
There is a general consensus among scholars that aging of the 
populations is likely to put strains on social security and pension systems 
and stress the economy because of decreasing consumption and 
decreasing labor force (Seitz 2007; Longman 2004; Weil 2006; Goldstone 
2010). In his book, “The Empty Cradle,” Longman (2004:156) writes: “…..the 
quality of health care for everyone will deteriorate. There will be serious 
hardships rippling throughout the economy and society.” 
 
However, some researchers continue to insist that declining 
population is at least not to be feared and at best is to be welcomed (Le 
Bras 2005; Akagawa 2004; Healy 1998, 2004; Curnow 2000). They argue 
that smaller population is not a bad thing and emphasize such benefits of 
smaller population as lower pollution, more resources per capita, etc. 
These arguments are of course valid, but the members of the “calm-down” 
group do not take into account that it is actually aging (not declining 
population) that is going to cause most problems. Another argument, 
often heard, is that as life expectancy increases, healthy life expectancy 
is going to grow as well, people in their 60s and 70s and maybe even 
older can be still active and contributing members of the societies, rather 
than dependents, if they are not discriminated against and are given the 
opportunity to work (Ogawa T., 2008). It is very possible (although not 
confirmed) that life expectancy means longer life without disabilities, but 
Ogawa T. and others, who share this optimism seem to disregard the fact 
that population structure changes, turning the pyramid upside down, so 
even if society is freed from the burden of carrying about the old, the 
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burden of carrying for the old-olds still remains and is growing. Furthermore, 
many specialists in longevity studies say that increase in life expectancy is 
not necessarily strongly associated with increase in healthy life 
expectancy (Olshansky, Carnes, Désesquelles 2001, Olshansky and Carnes 
2009). 
 
On another account, the fact that people will be able to work, does 
not mean they will be willing to work. They fulfilled their duty to the society 
by serving and paying taxes for a number of years. Rising pensionable 
age might face some opposition. For example, Healy (2004) writes:  
  
“Contrary to the gloomy view expressed by some, satisfaction with 
life increases with age….. (Headey 1999; Cummins et al. 2002). ….. a 
survey of 1400 older people aged 55-74 years reported that they identified 
many positive aspects of ageing: having more time and freedom; being 
able to do what they want….. (Howe and Donath 1997).” 
 
The “to do what they want” and “having more freedom” parts can 
be very different from “actively contributing to the society”. The dilemma 
here is whether we should, for instance, push retirement age up or keep 
the status quo.  
 
Campbell (1992) and Usui (2004, 2008) accept the idea that 
population aging is a serious concern, but they argue that with the 
correct government policies it can be easily dealt with and is not likely to 
cause major problems for Japan. Campbell argues that expenditures 
associated with aging are only going to rise 1~1.5% per year, which can 
be easily covered by economical growth of 2%. Campbell also explains 
that older people in Japan are more likely to continue to work and 
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contribute to economic growth and womens‟ participation in labor force 
is on the rise.  Usui argues, that being over 65 years old does not mean to 
be unproductive and expresses hope that Japan will successfully deal 
with problems caused by aging population by increasing its productivity. 
Her basic point is that societies become more and more efficient. 
 
Let‟s see how other researchers estimate the influence of 
demographic aging, based on empirical data. 
 
2.6 Aging and Social Security 
In welfare societies there are 3 ways of redistributing wealth from 
independent to dependent groups – taxes, family support and personal 
savings. Family is supposed to play vital role in taking care of children. 
Taking care of older people is government‟s responsibility and is fulfilled in 
form of pensions and health insurance programs. Personal savings is an 
additional way of financing one owns needs after retirement. 
 
Since population aging started to be widely discussed, a number of 
researchers have expressed doubts about sustainability of the welfare 
states and their ability to provide benefits to growing number of 
pensioners.  Many urged the governments to reform pension systems and 
cut welfare expenditures, but not that many reforms were actually 
undertaken. Galasso (2008) expresses doubt that any major reforms will be 
implemented if they are based purely on economic theory. He argues 
that success of such reforms depends on political factors. Galasso 
proposes a comprehensive analysis of financial sustainability of modern 
welfare states with aging populations in future and concludes that states 
with higher ratios of older people will tend to discourage reforms that aim 
at reducing benefits during the elections. As a result, aging population will 
31 
 
inevitably lead to increase in public pension spending to unsustainable 
levels and may cause collapse of pension systems. The only politically 
possible solution to this problem is pushing up the retirement age.   
 
Lee (2003) discusses two major problems caused by aging 
population: rising old-age dependency ratio and falling savings rates, as 
retired people start to spend their savings. Regardless of the fact that 
these problems are serious concerns, Lee expresses some optimism 
because of the gradual nature of increasing dependency ratio (Rosen 
2002). The burden on pensions and health care will increase at a relatively 
slow pace in US, so the government might have enough time to adapt. 
Also the labor force of future might be more productive than it is now.  
 
This kind of optimism cannot be shared by such countries as Japan, 
where the aging of the population is occurring at a very rapid pace. 
Contributions to Social Security are projected to rise from 13% of national 
income in 1993 to 21% in 2025 as shown on Figure 2.3 (Ogawa N. and 
Retherford, 1997; Retherford and Ogawa N. 2006). 
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Kawase and Ogura (1994, 2005, 2007; Kawase, Akihiro, Kitaura, 
Kimura, Maekawa 2007) have provided a comprehensive simulation of 
impact of aging on public finance. They show that PAYG (pay-as-you-go) 
health insurance and pension systems inevitably increase the level of 
contributions to maintain the current level of benefits as old-age 
dependency ratio grows. Kawase and Seiritsu‟s simultaion is based on the 
assumption, that current levels of benefits should be maintained, so they 
focus their attention on the relationship between the tax rate of the PAYG 
social security system and old-age dependency ratio. The other 
assumption is that aging society increases chances of longer life and thus, 
increases risks of chronic diseases and long-term care needs. Figure 2.3 
shows the result of simulation of future pension, medical care and long-
term care expenditures as percentage of GDP.  
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The results of simulations by Kawase, Akihiro, Kitaura, Kimura, and 
Maekawa (2005, 2007) make it clear that the 2004 pension reform may 
alleviate the problems caused by population aging to some extent 
(Figure 2.4). However, additional financing in the form of higher 
consumption tax and cuts in the benefit levels will be needed to make the 
social security system sustainable.  
 
One of the problems is that the simulation is based on the NIPSSR 
Population Projections for Japan: 2001-2050 (NIPSSR 2002) that tend to be 
too optimistic. For instance, it is unclear why in the low variant of TFR 
estimations for Japan assume that TFR will stop falling around year 2010. 
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The other problem is that if higher consumption tax is to be chosen as the 
way of financing growing social security expenditures, arrangements 
have to be made so that birth rates are not further depressed due to 
increased burden on young families.   
 
Takayama (2002, 2008) reaches similar conclusions about 
sustainability of the social security system based on his analysis of Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare estimates of social security costs. If total 
costs are taken into account, Social Security consumed 22.5% of the GDP 
in 2002 and will consume 32.5% of GDP in year 2025. Another problem 
Takayama addresses is the issue of inequitability of the pension system 
from the younger generation‟s standpoint. That is to say that due to 
population aging under PAYG system younger generations have to pay 
more only to get less if anything when they are retired. He points out that 
a growing number of young people feel reluctant to pay pension 
contributions because they have doubts the system will pay them back 
when they are old. In such circumstances, according to Takayama it is 
necessary to design a more “incentive-compatible” system, where the 
amount of contributions would me more directly linked to the benefits 
after retirement. Takayama acknowledges the problem of financing the 
pension system. He says that supporting growing retired population is 
possible if economic output increases. But as economic output depends 
very much on labor force, increased labor force participation will be 
required. Linking the amount of contributions to the amount of benefits 
may indeed work as a good incentive for people to participate in the 
system. However, it is hard to imagine how high level of contribution for 
the beneficiaries can be insured if the number of contributors will continue 
to fall.  
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2.7 Aging, Health and Care 
Many concerns with population aging are related to rising health 
costs. This is due to the idea that older people tend to be less healthy, 
have higher risk of disability and many of them have special health care 
requirements.  
 
There are three basic theories that predict the influence of aging on 
overall health of the population. The theory of morbidity compensation 
(Fries 1980) is the most optimistic. Fries suggests that medical progress will 
improve the health of every citizen of a given society. Better health 
behavior and medication will push the age of chronic disease and 
disability to later stages. If life-expectancy was to remain constant, the risk 
of illness and thus health expenditures would actually decrease.  
 
The most pessimistic theory is the theory of pandemic and chronic 
disease supported by Kramer (1980, 1983). It assumes that every year of 
gain in life-expectancy is another year spent in illness and disability. 
According to Kramer, in industrialized societies with high hygiene 
standards, all the gain in life-expectancy is not due to child survival rate, 
but due to decrease in lethality among chronically ill. Incidence of such 
illness or retardation of its development has little if any significance.  
 
Theory of dynamic equilibrium (Manton 1982) explains that 
improvement in life-expectancy is due to retardation of chronic diseases. 
It means that life-expectancy increases along with healthy life-
expectancy, thus healthy life time increases, while period of life spent in 
illness or disability remains stable.  
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There is one thing that all the three theories have in common: while 
trying to predict the effects of aging on society, they lack understanding 
of changes in demographical structure behind aging. The question is not 
whether a single individual will be more likely to be disabled or not but 
whether there will be a growing number of individuals with higher risk of 
disability. The three theories only account for increase in life-expectancy 
as a contributing factor to aging (Inoue 1997, Harada 2005). However, as 
will be shown later, low birth-rates are a more important factor. In addition, 
the most rapid growth occurs in the oldest age groups – the so called old-
old (Gaymu 1994; JICA 2006, 2007). In simple words, even if, for instance, 
healthy life expectancy goes up from 60 to 100 years, it does not make 
much difference for a person if he has to care for his parents when they 
are 60~70 years old or 100~110 years old. There is however a big 
difference between one person looking after three and three persons 
looking after one.  
 
But even if demographic factors are taken into account, there is still 
a debate between scholars about relationship of aging and health care 
issues. Healy (2004) argues that an aging population does not necessarily 
equal a population with high risk of disabilities and does not necessarily 
burden the country with health care related expenditures. This is partly 
due to the fact that the baby-boom and following generations are much 
healthier than today‟s old people. An alternative opinion is that a growing 
elderly population has particular health care requirements. For instance, 
about 30% of Japanese over the age of 85 are going to struggle 
Alzheimer‟s disease or similar illness. As aging among the oldest cohorts 
progresses, risks of severe health conditions, such as dementia, can cause 
huge increases in social and financial expenditures. 
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Furukawa (2008) traces the history of health care services in Japan 
and shows that proportion of patient cost sharing in national health 
expenditures declined from 40% in 1955 to 10-12% in 1990. However, the 
cost covered by the patient (jikofutan) started to rise again after recent 
health care reforms were implemented. Furakawa also confirms that 
average per-capita health care cost is 4 times higher for the persons over 
65 years than for other cohorts. Furukawa sees the problem of financing 
health care system as a very serious issue 
 
As for old-age care, Japan‟s government now is facing the dilemma 
of choosing between universal systems that cover everyone or targeting 
system, which only cover those who “really” need. The other choice is 
between institutional care and home care. Aratame (2007) and Ogawa T. 
(2007) address the aging and care issues at community level. They argue 
that in Japan, policy measures to address aging problems have to be 
focused on “community oriented welfare.” The idea is to reconstruct 
welfare system so that they are “community” oriented, because the 
present system has become obsolete due to rapid ageing, unsustainable 
national social security system and decline in family support. It is unclear, 
however, what is meant by the term “community” and how it will insure 
equal level of service to everyone who is in need.  Ogawa T. (2007) argues 
that the elderly people are not only consuming but also providing social 
services, and that population aging does not increase the expenditures. 
He sees community-based welfare going along with community 
development, in which older people are active participant in community 
life.  
 
Reliance on family and community advocated by Aratame and 
Ogawa T. raises new questions of expanding inequality between those 
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who have family to rely on and those who have not, and regional 
inequality between the communities that are supposed to provide care. 
Originally, the burden of caring for both seniors and children was taken by 
the family. In some cases, the community or religious organizations played 
a role in taking care of lonely seniors or abandoned children. However, 
with development of the welfare state, the country and the society 
assumed its responsibility for taking care of people who helped to build 
that country. Consequently, in modern welfare states the family is the 
main supporter for children, while the government takes care of seniors by 
providing pensions and health care. Despite the fact that failure to extend 
welfare state support for children is what caused population aging in the 
first place, there is an obvious tendency to reverse the history and limit the 
welfare state in questions of caring about the old.    
 
2.8 Aging and Inequality 
Early post-war years in Japanese society were characterized by class 
struggle and class division (Price 1997; Muto 1987). However, during the 
1960s a new concept of mass-middle class society was introduced and 
accepted within and outside Japan. Mass-middle class society meant first 
of all that Japan became a place free from class struggle, where all 
members of the society shared the same values and interests and life-
styles regardless origin, occupation or religious beliefs. It also meant that 
Japan‟s middle- became a dominating class, exercising power through 
elections. This view strengthened during the 1970s and dominated until 
mid the 1990s.  
 
In 1974, new Prime Minister Miki Takeo gathered liberal theorists to 
establish a new ideological base for social stratification. Led by Murakami 
Yasusuke, economists put forward the idea of a conflict-free mass-middle 
39 
 
class society (Murakami 1977, 1979, 1980; Vogel 1963). A widely cited 
analysis of an OECD international survey (Sawyer 1976) supported the 
idea that the level of inequality was the lowest among OECD countries. 
Subsequently, the image of Japan as a homogeneous classless society 
became commonly accepted. 
 
A large proportion of young people and growing labor force during 
years 1960-1980 was one of the factors that stimulated rapid economic 
growth (Ogoshi 2006). The triangular shape of the population pyramid 
combined with life-time employment created an environment where new 
recruits were promoted to higher positions almost automatically.  
 
Recently, economists re-analyzed the data from national surveys and 
reached conclusions different from the commonly accepted view of 
mass-middle class society. First, Japan was not extremely egalitarian in 
terms of income. Ishizaki (1983) showed that in terms of Gini coefficient 
Japan was somewhere in the middle among OECD countries and never 
had levels of inequality comparable to some of North-European countries.  
The share of the lowest 20% in total income was also not particularly high. 
Tachibanaki (1998) compared income distributions in Japan and the 
United States for years 1980-1995 and found that income inequality in 
Japan was as large as in US. Tachibanaki (2000) goes as far as claiming 
that Japan can no longer be considered a welfare state. He provides an 
extensive discussion about how the roles of family and private enterprise 
are overemphasized, while the role of the state is downplayed.  
 
Empirical evidence that Japan was a mass-middle class society is 
really weak. On the other hand, there are no studies clearly supporting the 
notion of a radical transformation from equal to unequal. How and why 
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did Japan switch from an equal “homogeneous” to unequal “kakusa” 
society? Japan society was known for long time as “connections society” 
(kone-syakai). Japan‟s economy was continuously criticized for being 
“closed” or “not-transparent.” Such phenomena as “amakudari” and 
“Iron Triangle” (Amaki 2004; Miyamoto 1995) suggest that Japan was not 
entirely a free-market economy, and so the well-being of citizens cannot 
be easily measured by income alone. 
 
Ohtake (1999, 2000) and Ooishi (1999) argued that inequality was on 
the rise in all OECD countries in 1980s, and Japan was no exception. 
Ooishi (1999) claimed that measurement of income used by Tachibanaki 
(1998) was not consistent between the 2 countries, so inequality in Japan 
was not as high as in US but started catching up from the 1980s.  
 
Ohtake and Saito (1998) concluded that a lot of the recent increase 
in inequality can be explained by changes in population structure. Their 
argument is very straightforward and technical – the inequality levels are 
usually high among older people, so the relative increase in number of 
seniors will cause more inequality overall. Ohtake (2005) disproves the 
idea of rising inequality as illusory, based on the fact that within each age 
cohort inequality did not change, thus the only explanation is that the 
number of people in a cohort where inequality tended to be higher, 
increased. According to Ohtake (2000) Japan‟s Gini coefficient fell during 
the period of rapid economic growth - from about 0.31 in 1960 to 0.25 in 
1970. Since then the Gini coefficient has grown and at least half of this 
increase can be attributed to population aging. In his other work, Ohtake 
analyzed consumption inequality using data from the “Income 
Redistribution Survey” of 1981 and 1993 to argue that inequality is on the 
rise among people over 40 years old. A big difference was found also 
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between full-time employees and individuals who faced illness or 
dismissals.  
 
Sociologist Sato (2000a, 2000b) also confirmed increasing inequality 
in Japan. Sato relied on historical comparison to show that social mobility 
became more restricted after 1980. According to Sato (2000a, 2000b) for 
cohorts born between 1896 and 1915 a person was 10 times less likely to 
get a white-collar job if his father was not from the same white-collar class. 
Later, for cohorts born between 1925 and 1945, the probability of moving 
up to higher class increased. A person was only 4 times less likely to end 
up in white-collar if his family did not belong to white-collar class. But, for 
cohorts born between 1946 and 1955 the chances of upward mobility 
returned almost to the prewar level: for those not from white-collar class 
families, the chance of becoming white collar was 8 times lower than for 
those whose parents had white-collar jobs. 
 
Of course, claiming that inequality increased in Japan implies that it 
was an egalitarian society to start with. Ishida (2002) and Hara & Seiyama 
(1999) argue that there is no evidence that inequality dramatically 
increased during the recent period and that people‟s preoccupation of 
rising inequality is based only on the myth that equality existed.    
 
Yoshihiro (2001) examined possible ways to reform the social security 
system and income redistribution policies in order to address the growing 
inequality in the aging society. The main objective is to analyze the 
relationship between the pensions and the income redistribution after the 
pension reform of 1999.  
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As this summary of the research shows, there is a consensus among 
many researchers that inequality represents a major concern for Japan‟s 
aging society. The difference in opinions lays in the question whether 
Japan became unequal after 1990 or was it a society with a significant 
level of inequality in the first place.  
 
Sociologist Shirahase (2006) agrees with Tachibanaki and others who 
point out that Japan was never as egalitarian as it used to be thought. 
Instead, she argues that the recent resurgence of preoccupation with 
inequality is better explained by labor market instability. The economic 
downturn of the 1990s had a big impact on enterprise employment 
policies. Seeking to save money here and there the private sector 
reduced numbers of new recruits. One-third of the labor force became 
employed on a non-regular basis and more than half of non-regular jobs 
were taken by women.  Shirahase points out that even having a job does 
not guarantee a bright future anymore, because it has become more 
difficult to be employed under life-time employment system. On the other 
hand, part-time workers are often underpaid and often have to work in 
unfavorable conditions.  
 
Much of Shirahase‟s work is about household income and changing 
household patterns. According to her findings, inequality did not strike 
every member of the society at once. Much of the poverty and inequality 
can be explained by the growing number of 1-2 person elderly 
households. Single person households, especially single older women are 
especially at high risk of falling under the poverty line, she explains.  
 
Similarly, the recent increase in inequality among young households 
hides increase in the number of single-parent households. According to 
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Shirahase, single-mothers are at high risk of falling under the poverty line 
even if employed.  
 
The family is traditionally a very important source of support in the 
Japanese welfare pattern. This is important for both child-rearing and 
caring about the seniors. However, because of the growing number of 
couple-only, single-parent and single households Japanese people can 
no longer expect the family to take all the responsibility. Shirahase (2005) 
argues that changing household patterns is one of the greatest problems 
in Japan. Especially, growing number of single-person and single-parents 
households is playing an increasingly important role in rising poverty rates 
as these households are at highest economic risk.   
 
There are two factors that explain declining birth rates in Japan. The 
first one is that many young people do not get married (mikonka). This 
factor was more important until the mid 1990s. Now the more important 
contributor is decline in birth-rates among married couples.  
 
The reproduction of class is one more important issue addressed by 
Shirahase. She concludes that marriage is one of the main institutions that 
transmit the stratification pattern to new generation. In Japan, people are 
more likely to get married with someone of similar social background and 
education. Thus, the children of rather well-off families will enjoy better 
chances, while less advantaged individuals will pass their disadvantages 
to their children.    
 
As we can see, a great deal of research has contributed to clarifying 
the influence of aging on inequality, with a focus on the increasing 
number of elderly households. Recently, a lot more attention is being paid 
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as well to economic disparities among young people. Genda (2002, 2004) 
argued that life-time earnings of youth are declining if compared to the 
previous generation. On the other hand, it has become clear that the 
difference between successful and disadvantaged young individuals is 
found in the difference between regular and non-regular employees or 
unemployment (Ohta 2005).  
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Chapter 3  
Demographic Determinants of Population Aging: What is More 
Important – Increasing Life Expectancy or Decreasing Birth Rates? 
 
In this chapter I will try to shed light on the demographic conditions 
behind population aging and the patterns of aging in Japan. As already 
mentioned, the debate on whether aging is problematic at all is ongoing. 
It seems like the nature of population aging and different demographic 
indicators are still not entirely understood. This section provides description 
of selected demographic indicators, their values in Japan and analyses 
the importance of demographic determinants of population aging in 
Japan. When speaking about population aging, many researchers 
emphasize the role of increased longevity (Wada 2007, Kyougoku and 
Takahashi 2008, Ishii 2008, Véron 2008). These conclusions are often based 
on short-term or one-point data that tend to underestimate the effect of 
the birth-rates.  
 
I analyze the National Census data from 1970 to 2005 to show the 
importance of the birth-rate factor and by doing so contribute to better 
understanding of nature of the population aging in Japan. In order to do 
so, I use component-cohort method discussed in details later in this 
chapter. This method is used for population projections by Statistics Bureau 
of Japan, the United Nations and many other institutions because it gives 
very reliable results under conditions of correct assumptions of life 
expectancy, birth-rates and other indicators. Using this method to 
evaluate what the population would be like if certain conditions were true 
in the past is even more reliable as we know what the birth rates of life 
expectancy were for sure. For example, we could set the TFR value for all 
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years studied to 2.1 and estimate the effect of life expectancy on 
population structure for that period.  
 
Unlike in other developed nations, Japan‟s aging population has not 
as much to do with baby-boom cohorts moving into older groups. This is 
because the baby-boom in Japan lasted only a few years and the baby-
boomers will still be part of the working age population during next 2-3 
years (Horlacher 2002).   
 
Both, increasing life expectancy and declining birth rates influence 
the population aging process. But there is a fundamental difference 
between aging due to increasing life expectancy and declining birth 
rates (Lee 2003). As mentioned earlier, declines in mortality among the 
older population may be accompanied by a corresponding increase in 
the ability to contribute to the economy over a longer period of time 
(although this is debatable). In contrast, lower birth rates increase the ratio 
of old population without increasing healthy life expectancy whatsoever.   
 
3.1 Definition and Measuring 
Demographic aging or population aging is a shift in age distribution 
of a population, characterized by increasing proportion of older 
population. There are three causes that may potentially influence age 
structure of a population: 1) birth rates, 2) mortality rates, 3) migration.  
 
Because concerns about population aging are often rooted in 
problems with pension systems, the aging of population is often measured 
by relative growth of the population of retirement age, and the 
commonly accepted old-age is over 65 years old.  
 
47 
 
Old-age dependency ratio (ODR) is often used to compare the 
number of working-age population to retired population. This measure 
should be used with caution, because not everyone who is over 65 is 
necessarily retired. On the other hand, in the modern developed world 
there are few children of 15~20 years old who actively participate in 
economy, but they are still included in working-age population. EDR is still 
useful to illustrate general trend in changing age structures and for 
international comparison. 
 
Old-age dependency ratio (ODR) as well as young-age 
dependency ratio (YDR) and old-age to young age dependency ratio 
(OYDR) are simply measures to relate two large categories, but they fail to 
illustrate more sophisticated age distribution within the larger groups. For 
example if the ratio of individuals over 65 years old is growing, it may be 
caused by a growing number of people aged 65 or a growing number of 
people aged 85. But the health expenditures and economic 
independence of 65 and 85 year-olds can be very different. More 
attention should be given to the so called old-old, usually defined as over 
75 or older (“koukikoureisya”), but perhaps it would be useful to 
decompose all of the old-age groups into smaller 5-year groups to see 
how fast they are growing.   
 
As population aging implies changes in every step of the population 
pyramid, no single indicator of population aging can measure it by itself. 
The age distribution is very uneven and has traces of some occurrences in 
the past, like WWII, the following baby-booms and so on. That is why it 
cannot be described in a simple way. Therefore, one of the best ways to 
describe the process of changes in age structure is by population 
pyramids (Gavrilov 2003). 
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3.2 Demographic Determinants of Population Aging 
To illustrate the influence of different factors on population structure, 
demographers use the stable population theory (Coale 1956, 1957; 
Preston 2001). The notion of stable population assumes that birth-rates and 
mortality rates remain unchanged. As a result, age distribution stabilizes 
and it is easy to single out the effect of every factor – birth rates, mortality 
or migration.  
 
Decreasing mortality rates are the most intuitive cause of population 
aging. This idea is based on the assumption that the longer people live the 
larger are the numbers of older individuals. The effect of declines in 
mortality are however not straight-forward. For example, decreasing 
infant mortality makes the group with age 0 to grow faster and thus has 
an effect of diminishing population aging. For the developed countries 
the decline in mortality rates during the postwar period are mostly 
explained by reduced infant mortality rates (UN 1956; Atoh 2001, 2008). 
Thus, in this case, decreasing mortality actually helped to alleviate 
population aging.  
 
On the other hand, decreasing birth rates always have the effect of 
increasing population aging and the mean age. During the post-war 
period, demographers showed that it is actually falling birth rates that are 
entirely responsible for increasing ratios of population over 65 (Bourgeois-
Pichat 1951, Coale 1956, Weil 1997, Horlacher 2002). Their arguments and 
evidence were so persuasive that many subsequent researchers focused 
on population aging tended to disregard changes in mortality patterns. 
Indeed, in Japan the decline of the TFR from almost 4 in 1950 to near 2 in 
1960 was the major factor responsible for population aging. Decline in 
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mortality during this period was mostly explained by declines in infant 
mortality and had negative effect on aging. 
 
However, very soon infant mortality reached very low levels and life 
expectancy in Japan still continued to increase this time due to better 
survival rates among older cohorts.  
 
 
 
  
Continuously increasing life expectancy forced experts to reconsider 
the roles of mortality and birth rates. Actually, due to the fact that Japan 
became so famous for its longevity, low birth-rates were overlooked 
(Kyougoku and Takahashi 2008, Ishii 2008, Véron 2008), especially by critics 
of family and child-friendly policies (Wada 2007). Nowadays, the general 
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consensus among researchers is that increasing longevity is the major 
contributing factor to aging of the population. But is it really so?  
 
In terms of human longevity, there are strong arguments to believe 
that there is a limit to the increase in human life time. Demographers 
Carnes and Olshansky (Olshansky et al 2001; Carnes 2003) argue we have 
almost reached the limit, thus further increases will be difficult. Thus, from 
now on the birth rates will be the determining factor of population 
structure. 
 
3.3 Estimation Method of Demographic Factors’ Importance 
For the purpose of the present research I have used component 
cohort approach, modified for one-year projections – a population 
projection method used widely for population projections. By using data 
from National Censuses from 1970~2010 (MIAC 1970~2010) and 
population projections for Japan (NIPSSR 2006a) I attempt to estimate 
what would Japan‟s population pyramid would look like if TFR remained 
stable at 1970 year level and what would it look like if life expectancy 
would be stable at the level of 1970. Then, by comparing the two 
pyramids it is possible to see whether growing life-expectancy or lower 
birth rates are responsible for population aging.  
 
Component cohort method is used by UN, Japan and many other 
countries and institutions to produce accurate population projections. As 
it takes into account survival rates of every-year cohort, birth rates, age at 
birth and base population – it is very accurate as long as the assumptions 
on future survival-rates and birth-rates are correct. That makes the method 
the perfect tool to answer questions like “What would the population be 
in year XXXX if TFR had been 2 during the period 1900-2000?”, because we 
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already know the real values of the variables that influence population 
structure and growth. This is the first time this method is applied to estimate 
figures in the past rather than population projections.  
 
The variables used in this simulation are as follows:  
 
- Life expectancy  
- deathsa,s,t-1,t = ( popa-1,s,t-1  /  2 ) • ( 1 - sr,a,s,t ) 
Death rate where deathsa,s,t-1,t  - is number of deaths during transition of 
the age group a-1, to age group a, during period t-1 
- popa,s,t   
population of age group a on the interval t    
- sra,s,t   
surviving rate or number of age group a-1 of sex s that passes to age-
group a on the interval t 
- popa,s,t = popa-1,s,t-1  - deathsa,s,t-1,t.  
For most age groups Population is calculated as the difference of population 
one year younger than the target age group in the preceeding year and 
deaths. 
- Last age group (in this case 80+) is calculated as 
popa,s,t = popa-1,s,t-1 - deathsa,s,t-1,t. 
- youngest age-group is calculated as the number of children born 
during the year and survived till the end of the year: 
pop0,s,t = birthss,t  - deaths0,s,t-1,t. 
- Number of births is calculated from total fertility rates, age at birth 
(age specific fertility rates) and female population: 
birthsa,t = TFRt • ASFRa,t • popa,female,t, 
where 
birthsa,t  - is number of births among women of the age group a 
TFRt - is the total fertility rate on t interval 
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ASFRa,t – is age specific fertility rate at age a  
- Sex at birth ratio is set to 106.  
 
International migration was excluded from this simulation to check 
the pure effects of low birth rates and life expectancy and also because 
immigration to Japan is so insignificant it has no substantial impact on 
aging. 
 
3.4 Population Pyramids 1970~2050 
Below are presented the actual population pyramids, population 
pyramids that show the actual population structure (column 1) compared 
to what would the population structure would look like if TFR had not 
changed since 1970 (column 3), and population pyramids that represent 
population structure in the case if life expectancy had not improved since 
1970 (column 2). 
 
As can be seen from the pyramids, no matter what age groups are 
considered to be old, increase in proportion of older population is obvious 
among all patterns. The difference is in the absolute numbers and the 
sources of increase in older cohorts.  
 
In the simulation, where life expectancy is kept stable at the level of 
1970, the increase in ratio of population over 65 is not as pronounced as it 
actually is due to higher mortality among older groups. However, the 
lower part of the stable life expectancy pyramids has exactly the same 
shape as the actual ones with every younger age group smaller than the 
preceding one.  
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Importantly, the biggest difference between stable life expectancy 
and actual pyramids is that between the oldest age groups. While the 
difference between the 60~64 and 65~69 age groups is not as 
pronounced. Thus the difference in aging among the oldest cohorts is 
more significant.  
 
Stable TFR pyramids resemble the population pyramids of the United 
States and tend to form a stable stationary population with all age groups 
almost equal in numbers.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Population Pyramids (actual and simulation results) 
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Source: Author’s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 
National Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for Population and Social Security 
Research, Population Projection (2005~2050) (NIPSSR 2006a)    
 
 
 
3.5 Simulation Results: What is More Important - Falling Birth-rates or 
Increasing Life-Expectancy? 
In order to see the difference between the effects of better longevity 
and lower TFR on population aging, it is useful to calculate the 
percentage of population over 65 for selected years. Below are the 
estimates of aging ratios according to the simulations: 
Table 3.1: Simulation Results 
Simulation Actual* Stable Life Expectancy 
since 1970 
Stable TFR since 1970 
Year 1970 
Total 
population 
104,448,200,000 104,448,200,000 104,448,200,000 
Population over 
65 
7,327,100,000 7,327,100,000 7,327,100,000 
Aging ratio 7.02% 7.02% 7.02% 
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Year 1994  
Total 
population 
124,051,623,094 119,277,193,109 131,729,010,594 
Population over 
65 
16,193,382,406 13,761,098,297 16,090,118,406 
Aging ratio 13.05% 11.54% 12.21% 
Year 2010  
Total 
population 
126,123,054,344 114,318,685,781 147,127,336,719 
Population over 
65 
26,603,355,438 19,364,632,906 26,308,738,844 
Aging ratio 21.09% 16.94% 17.88% 
Year 2020 
Total 
population 
122,722,845,813 106,079,281,844 153,497,624,219 
Population over 
65 
33,122,537,125 21,851,290,469 32,560,450,656 
Aging ratio 26.99% 20.60% 21.21% 
Year 2050  
Total 
population 
99,636,941,281 74,441,566,125 169,941,329,750 
Population over 
65 
37,812,590,563 19,257,050,844 39,733,799,875 
Aging ratio 37.95% 25.87% 23.38% 
Source: Author’s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, National 
Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for Population and Social Security Research, 
Population Projection (2005~2050) (NIPSSR 2006a) * Note: international migration excluded 
 
During the postwar period until 1960, decline in birth rates was the 
main reason of aging population. However, since 1960 longevity was 
improving, especially after 1970. It is fair to say, that aging population is a 
great victory of humanity that made it possible to increase the average 
life-span.  
 
Table 3.1 above shows that aging ratio would be less than 1% higher 
in 1994 in the case where TFR is stable since 1970. Thus the role of life 
expectancy during the time frame 1970-1994 is slightly higher that the role 
of birth rates. In 2010 this difference is still less than 1%.  
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Figure 3.2 below illustrates the speed of aging expressed by the 
percentage of increase in population over 65 under different scenarios. 
We can see that the effect of life-expectancy on population aging 
(green dotted line) is slightly more significant than the effect of the birth-
rates (red line) up until 2010. After 2025 the effect of the birth-rates 
increases drastically. But, it is very important to remember that the effect 
of the birth rates we see in 2025 is a result of fertility patterns during years 
1975-2000, because it takes time for the birth rate effect to show up in the 
statistics.  
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Figure 3.2: Aging Rate as Percantage of Increase in Population 
over 65 (%)
(%)
Source: Author’s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 
National Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for Population and Social 
Security Research, Population Projection (2005~2050) (NIPSSR, 2005)
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As we can see from Figures 3.2 and 3.3, both factors influence aging 
ratio almost in the same amount until 2010. After 2025 the influence of low 
birth rates becomes higher. Why is that?  In the stable longevity pyramids 
the bulge of second baby-boom (cohorts born between 1970 and 1980) 
moves up the ladder until it merges into the oldest group around 2025-
2050. That is actually when the effects of low birth rates will become most 
significant. It is important to note here that effects of low-birth rates on 
population aging are not immediate. Of course, there is an immediate 
effect of adding to the population aged 0. However, much more 
important influence is changes to population structure. It takes up 80-90 
years with birth rates of same level for the structure change to be 
complete. Thus, the rise in influence of low birth-rates can be explained by 
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Figure 3.3: Aging Ratio (population over 65 (%))(%)
Source: Author‟s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare, National Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for 
Population and Social Security Research, Population Projection 
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a long period of low birth rates that caused change in population 
structure. 
 
As mentioned earlier, dividing the population into 3 large groups 
gives a general picture of population structure trend, but it fails to illustrate 
detailed changes in population structure. Let‟s see what the speed of 
aging looks like for different age groups (Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6).  
 
 
 
As shown on Figure 3.4, the actual situation is that the oldest group 
(80+) is the one that is growing faster than any other.  Next to it is the 
second oldest group (75~79) and so on. The growth in the oldest (80+) 
age group is especially pronounced after 2010 and peaks at more than 
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14% of total population in 2050 putting nearly half of older population into 
the oldest group. What does this data tell us? 
 
For one, that upside-down population pyramid structure, caused by 
low birth rates combined with high longevity increases absolute and 
relative numbers of people who are more likely to be dependent, require 
more medical attention than other age-groups and are at higher risk of 
falling under the poverty line. 
 
What is interesting to note, is that even in the simulation were life 
expectancy is kept stable since 1970 (Figure 3.5), the oldest group grows 
at least as fast as other age groups and even faster during certain periods 
of time. This supports the argument that even though it is important how 
long people live, aging ratio is seriously influenced by the population 
structure caused by low birth rates.  
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In the stable TFR simulation, the oldest group (80+) is also growing 
faster than any other. This is explained by high longevity that is not to be 
underestimated. However, as opposed to upward trend of actual 
projection, the ratio of people 80 and over in this simulation seems to 
stabilize after 2030. This is a result of stabilization of the population pyramid 
(see population pyramid 2030~2050 column 3) due to TFR kept at 
replacement level during 80 years. This means that increase in life 
expectancy causes increase in ratio of corresponding age-group, but the 
population structure remains stable. 
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Figure 3.5: Percantage of Population Aged over 65 by Age Groups 
(Stable Life Expectancy since 1970)
Source: Author’s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 
National Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for Population and Social Security 
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3.6 Feminization of Aging  
So far it is clear that aging is caused by both low birth rates and 
increasing life-expectancy, and that aging occurs faster among older 
groups. However, there are still a few remarks that should be made about 
the nature of the aging process. First, as it can be easily noticed from 
population pyramids the number of older women is much higher than the 
numbers of older men. Second, which is not obvious, is the rise in one-
person and couple-only households.  
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Figure 3.6: Percantage of Population Aged over 65 by Age Groups 
(Stable TFR since 1970)
Source: Author’s simulation based on data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 
National Censuses (1970~2005) and National Institute for Population and Social Security 
Research, Population Projection (2005~2050) (NIPSSR, 2005)
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From the 1960s to the early 1980s the changes in Japanese family 
structure were characterized by nuclearization, that is to say switch from 
3-generation family to 2-generation family. However, since mid-1980s the 
most important change was an increase in couple-only and one-person 
households.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 shows a dramatic increase in one-person household 
relative numbers from 20% in 1980 to 31% in 2010 which is projected to 
become 37% in 2030. What about the elderly households?  
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Source: NIPRSS (2008b), Projections of Changes in Japan's household types
http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-ajsetai/j/HPRJ2008/t-page.asp
Figure 3.7: Household Types in Japan (1980-2030)%
67 
 
 
 
It is obvious that as population ages, the number of households with 
elderly grows as well. What is important is the increase in one-person 
elderly households. Their numbers increased 7 times between 1975 and 
2010. Currently 3 out of 4 one-person elderly households are female. 
Although, urbanization played a vital role in changing household structure, 
as children moved from urban to rural areas, the demographic factors 
behind changes in household patterns are very significant. Having fewer 
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Figure 3.8: Propotion of Elderly Households
%
Source: 
1975-2005: MHLW, National Census
after 2005: NIPRSS 2008, Projections of changes in Japan's household types
http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-ajsetai/j/HPRJ2008/t-page.asp
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or no children increases an individual‟s chances of living in a one-person 
household, especially when reaching old-age. 
 
So what kind of livelihood do those elderly households have? The 
image that is still stuck into minds of both Japanese people and foreigners, 
is that old people in Japan are carefree affluent couples, who spend most 
of their time playing golf, travelling around the world on a boat trip and 
wondering around photographing everything in large groups. Many 
journalists and enterprises see aging society as an opportunity for 
expanding business in an emerging “Silver market” (Tanikawa 1999, 
Aritake 2005). Average savings rate for all households in Japan is 
17,190,000 JPY, while for the households whose head of the household is 
over 65 this rate raises to 24,810,000 JPY (Horioka 2010, Bank of Japan 
2008). 
 
 What remains less acknowledged is the growing poverty rate among 
the elderly, especially among women (Nishioka et al 2010a). The 
distribution of the above savings rate is quite unequal: more than 35% of 
elderly households have less than 10,000,000JPY in savings. But the 
average figures are often misleading. 20% of elderly households have no 
savings at all (Horioka 2006, Bank of Japan 2008). According to National 
Livelihood Survey (MHLW 2009a) the relative poverty rate among women 
aged 65~69 is 19% as opposed to 15.5% for men. The poverty rate among 
women aged 70~74 is 26.6% as opposed to 17.3% for men. We can see 
how dramatically the difference in poverty rates increases among sexes 
with age. But even more striking result of the survey is the level of poverty 
among 1-person households. Relative poverty among men over 65 living 
alone is 38.3% and among women living alone 52.3%.   
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When compared to other age groups, income inequality is higher 
among households with a person(s) over 65 years old (Seike and Yamada 
2003, Ohtake and Saito 1998, Ohtake 2005a, Shirahase 2006). Also, 
economic inequality is higher within a generation than between a 
generation for cohorts older than 65 (Iwamoto 2000, Ohtake 2005b). The 
ratio of population with higher inequality levels increases, and so the 
overall inequality level is growing as well. However, it is also very important 
to acknowledge problems of the youth and growing inequality among 
young cohorts. It has been shown that expected lifetime aggregate 
income of today‟s young cohorts is significantly lower than the lifetime 
income of the retired cohorts (Ishikawa 1991, 1994; Genda 2002). The 
difference in incomes among the young is explained by growing 
practices of irregular employment (Higuchi 2004, Ohta 2005). But there are 
reasons to believe that it is actually changing age structure that 
diminishes employment and reduces the chances of the young 
population. This influence of aging on employment environment will be 
discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
The most important findings of the simulations presented are: 
1. The most important finding is that the influence of longevity and 
low birth rates on aging ratio is equally important and the 
influence of birth rates is growing rapidly. Furthermore, if the birth 
rates continue to be low for a long period of time (80-90 years), 
the structure of the population changes completely and 
population starts to shrink exponentially causing an old-age 
demographic trap. Japan as a society is getting older not 
because people live longer, but because people have fewer 
children. 
70 
 
 
2. Population aging occurs faster in the oldest age groups. Thus, the 
hope that aging problem can be alleviated significantly by the 
fact that older people are becoming healthier may not be true, 
because the number of the oldest people is growing fastest. 
 
3. It is birth rates and not longevity that are responsible for changes 
in age structure. Increased longevity only makes the pyramid look 
higher and only changes the structure at the top.  Low birth rates 
are much more important factor because they cause aging 
without a corresponding increase in healthy life expectancy and 
because of their long term consequences for population structure.  
 
4. It does not really matter what age is considered to be old-age. 
The upside-down triangular shape of the population pyramid is 
self-explanatory: the share of dependent people increases, while 
the number of contributors to pension and health care systems 
shrinks.  
 
5. As a secondary observation of the analysis in this chapter, it 
should be noted that population aging is particularly rapid among 
women. In Japan this is especially important because women are 
often less protected and are often house-wives or part-time 
workers. When retired and without husband‟s support, the risk of 
falling under poverty line is very high (Shirahase 2006, Atoh 2008).   
 
6. Finally, both increased longevity and low birth rates are important 
when evaluating population aging. Focusing on only one factor 
might give a distorted picture and lead to erroneous conclusions. 
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However, it is important to acknowledge the role of low birth rates 
in changing the structure of population pyramid with the ratio of 
oldest group growing faster than others.  
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Chapter 4 
Population Structure and Economy: How Is the Labor Market 
Affected? 
In this chapter I will analyze how the aging of population and 
changing population structure affect the labor market in Japan. It was 
predicted that aging population will cause labor shortages, but that did 
not happen in Japan and there must be an explanation for that. In 
addition I speculate about the influence of the labor market on 
population structure, in particular the influence of employment inequality 
(labor market dualism) on young people. The problems of unemployment 
or labor market dualism are often discussed in terms of “overprotection” 
of the oldest cohorts. The economists who study the labor market tend to 
tie the problems of employment to economic downturns and political 
decisions, such as deregulation. I strongly believe we should reconsider 
the role of the demographic factor as a catalyst of economic downturns 
and labor law deregulation. The contribution of this section is that it links 
the decreasing birth-rates as a determining factor of changes in 
population structure to the contemporary problems of Japan‟s labor 
market. The question this chapter is answering is: how is the labor market 
affected by population aging caused by falling birth-rates? 
 
Reflecting on the demographics of the period of high economic 
growth, the Japanese adult population (over 15) increased by 21% 
between 1960 and 1970.  During the 80s and 90s, the adult population 
grew by 13%. Total population increased from 65 million in 1960 to 101 
million in 1990, but after that population growth became significantly 
slower. The adult population increased only by 7.3% between 1990 and 
2000 (Table 4.1).   
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Table 4.1: Population and Labor Force 
Year 
Adult population 
(15 an over, millions) 
Labor force 
(millions) 
Labor Participation 
Rates (%) 
1960 65.2 45.1 69.2 
1970 78.9 51.5 65.3 
1980 89.3 56.5 63.3 
1990 100.9 63.8 63.2 
2000 108.4 67.7 62.5 
2005 111.0 66.5 60.4 
2009 110.5 66.2 59.9 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Annual Report on the Labor Force Survey, 2009 
 
The fact that age specific labor force participation rates decreased 
and demographic changes towards an older society meant that the 
labor force increased more slowly than the total population (Sakai and 
Asaoka, 2007). As a result, the labor force started declining 7 years earlier 
than total population. It reached its peak at 67.9 million in 1998 and fell 
every year after with a small break between 2004 and 2006. 
 
The beginning of the 1990s is often regarded as a borderline when 
Japan‟s economic environment and labor policies started to change 
(Wood 1992, 1994; Rebick 2005). Collapse of the bubble economy and 
plummeting asset prices were obvious, so it is intuitive to draw a line at 
that pont. The end of the bubble economy is also strongly associated with 
rising unemployment and subsequent economic stagnation (Clark et al 
2009).  Changes in labor market environment are often described in terms 
of differentiation of employment patterns (regular vs irregular). However, 
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the traditional life-time employment system has changed substantially in 
itself: 
 
1. Age of mandatory retirement was pushed from 55 to 60 or more 
years old 
2. Age-seniority principle weakened. In other words, the salary now 
depends less on age than it used to. 
3. Education matters more these days and cases when high-school 
graduates could make it to managerial positions have now faded 
away.  
 
Common wisdom suggests that aging of the population eventually 
will cause the share of working population to shrink, causing more 
demand for labor and thus reducing unemployment. Many scholars 
predicted social crisis induced by huge labor shortages in the countries 
where aging pace is most rapid (Richman 1990, Hewitt 2002). The question 
is – where is the labor shortage? Why did these predictions not come true 
in Japan? 
 
4.1 Why is Demand for Irregular Employment Increasing? 
Despite the fact that the population started declining in 2005, and 
the working population started declining even earlier, labor shortages 
predicted by some scholars are nowhere to be seen. Why are 
unemployment and demand for irregular workers increasing? In order to 
answer that question, I consider the interaction between the 
demographic factors (birth-rates), socio-economic factors (age seniority 
system) and political factors (deregulation of the labor market). Under the 
age-seniority system supported by most Japanese enterprises, salaries rise 
with worker‟s age. Younger workers are paid less, and so they are more 
75 
 
attractive to employers.  If unemployed, the difficulty to find employment 
increases with age. However, official statistics still show that 
unemployment rates are higher among the young.  
 
  
My interpretation of this data is the following: firstly, even though the 
number of people without jobs among the old increase, they are often 
left without any hope of finding a job and so have stopped looking for 
work. So they are not included in the statistics. Secondly, economic 
downturn and increased concerns about profitability have forced 
enterprises to limit hiring young workers. 
  
The government is caught in a dilemma: on the one hand, increasing 
pensionable age seems logical as life-expectancy increases and people 
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are supposed to be able to work longer (Akagawa 2004; Healy 1998, 
2004). On the other hand, even under current legislation many enterprises 
refrain from hiring new workers unless they can dismiss older workers. In 
other words, older workers are overprotected and therefore diminish 
employment opportunities for the young (Genda 2003).   
 
Genda et al (2007, 2008) found the effects of aging on 
unemployment to be minimal. Their analysis focused on how the change 
in age composition of labor supply affected overall unemployment rates. 
However, as the authors point out themselves, aging may be related to 
labor demand as well as labor supply.  
 
In this section I investigate how changing population structure 
influenced the labor environment. Even though the 1990s are regarded as 
a line between prosperous Japan and post-bubble Japan with its growing 
unemployment and stagnating economy, it is useful to recall some 
processes that started in 1970s that helped bubble creation in the first 
place.   
 
Japan faced a severe economic challenge in the mid-1970s. In 1973, 
the October War broke between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. The 
war had a lot many consequences for international community. In 
particular, the Arab members of OPEC announced that they would no 
longer ship oil to any country that supported Israel, including Japan. As a 
result, Japan‟s Consumer price index (CPI) and inflation rose. Japan 
experienced its first postwar decline in industrial production. A recovery 
followed, however ensuring economic growth became impossible without 
some serious changes in the way enterprises were run.  
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Many businesses started to hire low-wage part-timers to cut costs.  
And, interestingly, these low-paid, part time jobs were often taken by 
women. Caring for children – was and still is women‟s responsibility in 
Japanese society. Lack of child-care support from government combined 
with growing numbers of women employed led to further decrease in the 
birth rates.  TFR fell to 1.91 in 1975, 1.76 in 1985, 1.42 in 1995, and 1.26 in 
2005. Women, now more and more often with higher education, supplied 
labor to enterprises at a low cost and often without any prospect of 
making a career. In the 1990s, following the bubble collapse, the trend 
persisted. Companies began to hire more contractual workers, most of 
them women. Most of the newly hired expected that their unsecured 
position would evolve over time into a full-time job, but that just did not 
happen.  
 
It is often argued that during the 1990s the  employment environment 
in Japan underwent very significant changes. I think that unstable 
employment is nothing new in Japan. This country is a very good example 
of dual labor market. The division between different types of employment 
is clear cut. By saying this I mean the difference between regular and 
non-regular employment. On the other hand the difference between 
multiplying types of irregular jobs is very confusing and makes it very 
difficult for legislation to create universal and fair rules.  Formally, no 
fundamental changes occurred to the main characteristics of the labor 
market.  The main shift that is obvious – is that irregular working 
arrangements are becoming more common and more important. 
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Let‟s have a look at the actual population pyramid of 1970 (Figure 
4.2). The 1970s are the period when the baby boomer generation entered 
the labor force. With every decade, this generation goes up one step in 
the pyramid and every subsequent generation is smaller in size. It is 
important to take into account the life-course pattern of a Japanese 
salary-man. Japan‟s age seniority system works on the assumption that 
young people do not really need that much money and have to show full 
devotion to the enterprise. This is compensated in future with promotions, 
gradually rising wages, bonuses, lump-sum retirement payments and 
finally pensions. Even now it is very uncommon for young individuals to be 
in top management or to be a president of a company. Even more 
uncommon is a situation where young individuals are in position higher 
than older employees. In practice this means that an individual‟s highest 
earnings are reached at about age of 55~60. The devotion of a young 
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worker to his employer is an obligatory investment in the future – a person 
agrees to work for less, so that he can get more afterwards.  
 
4.2 Is Age Seniority Principle a Pyramid Scheme? 
The 1970 population pyramid shows us that a significant number of 
people entered into the labor force group. High levels of wages and other 
benefits for the much smaller population aged 55~60 were secured at the 
expense of newcomers who work for lower wages.   
 
The age seniority system is based on the principle of paying relatively 
low wages to newcomers. In exchange, workers were guaranteed 
promotion and salary increases with time. If a worker changed jobs, he 
had to restart at a low level. Thus loyal workers, who dedicated their lives 
to the company, were most rewarded, often ending up in management 
or top-management positions after 20-40 years of service. In postwar 
Japan the system allowed enterprises to grow fast by hiring young workers 
in masses (Ogoshi 2006). During the rapid economic growth period, more 
and more young cheap workers were hired every year. This allowed 
paying higher salaries to older workers, who supervised the new-comers. 
Japan‟s population pyramid in 1950-1960 almost perfectly fit the hierarchy 
pyramid of enterprises, which provided life-time employment (Figure 4.3). 
With certain reservations, it can be argued that the age-seniority system is 
a pyramid scheme highly dependent on cheap new labor. Falling birth-
rates have made this system unsustainable not only by failing to provide 
cheap new labor, but also by increasing the ratio of those who are 
supposed to be at the top of the pyramid.  
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Figure 4.3: Population Pyramid vs Enterprise Structure 
 
 
4.3 Changing Age Structure of the Labor-Force 
What is happening to this age-seniority pyramid, as the demographic 
structure of the population changes? The major concern with aging is the 
retirement of baby-boomers, - people born right after the war, in years 
1946-1947. Problems caused by aging are often described in terms of 
growing burdens on pension and health insurance systems. But it will not 
be until the year 2011~2012 that baby-boomers will reach age of 65 and 
retire en masse creating additional burden on pension and insurance 
systems. Meanwhile, it is interesting to look at workplaces. As mentioned 
above, the 1950~1960 population pyramid fitted almost exactly the 
hierarchy pyramid of most public and private enterprises. Under the age 
seniority principle, newcomers could expect to be promoted almost 
automatically as they reached appropriate age (Ogoshi 2006; Rebick 
2005). 
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The 2007 population pyramid no longer corresponds to the 
hierarchical structure of enterprises. The middle layers of the triangle are 
no longer able to accommodate all the workers who reach “appropriate” 
age for promotion. What happens to those outside the red full-time 
employment triangle? All the workers who cannot be supported in a 
traditional full-time employment age-seniority system are hired or re-hired 
on contractual basis or are let go. Many workers are sent out to 
subsidiaries. Older workers, who are rehired on contracts when they reach 
age of 50-55, make up for lower numbers of new recruits and provide 
cheap and experienced labor. In factories where emphasis is put on 
physical endurance, the preference is given to young. In the very end 
there are employees who are able to maintain their positions, employees 
who are hired on contracts and those who are let go (Lonien 2003).  
 
Thus the rise in inequality after the 1990s is largely inequality between 
those who fit into the corporate hierarchy pyramid and those who do not. 
The above pyramids are not an exact representation of absolute figures in 
full time and part-time employment, but are rather an illustration of trends 
in Japan‟s labor market.   
 
Note also that the enterprise hierarchy pyramid has changed in its 
shape as well. The enterprises have stopped promoting everyone 
according to age and significantly reduced the number of managerial 
positions (Sako and Sato 1997; Hassard and Morris 2008; Iida and Morris 
2008). The enterprise hierarchy pyramid has become narrower, especially 
at the top. On a side note, this hierarchy-pyramid theory can also be 
applied to the public sector. In governmental institutions such as 
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universities and organizations financed from budget, the age-seniority 
principle tends to be more important (Jyo 2006).  
 
4.4 How Do the Enterprises React to Changing Age-Structure? 
Neither the aging of the Japanese work force nor the increasing 
longevity of workers has led corporations to adjust their thinking about 
how old is too old. In the seniority-based wage system, an aging 
workforce equates to a salary increase. Japanese enterprises are seeking 
to cut labor costs, and so reduce hiring of young people and take any 
opportunity to cut expensive older personnel. Companies tend to offer 
money as an incentive, often sweetening or accelerating benefits, to 
usher employees into retirement. But many people measure their self-
worth by where they work, so they have to be pushed out - unless they 
are too successful and powerful to oust. What caused enterprises to be so 
preoccupied by labor costs? While collapse of the bubble economy as 
well as recent economic recessions and low consumption played vital 
roles, demographic factors are also worth attention.  Age-seniority life-
time employment system with high salaries for older workers increases 
labor costs dramatically as the proportion of older workers increases. In 
spite of attempts to introduce performance-based promotion systems, 
age-seniority remains largely intact in many enterprises. Under that system, 
a person is rewarded based on age and years of employment. The 
problem is that as the number of older workers within companies 
continued to grow, this age-seniority system became more and more 
difficult to maintain (Boscaro, Gatti, Raveri 1991; Conrad 2009). 
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The figure 4.4 shows how fast the number of older workers within 
companies is growing. In 1998,1999 and 2002 there is a step decrease in 
the ratio of older workers. In my view, there is no other plausible 
explanation for this decrease, but an attmept by the enterprises to get rid 
of the older workers. 
  
In response to labor force aging acommpained by swelling labor 
costs, enterprises took steps to reduce expenses. In particular many had 
their personnel expenses fixed.  To stay within the fixed amount of 
personnel expenses the companies 1) cease hiring or hire fewer young 
25%
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35%
40%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Small or medium enterprises (10 to 1000 workers)
Large enterprises (more than 1000 workers)
Figure 4.4: Regular Workers over 45 Years Old
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Basic statistic survey on wages. (2008)
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workers, 2) switch (partly) from age-seniority to performance based 
principle 3) hire easily dismissed non-regular workers (hiseiki) who are not 
subject to the age-seniority principle 4) try to dismiss as many older 
workers as possible and possibly rehire them as contractual or part-time 
workers. All four statements are cited among the top reasons for 
increased inequality.  
 
Figure 4.4 above shows that the intensity in older workers increase 
continued until 1997 but fell thereafter. This trend cannot be explained by 
an increased proportion of young workers because of aging and 
decreasing labor demand. The only explanation is that older workers were 
removed from their jobs.  Policies undertaken by enterprises, such as fixed 
labor budgets and removing older employees, increased unemployment 
and labor-market-dualism, a situation when full-time and contractual 
workers receive significantly different treatment and salaries while often 
doing basically the same job. Two studies (Genda and Kondo 2003; 
Genda 2005) show that enterprises with more middle-aged and older 
workers tend to limit labor demand for youth. Consequently, aging within 
such enterprises progresses further. In this sense, aging in Japan‟s specific 
environment has a negative influence on labor demand, expecially for 
young workers.  
 
According to a Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare survey on part-
time workers (MHLW 2006a), reducing labor costs is the most important 
reason why enterprises hire non-regular workers (71% of respondents). This 
number was higher in 2006 than in a similar 2001 survey, suggesting that 
the corporations were even more committed to labor cost cutting in 2006 
than during the 2001 downturn (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Reasons Given by Enterprises for Hiring Irregular Workers (%) 
 Share of 
enterprises 
hiring 
non-
regulars 
To 
reduce 
costs 
To deal 
with 
temporary 
demand 
To deal 
with 
business 
fluctuations 
To deal 
with 
busy 
time-
frames 
To 
work 
on easy 
tasks 
Easy to 
hire 
To hire 
skilled 
workers 
 
To 
reemploy 
retired 
regulars 
Not able 
to find 
new 
graduates 
 
Other 
 
2001 Survey            
Part-time 56.6 65.3 27.3 16.4 39.2 31.4 17.8 12.2 12.4 5.8 6.5 
Irregular 15.3 57.9 17.3 19.6 11.0 15.7 8.1 19.8 16 6.4 13 
2006 Survey            
Part-time 61 71 23.8 21.9 39.5 36.3 29.5 18.8 15.5 12.9 7.9 
Irregular 17.3 58.4 18.8 19 9 18.6 15 31.9 29.3 16.1 17.1 
Note: Multiple answers were allowed; Irregular workers include contractual, dispatched 
and other workers whose working hours are as long as regular workers and thus 
they are not considered part-time. Part-timers are also included.   
Source: MHLW 2006a, General Research on Part-time Workers.  
 
Jones (2008) also shows that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the rise in part-time employment and wage growth by industry. 
Retail, restaurants and hotels, medical and nursing care and other 
services which are the four service industries with the largest increases in 
part-timers – also experienced the largest wage declines. 
 
There are several reasons why Japan‟s enterprises became more 
focused on profitability. Recessions made it more difficult to borrow 
money from banks, so many rely on stock selling for cash inflow, and so 
seek to cut labor cost to show higher profitability.  It is the rising cost of 
labor in Japan – a product of both decline in labor-force and changing 
population structure, combined with age seniority system – that pushes 
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enterprises to divide employees into regular and irregular. They tend to 
rely more and more on irregular employees as focus on profitability 
becomes more important.  
 
4.5 Enterprise Pensions  
As population ages and the number of retired people eligible for 
pension benefits grows relative to working population, it becomes more 
and more difficult for government to finance the pension funds. Currently, 
the government is considering financing national pension through taxes. 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), who initially strongly opposed 
increasing the consumption tax, is now planning to increase it from 5% to 
10%. The funds raised from increasing tax rates are supposed to be used 
for “welfare purposes”.  
 
However the government is not the only one who is struggling to 
balance income with expenditures. The pension system in Japan consists 
of basic pension (financed by National Pension fund) and Employees‟ 
Pensions Insurance for employees of private enterprises (financed by 
respective enterprises‟ pension funds) (Takayama 2004). As population 
ages, age structure shifts towards older age with the corporations as well. 
The problem here is that the baby-boomers and subsequent generations 
who were employed en masse during the 60s and 70s are heading for 
retirement, while the numbers of young working employees relatively 
decreases. How are the enterprise pension funds dealing with this 
problem?  
 
Naturally, the enterprises do not have the option to finance their 
pension schemes trough taxes. There are only two ways to maintain the 
level of benefits for the enterprise. One is to increase profitability and to 
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use a share of the profit to finance the pensions of retired generation. 
However increasing profitability under conditions of slow economic 
growth or economic downturn is not an easy task. In addition, private 
companies are created with the purpose of generating profit, not 
financing pension in the first place. So in order to keep the existing levels 
of benefits, profitability should be reduced or some part of salary funds 
have to be transferred to the pension fund. The second way to maintain 
the pensions system is to reduce the level of the pension benefits. So far, 
this seems the way some enterprises tend to chose.  
 
A recent example is Japan Airlines (JAL). This company filed for 
bankruptcy in January 2010. At that point JAL had 2.3 trillion yen in debt, 
and so was unable to pay full amount of promised pensions. The 
government has bailed out the company 4 times during last 9 years. In 
March, 2009 the then president of JAL made a plea to the pension fund to 
reduce the pension benefit by 50%. This move triggered strong opposition 
from both current workers and pensioners. They felt the commitment that 
the company made to them was undermined. Finally, JAL announced 
that current workers agreed to have their future pension benefits cut by 
50%, and retirees by 30%. However, a website 
(http://jalnenkin.web.fc2.com/) set up by a former employee of JAL 
showed that 40% (well above 1/3 needed to stop the reform) of 9,000 who 
are receiving the benefits signed an online petition against the cuts.  
 
JAL‟s example is the first big issue, but such benefit cuts may spread 
all around Japan. Giant enterprises like Hitachi had the largest deficit in 
pension funding (687 billion yen) in 2009. The Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation (NTT) and Toshiba are also among the enterprises 
with huge pension fund deficits.  
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NTT group recently filed a lawsuit against the government 
demanding to change the verdict forbidding NTT to cut pension benefits 
to 140,000 of its retirees. The government denied the corporation the right 
to cut its pension expenditures based on the fact that NTT has actually 
made profit during the last fiscal year and so the financial condition of the 
enterprise cannot be described as poor.  
 
These stories about enterprises seeking to cut pensions benefits raises 
again the question whether the pension should be financed by private 
sector enterprise in the first place. Private enterprises in a capitalist world 
are built to make profit and the whole structure of the companies is not 
suitable for taking care of retirees and running pension funds. It is the 
government‟s task to tax profits and salaries, ensure minimal wages, and 
use these funds to support the welfare state. We may not rely on the 
“good will” of private enterprise to finance the welfare state because the 
“good will” may change dramatically from company to company and 
even within a company depending on who is in charge during that 
particular time frame. It is natural that the management of the company 
will seek to cut salaries and pensions to increase profit, as profit is the 
ultimate goal. To say more, a private company may go bankrupt in some 
20-30 years, and then the promised pensions cannot be paid at all.  
 
The government including the newly established DPJ cabinet was 
arguing for unification of the pension system for a long time now. However, 
unification of the pension system seems to be a very difficult issue. In fact, 
what the government says does not always comply with what the 
government does. And this is exactly what happened when the 
government supported the reduction of pension benefits by JAL.  
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As the debate about whether it is enterprise greed or inevitable 
economic conditions that push private companies to cut pensions 
continues, population aging progresses and the age-structure of the labor 
force changes toward a higher ratio of older individuals. The problem of 
enterprise pensions may trigger rising inequality among those who retired 
from well-off corporations and those who are beneficiaries of pension 
funds with huge deficits. It is quite possible that an enterprise will be out of 
business and not able to pay the pension benefit anymore. So it will be up 
to government to support its retirees. That said we may expect the 
situation to become even more serious. Even if birth-rates return to 
replacement level (which is not likely to happen) the labor force is 
destined to age at the present pace for another 20-30 years. 
  
4.6 What Constitutes Class in Modern Japan?  
When resources available for distribution are limited, there are two 
options: 1) decrease everyone‟s share, so that the amount distributed 
equals to the amount of resources available, or 2) differentiate levels of 
benefits. It seems that Japan is pursuing the second path. The companies 
keep a lot of employees on the life-time career track. Are there limits to 
cost cutting? Obviously there are. In order to maintain know-how, sustain 
the image of the enterprise and so on, companies must have permanent 
workers. The division of population into regular workers and irregulars is a 
contemporary variant of class division. The division is mostly forced and 
artificial, but to justify it LDP officials used the neoliberal “Get what you 
deserve” or “Everyone who makes effort is rewarded” ideological base. 
The reality, however, is that no matter how hard one works, a place in full-
time employment is no longer guaranteed, as there are simply not 
enough “chairs to sit on” (Genda 2006). The new government formed by 
the DPJ proposes a bill that will make dispatched workers illegal in 
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manufacturing. This seems to be a good place to start, but whether 
policies to reduce labor market dualism will be effective is still a question.  
 
I believe that the increase in labor market dualism in Japan can be 
explained by aging population within enterprises (demand side of the 
labor market). This employment inequality divides workers into groups, 
making it difficult for them to act uniformly to protect their interests. Non-
regular employees seldom have protection from labor unions, while full-
time workers are always told they should be happy with what they have. 
The difference between permanent and non-regular workers is one of the 
features that constitute classes in modern Japan.  
 
Essentially, the class is still defined by the relation of the individual to 
the means of production. The two big fractions are the owners of the 
means of productions and those who use the means of production to 
create commodities. However, in a process of evolution the owners of 
means of production became able to control the labor force (often by 
compromise) in order to avoid social conflicts. Splitting the other fraction 
into small groups is a strategy often employed by the class of owners. And 
the division of workers into regular and irregular groups is a successful 
example of such approach.  
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4.7 Will Inequality between Regular and Non-Regular Workers 
Increase? 
What is interesting to note is that between 1990 and 2008, the ratio of 
older workers in enterprises was highly correlated (r=0.8) with the increase 
in the share of irregular workers. It may be argued that other factors like 
economic crises and recession might have influenced labor market, but 
even when controlling for GDP and GDP growth, high correlation (r=0.8) is 
observed. This leads to the conclusion that labor market deregulation laws 
are an inevitable arrangement to allow business to shed the workforce 
that does not fit in the shrinking triangle of corporate hierarchy. Japanese 
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Figure 4.5: Share of Non-Regular Workers
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau, The Special Survey of the Labour 
Force Survey (February from 1985 to 2001), and Labour Force Survey (from 2002 to 2008)
Note : Non-regular employees include part-time workers, albeit’s temporary workers, dispatched workers, 
contract workers, entrusted workers and other non-regular workers. 
92 
 
enterprises, represented by Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) have 
put pressure on government to relax labor regulations and introduce 
flexible-employment. The “Tripartite Agreement on Employment issues” 
(Keidanren, 2002) emphasizes the necessity of cutting labor costs and 
pressuring labor to adopt “more diverse employment patterns”, “using 
private job placement agencies” (haken), “actively promoting trial 
employment and tailor-made vocational training”. This agreement 
eventually developed into further deregulation of labor laws in 2004. 
“New Directions for the Japanese-Style Employment System” (Keidanren 
2007:2) emphasizes the aging population problem and concludes that 
because of aging “people desire various types of employment and more 
flexible options”. The foreword of the document says: 
 
“To respond to this changing business environment, elements of the 
Japanese-style management and the employment system behind it that 
must be preserved should be retained, but at the same time there should 
be awareness that the necessary changes must be made.” 
 
Reading the document, one is fully convinced that “must be retained” 
practices include hard work and full devotion to the company, while 
“changes that must be made” include abolition of industry-based 
minimum-wage, introduction of flexible employment patterns, 
deregulation in dispatch labor related laws and abolition of the age-
seniority principle. Flexible working hours as well as work sharing are not 
considered at all.  
 
On another account, the ratio of older workers in big enterprises is 
negatively correlated with the job-offers-to-seekers ratio (r=-0,5). These 
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findings support the claim that companies with older workforce tend to 
limit hiring full-time employees.  
 
I think that if the situation remains as it is, the inequality between 
regular-employed workers, contractual workers, part-timers, and “freeters” 
at retirement age will increase. People who retire from regular 
employment usually enjoy:  1) really high salaries just before retirement, 2) 
high retirement bonuses 3) a high level of savings. Non-regular workers, on 
the other hand, are usually cut-off much earlier than retirement age, do 
not get bonuses and often have no savings, as they work for only 40% of 
regular workers‟ salary (MHLW 2008a). The practice of hiring part-time 
workers increased from the 1970s and the numbers of non-regular workers 
has grown since then (OECD 2008a). By the year 2020, when the first wave 
of workers employed on a non-regular basis will reach retirement age, 
inequality between the two groups will become even more apparent. The 
Liberal Democratic Party was criticized by the Democratic Party of Japan 
for promoting labor market dualism and inequality. But since DPJ took 
power, the situation has not yet shown any sign of improvement. How the 
new government will deal with rising inequality due to upside-down 
population pyramid still remains to be seen.  
 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this Chapter I discussed how the changing population structure of 
Japan‟s labor force challenges traditional employment norms. The first 
important finding from Japan‟s experience is that despite decrease in the 
labor force, labor shortages are very unlikely. This is due to falling demand 
within the country and outsourcing to other countries where the labor is 
cheaper. The second thing that other countries should learn from Japan‟s 
experience is that under conditions of growing labor costs, the private 
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sector is going to put pressure on the government to promote 
deregulation reforms to reduce expenses. If done unwisely, such 
deregulations will lead to increased inequality, falling demand and further 
decline in population due to low marriage and birth-rates, creating a 
vicious circle. I believe that the burden of socio-economic problems 
caused by population decline should be equally distributed among all 
players on the field, then it will be easier to deal with and will not produce 
further complications. 
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Chapter 5  
Growing Old Alone: What does Skewed Population Structure Mean for 
Families? 
Japan is a country with growing numbers of elderly people and, as 
discussed throughout this paper, aging society poses a number of 
problems that need to be solved, such as the material well-being of the 
elderly, including pension systems or medical care in old-age. These 
challenges that Japanese society is facing seem even more serious if we 
consider the fact that more and more elderly people are living alone, 
often without any support from their families. Is aging society problematic 
only because the number of the elderly is growing? Are there other issues 
related to changes in population structure and changing household 
patterns? This chapter illustrates the changes in social arrangements 
caused by continuously low birth rates.  It argues that the nature of these 
changes is best understood through the lens of changing population 
structure. 
Japan has been traditionally a country where the social security 
system heavily relies on family support (Ochiai 2005, Traphagan 2003, 
Shirahase 2006, Long 2008). This chapter analyzes how aging population 
affects the way of living, in particular household patterns.  
 
5.1 Changing Household Patterns (explained by changing population 
pyramid) 
As discussed earlier, the two major demographic contributors to 
population aging are increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth 
rates.  Figure below shows the aging index calculated as the percentage 
of population aged 0-14 to population over 65 years old.  
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It can be seen that there is a step increase in the speed of aging since 
1990. This is when low birth-rates start to play a more important role than 
longevity. A very rapid transformation of population structure brought a 
significant imbalance between preceding and succeeding generations.  
Changes in household patterns are often regarded as a result of 
cultural or historical changes or adaptation of a society to new 
circumstances (Ochiai 1997, 2005, Osawa 2002, Nishioka et al 2010b). 
However demographic factors influencing household composition are 
often ignored, because they are to some extent caused by the same 
cultural or social changes.  
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Figure 5.1: Ratio of Population Aged 0-14 to Population 
Aged over 65
Source: NIPSSR (2010), Latest Demographic Statistics 2010 
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Population aging is not simply an increase in absolute numbers of 
people over 65. Population aging is first of all an increase in the ratio of 
older people and is accompanied by changes in household structure. The 
fewer children people have – the smaller and older is the household they 
live in. The household type is one of the most important factors in social 
stratification studies (Goldthorpe 1980, Osawa 2002, Shirahase 2006). The 
usage of the household concept became problematic as female labor 
participation rates went up and household lost a lot of its uniformity. For 
example, the husband may be employed in a white-collar job while his 
wife may be a blue-collar worker or vice-versa. In such a case it is difficult 
to judge what class the household belongs to. However, in Japan, the 
concept of the head of the household has always been and still is very 
important, and usually, the social position of the household is defined by 
the social position of the head of the household.  
Another problem with the household concept is that the household is 
seldom permanent. It is much more common for a person to change the 
household patterns during his or her life-course. For instance, one can be 
born in a three-generation household, then move to another city to study 
or to work and live in one-person household, then get married and have 
children – nuclear family household. This fact may represent a problem in 
some cases, but when analyzing changing household patterns in Japan, 
this fact only emphasizes the point.  In Japan‟s particular situation the 
relative number of the young (who would normally fit into one-person 
household) is falling, while the number of one-person households is on the 
rise and the total number of households will soon go over 50 million for the 
first time in history. 
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The total number of households, type of households, and size of 
households have undergone very significant changes. If the trend seen 
from the data in National Censuses continues, one-person households will 
outnumber all other types of the households this year (2010). In half of all 
the households there are no children of any age living with their parents.  
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Japan‟s population has the highest life expectancy and it continues to 
rise along with the proportion of the life spent in a one-person household. 
Japanese live more of their lives alone.  A great concern is that the pace 
of increase of 1-person household is faster among the so called “old-old” 
(persons over 75 years old), who are under greater risk of becoming 
dependent on care. 
As I am arguing through the whole paper, like any changes, the 
changes in living arrangements are most likely to have biggest impact on 
those who are most vulnerable.   
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The projections shown on figure 5.3 and 5.4 also reflect the fact that 
the very oldest population ratio is growing faster than the moderately-old 
population ratio. That is to say aging is faster among older cohorts. 
What does this trend mean? Behind the figures of growing numbers of 
elderly and small households we can clearly see an image of a person lost 
in an urban space without family support. According to a recent 
government white paper on aging society (Cabinet Office 2010), the ratio 
of single males over 65 years old living alone as a percentage of older 
households is expected to increase from the current 11% to 17.8% by 2030. 
As for women, the ratio of older women living alone is projected to 
increase from the current 19% to around 21% by 2030. But given life-
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expectancy rates and household trends, there is high probability of 
underestimation.  
5.2 How Does Aging Affects Socializing Opportunities? 
The idea that the household type a person belongs to can influence 
his or her social ties and life prospects -is not a new one.  A number of 
studies have been made to assess the effect of new-born child on social 
networks and family support (Belesky and Rovine, 1984). It is commonly 
accepted that family relationships are modified as the family becomes a 
3-person micro society (Rossi 1968, Russel 1974).  
Hammer, Gutwirth and Phlips (1982) find that rearing children 
increases kin connections for both parents and that working mothers tend 
to interact more with their friends than coworkers. According to their study, 
working parents have a larger number of friends than do people without 
children. This is natural as people get to know other people as they take 
their children to nursery or school. It is also normal to rely on family help 
and support when a child is born.  The social ties of the family tend to 
expand or deepen as well, as the child grows up and builds his own 
network of friends. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to assess how the 
children influence social ties of a family during the life course, and no 
longitudal study has been done focusing on this. However, it is still 
important to note that simple support from children is a very important 
factor influencing well-being during old-age.  
I argue that the decline in birth rates is not only the main reason 
causing aging it is also a very important reason why a growing number of 
elderly people are living alone. Such social problems as falling birth-rates, 
aging, and solitary death (kodokushi) are all results of the same change in 
demographic behavior. People are just not getting married.  And in case 
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of Japan this also means they have no children, although problems of 
single mothers and single farthers are becoming a serious concern worth 
attention.  In order to understand fully how birth rate patterns change the 
society, it is necessary to consider how family ties and social networks are 
affected. The number of opportunities for socializing and creating social 
ties decreases together with the number of children born.  
 
5.2.1 Shrinking Family 
First of all, decreasing number of children means decreasing number 
of immediate kin, who play vital role in providing a safety net and support 
in the case it is needed. This is especially important in Japan, as, 
traditionally the family played and continues to play a very important role. 
In a traditional family, any burden (like financial problems or caring for sick 
members of the family) is shared (unequally or equally) between family 
members. A smaller household makes the burden bigger for every single 
member.  
It should be noted that there is a substantial difference between 
switching to smaller (1 or 2 generation) households due to rural-to-urban 
migration and switching to smaller households due to changes of customs 
or housing. In the first case the physical distance between the family 
members increases significantly, so the family relations are weakened by 
distance. In the second case, the family members may have different 
residences but still maintain deep relations with each other. In Japan the 
biggest reason why the average number of persons per household 
decreases is low birth-rate. More people chose not to get married. People 
live in smaller households because they do not have any children to live 
with, in the first place. The second big reason is migration. As will be 
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discussed in the next chapter, the regions that have higher birth rates 
“subsidize” the population growth of the metropolitan areas around Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya. The children who were born in rural areas of Japan 
move to big cities. This is the main reason why the population of the 3 big 
metropolitan areas is still growing, despite overall decreasing population.   
And, finally, changes in traditions and customs, account for the smallest 
part of changes in the household patterns.  
5.2.2 Shrinking Social Networks  
Secondly, people often make new acquaintances when meeting 
other parents, sending children to school, taking them to hospitals, sport  
clubs, camps etc. Therefore the decreasing number of children is one of 
the major factors for degrading social networks along with urbanization 
and migration (Nishioka et al. 2010a). 
Based on a study of social integration among 4 groups of elders in USA 
(1.Without children; 2.With one child; 3.Two or more children; 4.Children 
and grandchildren) Gironda, Lubben and Atchison (1999) argue that 
people without children are often members of unprivileged groups, live 
alone and have fewer social ties. They tend to have lower incomes and 
are more prone to sickness and health problems than those who have 
children and stay in close contact with them.  
Makino (2001, 2010) argues that the shrinking size of the family 
negatively affects children‟s ability to socialize with other people. This is 
explained by the fact that the children have less and less experience of 
living or communicating with individuals of different ages.  
Many family sociologists address the issue of voluntary childlessness 
and involuntary childlessness, and define involuntary childlessness as a 
physiological infertility. What about people who are forced into decision 
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not to have children due to economic reasons? Should we still count them 
as voluntarily childless?  
Unfortunately, the tendency is that social networks are absent in 
places where they are most needed. Similarly, the people who are most 
likely to require financial and emotional support from their children when 
they are old do not have children.  
According to the Population Survey Report compiled by Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, men with higher education and higher 
income are more likely to get married. In particular, men with permanent 
place of employment are twice as likely to get married as contractual or 
part-time workers. A survey conducted by Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare tracked records of 21-35 year old men and women between 
2002~2005. The table below shows the percentage of who got married 
during last 3 years according to their employment status: 
Table 5.1: Number of Persons Married During 2002-2005 
 Permanent job Irregular job Unemployed 
Men 15.3％ 6.3％ 4.4％ 
Women 14.9％ 16.8％ 15.6％ 
Source: MHLW 2009c, 21st century Full-age Survey 
 
According to another survey by the Independent administrative legal 
entity “Institute for Labor Policy”, 50% of men 25-29 years old, whose salary 
is over 5.000.000 yen per year are married, while only 15% of same age 
cohort as part-time or contractual workers are married.  It is evident that 
income/employment inequality among young influences significantly their 
chances to get married and have children.   
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The role of the family is even more important when considering the 
time average Japanese spend at work. With long hours of “zangyou” 
(overtime) and almost no vacation, people just have no time to make 
close friends. In such an environment, the difference between the 
relatively well-off educated people in regular employment and 
underprivileged individuals is deepened by the fact they do not get 
married and do not have children. Not only is their financial situation is 
worse, their social capital is also limited if compared to the members of 
big families. As the shift to smaller households continues, more and more 
people may end up in isolation, especially as they reach old age. It is 
therefore an important task for the government to ensure that people 
living in 1-person or couple-only households do not end under the poverty 
line. 
5.3 Wealthy or Poor? 
In this section I will discuss the economic situation of people who 
belong to the old age groups. In order to grasp the economic situation of 
people it is necessary to take their income, property and consumption 
into account. However, this data should be also seen through the lens of 
living arrangements. For example, the situation of two elderly persons who 
have the equal pension and equal property maybe different, because 
one lives with his son, who happens to be rich and takes the responsibility 
of covering financial costs of his father, while the other lives alone and has 
to make ends meet by himself.  
Until recently, the idea that the old in Japan are rich, healthy and 
satisfied with their lives was widely spread and commonly accepted. The 
image of a wealthy Japanese couple after their retirement travelling 
around the world with expensive cameras and spending a lot of money 
ware enforced by the statistics on saving rates. The statistic data on 
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savings rates was interpreted in a way that showed Japanese older 
generations as wealthy and big-savers (Horioka 2006, Horioka, Suzuki, 
Hatta 2007).  
As long as average figures are considered, the economic situation of 
old people in Japan has been improving significantly since 1945. This is 
mainly due to implementation of the public pension system. The public 
pension consists of basic benefits – a defined amount of money granted 
to anyone who paid the premiums for required period of time (25 years) 
and additional benefits corresponding to the period and amount of 
contributions. The second part is paid according to what sum and how 
long the person was paying the contributions, but the maximum period is 
defined as 40 years and the benefit do not grow from there on.  Currently, 
the number of people who contributed to the pension system for 40 (thus 
the older people with high pension benefits) years is growing significantly. 
What is interesting to note, is that even though average household 
income stagnated for a long time and started to decline in the 90s, the 
average income of elderly households continued to rise (MHLW, National 
Livelihood Survey, 1990-2005) 
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So, it looks like while average income of regular households stagnated 
and eventually went down, the income of elderly households was still 
growing until 1999 and even then, the decline is not as sharp. As long as 
we consider average, the situation of elderly households improved 
relatively. However, as the average was increasing, income and wealth 
gaps continued to grow. I argue that this data cannot be interpreted in a 
way that makes elderly livelihood improving.  
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Figure 5.5: Average Income of Regular Households
vs Average Income of Elderly Households
Source: MLHW, National Livelihood Survey, 1990-2005
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To see what stands behind the average numbers, I analyzed the data 
from the MHLW National Livelihood Survey (2000). In year 2000 the 
average income of elderly households was 3.289.000 yen, however the 
mode value lies between 1and 1.5 million yen. 
 
 
This data shows for one, that income for a very significant number of 
elderly households is around 1~1.5 million yen. This income level is the most 
common among elderly households. For two, it shows that majority of 
elderly households (62.1%) live on less than average income.  
The difference between average and mode values of regular 
households‟ income is not as pronounced. This is explained by the fact 
that the gap between the rich and the poor is larger among older 
households. Unfortunately, the data from MHLW National Livelihood 
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Survey is published selectively, and the data available for each year is not 
consistent, thus it is very difficult to trace the trends and compare the 
results for different years. However, the Gini coefficients suggest that 
inequality has expanded. 
Horioka (2006) showed that savings rates were at least not as big as 
many believed and argued that inequality between those with savings 
and those without is widening. Horioka, Suzuki, Hatta (2007) argue that the 
trends in households savings can be explained by demographical trends 
and that the pay-as-you-go pension systems, combined with rapid 
population aging, created great intergenerational inequalities.  
To put it into simple words – inequality in savings rates is also more 
obvious among the older cohorts, and the image of wealthy Japanese 
elderly is misleading.  
In order to illustrate the inequality in savings rates among age groups, I 
have compiled the data from the Cabinet Office, Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey, 2008 in Figure 5.7. The blue line indicates that saving 
rates grow with age, as people work and accumulate wealth. The savings 
rate tends to go down at age 65-70 when people retire and start to draw 
down savings to meet their needs.  
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This is a normal state of things and can be easily explained by human 
life course. What I see as an alarming problem here are the households 
without savings (yellow columns). Despite the fact that average savings 
rates grow with age the number of people who are able to accumulate 
wealth is limited. More than 20% of all households enter old age with no 
savings. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I believe this inequality 
exists because of labor market dualism, which in turn is caused by skewed 
population structure. 
The issue here is not inequality in itself, but rising poverty among the old. 
According to a recent OECD report, Japan is ranked 4th in terms of 
inequality, following USA, Mexico and Greece (OECD 2006b, 2008b). 
These are not simple figures – Japanese society is undergoing changes: 
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111 
 
people feel anxious about their future; many do not believe the pension 
system is sustainable and therefore the number of people not willing to 
pay the premiums is growing.  Finally the crime rates among the elderly 
are higher than ever before. 
5.4 Elderly Crime 
The problem of the elderly living alone and the problem of inequality 
show up in many surprising dimensions of social life. The number of old age 
law-offenders (excluding traffic related crimes) arrested tripled since 1999 
and reached 48,786 (MOJ, 2008). About 30% of those arrested during the 
period were repeat offenders.  
Crimes committed by the elderly are becoming a serious issue as they 
are, but the tendency of growing crime rates reflects the problems old 
people are facing in an aging society. The newspapers are full of 
headlines like “Elderly Steal to Make Ends Meet” or “Prison Is Better than 
Pension”.   
A White Paper by the Ministry of Justice (2008) emphasised on 
demographical problems, saying that aging of the baby-boomers is 
primarily responsible for such an increase in crime-rates among the elderly.  
The White Paper goes on to argue that those who are over 65 now, are 
the ones who also contributed to the highest crime rates among youth, 
during the post-war period. In other words, the old criminals suddenly 
decided to turn to the good-old method of making money – stealing. 
According to the report, 68% of crimes were theft, while violent offences 
and fraud amounted for 1.8% only.  
The attitude of the report seems to ignore the real problem forcing 
people into crime – poverty.  According to the data presented, about 
60% of the repeat criminals were people who lived alone. This indicated 
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that more aged individuals try to make ends meet by committing minor 
crimes like shoplifting. As discussed in the previous sections, the number of 
1-person households is rising and the family ties tend to weaken. Lonely 
people are more likely to fall under poverty line and less likely to be 
stopped from committing crimes by thoughts about the family.  
Some of the old age law offenders actually turn to crimes just to have 
a place to sleep and 3 meals a day. In August 2008, a 79-year old woman 
was arrested in Tokyo for stabbing a person. When asked what her 
motives were, she replied she had no place to stay and wanted the 
police to take care of her (Yomiuri Shinbun of 22 August, 2008). 
Unfortunately, such crimes are not isolated cases.  
Who ever thought that Japan will have to support a special prison for 
the old-age inmates? The growing numbers of elderly inmates are forcing 
the authorities to rethink the design of the jails to meet the special needs 
of the olds. The first modern prison for the elderly is stated in Onomichi, 
Hiroshima prefecture. The average age of the prisoners in this special 
facility that at times reminds visitors of a nursing home for the aged, is 70. 
Special rails are installed in halls and toilets to prevent those with 
disabilities from falling down.  
Hamai Koichi, a professor at Law School of Ryukoku University says in 
his interview to AlJazeera in March 2008 that much more of aged prisoner 
are expected, so the government needs to build new facilities similar to 
ones in Onomichi. Many of the inmates just cannot keep up with the strict 
regime demanded of younger prisoners. They are also given light work 
and extra-medical examinations. Many have poor hearing or eyesight, 
while others suffer from dementia. The prisoners are given three meals a 
day, a place to live and something to do. Many of the inmates are 
homeless with nowhere to go after they are released. So they would just 
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often go and commit some minor crime just to be brought back (Yamada 
2007). 
I believe that as long as the inequality gap and social isolation of the 
elderly continue to increase more and more elderly people may be 
reduced to crime as the only solution to their economic and social 
problems. Therefore crime-fighting should not be focused on increasing 
the deterrent, but removing the root of the problem which is poverty 
among the elderly.  
5.5 Problem of the “Forgotten Olds”   
Recently, the public in Japan and abroad was shocked by news 
hundreds of people registered as elderly citizens who have been found 
dead or have not been heard from for decades.  
The news about centenarians who were found to be dead long time 
ago or not found at their registered addresses unveiled the gloomiest 
problems of the aging society, including social workers overwhelmed with 
the crushing labor of looking for the oldest citizens, isolated and forgotten. 
The mystery of the forgotten olds became highly publicized in July 
2010, when the police and prefectural authorities discovered that the 
person thought to be Tokyo prefecture‟s oldest man had been dead for 
32 years. The public was shocked to know that his decayed body was 
kept at home all these years. The police initiated an investigation with 
allegations of pension fraud and illegal abandonment.  
This discovery revealed the problem of forgotten olds and forced the 
authorities around the country to look for the people who are over 100 
years old. The findings were not less shocking than the first incident.  
114 
 
The woman born in 1897, registered as Tokyo‟s oldest, was also missing. 
There were cases when old people were registered as living in buildings 
that no longer existed.  In Kobe city a woman, who would be 125 if still 
alive, was registered in an address where now a parking lot is standing 
instead of a building. Authorities keep looking for more than 100 lost 
centenarians.   
According to official statistics, Japan has 40,399 centenarians. 
However, no one knows if this number should be diminished by a few 
hundreds or maybe even thousands. More than 230,000 centenarians are 
missing all around Japan (BBC, 10.09.2010).  
The mystery of forgotten olds unfolded just in time to illustrate problems 
related to changes in household patterns discussed in the previous section, 
when an ever growing number of elderly live alone.  
The family members, who in Japan traditionally play the role of main 
care-givers and are supposed to revere of their old relatives, often do not 
know where they are and even are not aware if they are alive. From now 
on, the number of such lonely forgotten elderly people is going to grow, 
as explained in previous section. Furthermore, many of the elderly in not-
so-far future are not going to have any relatives. 
As a sign of recognition and respect, the government sends a present 
and a letter to every person who celebrated his/her 100th birthday, but 
until the recent incidents little was done to check the living conditions of 
the oldest citizens. Single-household elderly are becoming isolated from 
the rest of the community, especially when they reach “old-old” age and 
have problems with moving around. As a result, some of the lonely aged 
people may be left unnoticed even after their death. “Kodokushi” - lonely 
death – is a growing concern in Japan. According to Tokyo Medical 
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Examiner‟s Office data, the number of people over 65 who died alone in 
their homes amounted to 2211 in 2008, which is almost twice as much as 
in 2002. The tendency is that the number of people living alone is 
increasing. As discussed earlier, one in 10 elderly men and one if four 
elderly women were living alone in 2005. (MIAC, National Census 2005). 
There are more women living alone than men, because they have longer 
life expectancy. However, men are more likely to become socially 
isolated (Fujimori 2010). This is most likely due to the fact that long hours of 
work and poor work-life balance prevented men from participating in 
community activities and making friends other than at the workplace.  
An interesting internet survey was made by Goo Research and All 
About Japan (All About Japan 2008). Among other things, the survey 
asked 1017 persons aged 20-35 who live alone how well they know their 
neighbors.  The answers are represented in the Figure 5.8 below:  
 
 
3% 3%
47%
47%
Figure 5.8: How Well do You Know Your Neighbours? 
Share activities with them
Often talk with them
Just exchange greetings
Source:  All About Japan, Survey on security issues for young Japanese 
living alone, 2008
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I interpret this information as a sign that the problems related to elderly 
care, elderly crime etc will be growing very rapidly as the subjects of the 
survey are people who in some 30 years will become elderly themselves 
and they are much less likely to have children than today‟s elderly. But not 
only they won‟t have children to turn for help; they may also be 
completely isolated and have no close friend around them.   
Today‟s elderly living alone spend less time with people other than 
family. Elderly people still continue to rely on their relatives for nursing care, 
but very often, there is no one who can become a caregiver, or the 
supposed caregiver is old himself/herself. 
In 2000 a nursing insurance system was introduced, targeting the 
elderly people who need assistance. Under the system 90% of the cost is 
covered, but 70% of the households with elderly who qualify, cannot 
make use of the system (Fujimori 2010).    
Despite the fact that Japan is one of the oldest nations, its social 
security spending related to GDP is not that big. As the graph below 
shows, in Sweden and France this ratio is approaching 30%, while in Japan 
it is less than 20%. The experts wonder if Japan is really doing all it can. 
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It is the task of local authorities to ensure that each community 
provides the necessary support and increases interaction of the elderly 
with the society. However, in a rapidly aging society like Japan, this task is 
becoming more difficult every day. For the central government a pressing 
issue is to reinsure the people‟s trust in financial and security system in 
order to be able to continuously collect taxes and increase social security 
spending according the need of an aging society. 
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Figure 5.9: Social Security Expenditures per GDP (2005)
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), 2005 
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Chapter 6  
Old Age Care in Japan 
As the population of Japan ages, the number of people who need 
assistance with their daily activities increases. More and more people 
become eligible for the care services provided by the Long Term Care 
insurance (LTC) or Citizen‟s Health Insurance (CHI) programs. In this section 
I discuss how the welfare sectors are influenced by demographic 
changes and what urgent problems in the area of old-age care emerge 
as a result of the population aging process.  
 
I use the data from Survey of Households Requiring Care (MHLW 
2006b), and Life Security Survey (JILI 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010) to illustrate 
how aging population changes the situation in old-age care sector. I 
argue, that the increase in life-expectancy will not be necessarily 
correlated with improved health conditions of the aged people. 
Furthermore, as a major contributing factor to aging is low birth-rates (and 
not only increased life expectancy), the situation in the old-age care 
sector may worsen, unless appropriate measures are taken.   
 
6.1 How Was it and How will it Be? 
Traditionally, care of the ill, disabled and elderly in Japan was 
considered the responsibility of the family (Ikegami 1995, 2006). In 1961 
universal health care coverage was introduced, but the rate the patient 
had to cover him/herself was set at 50%, so for elderly people access to 
health care services remained fairly limited. In the pre-war Civil Code the 
right of the eldest son to inherit the property was bound with obligation to 
care for the parents, and practically this meant that the daughter-in-law 
of the eldest son was in charge of caring for the parents. Even though the 
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“ie-seido” (family system) was abolished after World War II, these practices 
were still considered to be social norms and were widely accepted.  
 
Public welfare services were mostly used by people of the lowest 
social class who had no children. This is the main reason why the welfare 
services such as elderly nursing homes became stigmatized and many 
people felt reluctant to use their services. The very first elderly homes were 
introduced under Welfare law for the Elderly (Rojin Fukushi-hou) in 1963. At 
the present there are two types of facilities: 1) Special Care Homes for the 
Elderly (Tokubetsu yougou rojin houmu) and 2) Care Homes for the Elderly 
(Yougou rojin houmu). The first type was designated for people with 
severe disabilities (like Alzheimer disease) who require help in their daily 
activities, while the second type was restricted to the people of low social 
class who do not necessarily require care. These services have been 
covered by taxes from central and district governments. The welfare 
services in Special Care Homes and Care Homes for the elderly are 
funded by taxes and are limited by the budget. So services have been 
inadequate to meet the need of the rapidly aging society.  
 
However, the latent demand for long term care has increased. The 
health care was made more available to all elderly people, in 1973 when 
health care became free for everyone older than 70. The number of 
elderly in the hospitals rose very quickly. By 1990 about 60% of all the aged 
people who were taken care of in a facility were in hospitals and not in 
the facilities for the elderly (MHLW 1992). Due to the lack of welfare 
services, many elderly people who needed a place to live or simply 
wanted food tried to secure a bed in a hospital. First of all, being treated 
in a hospital was not stigmatized as was the case with other welfare 
facilities for the old. Furthermore, there were no officially set limits for 
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health-care expenditures as opposed to welfare with its limited budget. 
This created a phenomenon known in Japan as “social hospitalization” 
(Ikegami 1995, 2006). The government eventually had to introduce a 5% 
co-payment to decrease somehow the amount of “social hospitalization”. 
The problem here is that unless a person is from a very low-income class, it 
is cheaper to stay in a hospital than in a welfare facility for the elderly. 
That is why many aged people tend to stay in hospitals even if they no 
longer require medical attention.  
 
In 1989 the so called Golden Plan was introduced to develop welfare 
services for aging society. This project represented a major shift from 
institutionalized care in hospitals to home-care programs. It also aimed to 
increase the availability of long term care services to the elderly. Goals 
were set to reach a certain amount of facilities and workers in the field of 
long term care. Even though the plan was a success, later, it became 
apparent that the goals specified in the plan were not enough. So it was 
followed by a New Gold Plan in 1994 with the following goals: 
 
- Home helpers     – 70,000  persons 
- Short stay institutionalized care  – 60,000 beds  
- Day care centers    – 17,000 units 
- Home-visit nursing care facilities  – 5,000 units 
- Special Care Homes for the elderly – 290,000 beds 
- Health care facilities for the aged  – 280,000 beds 
- Care Homes for the elderly   – 100,000 beds  
 
These services were still controlled by local government, and a 
significant degree of regional inequality exists. Although the restrictions on 
income and family members have been removed, the lack of beds and 
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manpower forced the municipalities to choose among the persons in 
need of care, and the preference was given to underprivileged lonely 
persons.  
 
Because of the problems with providing care in hospitals and welfare 
facilities a new Long Term Care insurance (kaigo houken) was introduced 
(Ihara 2000). As a result home services such as bath giving, home 
alterations and leasing of welfare products such as wheelchairs were 
transferred to the Long Term Care insurance system.  
 
6.2 What are the Challenges of Old-age Care in Japan? 
As it can be seen the government is making efforts to transfer the 
elderly from hospitals to elderly homes or deal with the elderly at home. 
Even though some level of efficiency is achieved by introducing the 
various systems, they do not solve the problem of aging population. The 
number of people requiring help in their daily activities is growing with the 
ratio of elderly, while the ratio of people who are supposed to be 
caregivers decreases.  
 
The current state of things is that there are 9,108 welfare facilities for 
the elderly with about 572,600 beds and 2670 paying elderly homes while 
there are 4,587,000 people who require help with their daily activities 
(MHLW 2007). It is not unusual for an elderly nursing home with 200 beds to 
have a waiting list of 400 persons. This situation is common in elderly homes 
and even hospital around Japan (Ikegami and Ikeda, 1996) 
 
Currently there are 4 types of facilities for the elderly: 
1) Care Home for the Elderly (Yougou Rojin Houmu) 
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Admission for people older than 65 who do not require daily care but 
need a shelter due to financial difficulties. The price to enter differs 
from 0 to 80,000 yen monthly depending on income. 
 
2) Special Care Homes for the Elderly (Tokubetsu Yougou Rojin Houmu) 
Admission for people over 65 years old and who require help with their 
daily activities. The price is 150,000 yen monthly plus around 50,000 yen 
monthly is charged for the meals.  
 
3) Low-Payment Homes for Elderly (Keihi Roujin Houmu) 
For people over 60 who do not require care but whose life at home 
became difficult because they have no relatives or due to other 
reasons. The entrance fee for such facilities varies from zero to several 
hundred thousand yen, the monthly payment varies from 60,000 yen 
to 110,000 yen and the charge for meals is 50,000 yen monthly.  
 
4) Paying Elderly Homes with Care Services (Kaigo-tsuki Yuryou Roujin 
Houmu) 
Admission is for people over 60 years old. The facilities are mostly run 
for profit so the entrance fee varies a lot from 0 to hundred million yen, 
monthly rent is several hundred thousand yen and additional 60,000 to 
70,000 yen is charged for meals.  
 
The easiest facility to get into – is type 4) Paying Elderly Home with 
Care services. Because of its “for profit” basis the services are readily 
available but for a price an ordinary person is not likely to be able to 
afford. For example, an entrance fee for such facilities in Tokyo area is 
around 50,000,000 yen. This is a lump sum paid just to be admitted. On the 
other hand, the most difficult to enter the type 2) Special Care Home for 
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the Elderly. There are simply not enough facilities to accommodate 
everyone who needs help with daily activities. Like Japanese society, the 
welfare domain is becoming extremely polarized. There are high-end 
luxurious elderly homes providing high quality services, the state-run 
elderly homes that do not have nearly enough places to accommodate 
everyone and un-registered “mutodoke” elderly homes that accept 
anyone but have a very low level of service. 
 
The welfare expenditures related to aging are growing exponentially. 
The government declared that the cost of old age care would have to be 
increased from 4.3 trillion yen in 2000 to 5.5 trillion yen in 2005, but actually 
the expenditures reached 6.8 trillion yen (Ikegami 2006). The number of 
persons eligible for old age care services increased from 10% of elderly 
over 65 years old to 16% during the years 2000-2005. As more and more 
people become aware of the services available, and more and more 
people find themselves in a situation when they cannot be helped out by 
their family, the number of persons eligible for health care will grow at an 
even faster pace (MHLW 2005a). 
 
The government is making continuous efforts to cut the costs. For 
instance, since 2006, the community care programs no longer provide 
services other than so called “preventive services” that constitute physical 
training and proper diet advice for those who are classified as lowest 
levels of eligibility for care services. Also, many auxiliary services like house 
cleaning are no longer available. In welfare facilities that used to be free 
except for food, some rent is to be covered by the patients since 2005. 
The persons with low-income are still charged lower amounts (MHLW 2005). 
Perhaps one of the most important cuts is decreasing the actual 380,000 
beds designated to long term care in hospitals to 150,000 beds by the end 
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of 2011. Long term care in hospitals is one of the most expensive and 
perhaps ineffective forms of care. The beds covered by long term care 
insurance system are going to be cut and transferred to elderly homes 
(Ikegami 2006). Furthermore, a new payment system that took effect as of 
2006 makes it unprofitable for hospitals to keep patients in hospitals for a 
long time, unless they are classified as high complexity patients (MHLW 
2006b). This measure is designated as finally putting a stop to “social 
hospitalization”.  
 
The problem of old-age care is not limited by the number of beds 
and facilities. According to the information posted on MHLW website as of 
2009 there were 640,402 persons qualified as welfare care workers. Around 
130,000 of moved to other jobs or never worked in welfare sector. The 
MHLW (2006b) calculations however show that by the year 2014 around 
1,500,000 care workers will be required to cover the needs of the rapidly 
aging population. Due to the lack of experienced workers, the working 
hours of the caregivers tend to be long and very intense. Here is a rough 
list of the duties that the care giver should carry out during the day. This is 
a typical schedule officially used in job-offers, but in reality the working 
day may start earlier and last longer. 
 
09:00  getting to the workplace, making necessary preparations 
10:00 helping the patients with waking up and the exercise  
10:45  helping patients with shower, toilet, etc. 
11:15  preparing lunch 
11:30  helping the patients to the dining room 
12:00  Helping the patients with their meals and giving them 
medicine  
13:00  dinner break 
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14:15  helping with bath, shower 
17:00  preparing for supper 
18:00  helping with dinner, toilet, etc. 
19:00  doing the paperwork, giving instructions/information to the 
night shift workers 
20:00 going home   
 
Meanwhile, the law of demand/supply does not seem to work in the 
case of caregivers. Despite the exhausting and long hours of work, the 
salary of a care worker starts at 160,000 yen and averages at 210,000 yen. 
If overtime work is excluded, then the salary will almost always be lower 
than 200,000 yen (MHLW 2006c).  
 
As of 2010, the population over 65 years old is around 28,220,000 and 
there are 2,260,000 persons suffering from dementia Alzheimer or similar 
disease (JSPN 2010). This means about every 12th elderly person is suffering 
from an illness that requires institutional care. And there are around 
600,000 qualified care-workers. Around 50% of the qualified care workers 
are not working in the old-age care segment due to various reasons like 
low salary and exhaustive work. Thus there are only 300,000 qualified care-
givers available – nearly 1 care-giver per 8 persons with severe illness.  
    
Despite government efforts, at this point in a rapidly aging Japan 
there are not enough bed-places for all the people eligible and not 
enough man power to provide care services.  
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6.3 A Growing Problem: Population Shift and Care Receivers 
 
As mentioned earlier, the population of Japan is aging at a very 
rapid pace, and the speed of aging tends to be higher in the oldest 
cohorts. Logically, this means that the number of persons who need 
assistance with their daily activities is growing even faster than the 
population is aging. However, it might also be that healthy life-time 
expectancy is improving together with the life-time expectancy and that 
should reduce the number of people who require care. 
 
In order to verify whether these assumptions have real ground 
beneath them it is suficient to check the numbers of people who require 
care for different periods. In 2000 there were 2,800,000 or 2.2% of total 
population and 12.8% of the population over 65 years old who need care. 
In 2010 there are 4,752,954 or 3.7% of total population and 16.4% of the 
population aged over 65 years old who need assistance in their daily life 
(MHLW 2000, MHLW 2010).  
 
The number of people who need care is growing in relation to the 
total population. This can be explained by growing ratio of population 
older than 65 years old, because those who need care usually belong to 
that category. But, it is clear that the ratio of people who require help 
grows even within the “over-65-years-old” group. This fact makes the idea 
that healthy life-expectancy increase will alleviate the old age care 
problem look too optimistic. My explanation of this phenomenon is 
demographical population shift. When speaking about population aging, 
we all tend to think of it as an increase in numbers or ratios of those over a 
certain age (usually 65), but we often forget about aging within this old-
age group. Within the “over 65” age cohort the average age is growing 
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as well and the relative number of those who are over 75 or over 80 is 
growing even at a faster speed.   
 
The issue is not only with the people who require helping themselves, 
but also with those around them. As population ages, spouses, children 
and friends are getting older as well, and those factors also increase the 
number of persons eligible for care services.    
 
The results of Survey of Households Requiring Care by MHLW (2000b) 
show that most of the people who require help with their daily activities 
are over 80 years old. As a whole, men constitute only 33.8% of population 
with special needs, but it can be seen that in early stages (40-69 years old), 
there are more men requiring help, while among the old-old, there are 
many more women who need care services in their daily life. 
 
 
Table 6.1: People Requiring Care by Age Group (%)  
Sex Total 40~64 65~69 70~74 75~79 80~84 85~89 90~ Over 
65 
Total 100 4.4 7.0 12.6 16.6 22.0 22.6 14,7 95.6 
Men 100 7.7 10.8 17.6 19.5 19.0 16.7 8.6 92.2 
Women 100 2.7 5.0 10.1 15.2 23.6 25.6 17.8 97.3 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Men 33.8 59.5 52.6 47.0 39.7 29.2 25.0 19.7 32.6 
Women 66.2 40.5 47.4 53.0 60.3 70.8 75.0 80.3 67.4 
 
Source: MLHW (2000b), Survey of Households Requiring Care 
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With higher age, more women and fewer men are in a position when 
they need assistance for their daily activities. According to the same 
survey, the reasons why men need care include mostly cerebral-
vascular diseases; while for women, the reasons are elderly debility, 
rheumatism and other conditions specific to the oldest ages. The same 
reasons contribute to the difference in periods of care between men and 
women.  
 
The first attempt to study this difference was made in 1995 by MHLW 
(1995) in a Study for Development and Application of Indicators of 
Regional Healthcare. The data collected in this study subtracted average 
healthy life expectancy from average life expectancy to calculate the 
time an old person will spend in dependence of third-person help. At age 
65, life expectancy for men was 16.48 years – of which 14.93 years was 
healthy life expectancy and 1.55 was the average period spent in need 
of care. For women of the same age group, life expectancy was 20.94 
years – of which 18.29 was healthy life expectancy and 2.65 years – time 
spent in need of care.  
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The average dependent life expectancy is calculated based on 
population statistics from National Census (MIAC 1970-2005), mortality 
rates from Life Tables (MHLW 2005b) and Population Survey Report (MHLW 
2006d). It is too early to make final conclusions on whether healthy life 
expectancy will grow along with life expectancy or vice-versa. However, 
it is clear that women have longer life expectancy as well as higher 
probability of needing care, and this difference grows with age.  
Furthermore, as explained in chapter 2, more than 50% of future aging will 
be caused not by increased longevity but by cohorts joining the old-age 
group and by low birth rates. The number of potential caregivers 
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decreases while the number of potential care receivers increases every 
year.    
 
 
 
My interpretation of this data is following: Risk of becoming 
dependent and unable to fulfill ones daily needs alone grows with age. 
While as discussed in Chapter 3, the population is aging by large due to 
falling birth-rates, population shift occurs on every stage of the pyramid, 
that is to say the ratio of the oldest-old is also increasing relatively to the 
ratio of old people. The optimists may argue that overall health is 
improving and very soon anyone will be able to afford a home robot that 
will be helping with all daily activities. I do not want to sound pessimistic or 
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optimistic. As no one can predict the future with 100% accuracy, my 
suggestion is to assume that the present trend will continue unless 
something is changed. Therefore, I believe that the relative number of 
people who require care is going to increase at a faster pace than 
technological progress. 
 
 
 
As discussed earlier, aging of Japanese population is characterized 
by aging in the oldest cohorts, which means the numbers of people who 
require care will be growing exponentially. The problem is not limited by 
the absolute and average number of people who are dependent on 
care-services. The situation is aggravated by the fact that expected care-
giving period is also increasing. 
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According to a survey by Japan Institute of Life Insurance (JILI 2001, 
2004, 2007, 2010) the average period of care-giving is increasing. The 
average period of care-giving is now around 4 years, and the number of 
people who stay dependent for more than 4 years and more than 10 
years is growing rapidly. This increase in the time people spend being 
dependent on someone‟s help is corresponding to the increase of the 
ratio of the eldest cohorts (over 75 years old and 85 years old).  
 
Thus, even if we accept the idea that healthy life expectancy grows 
with life expectancy, that fact alone will not be enough to reduce the 
burden of the aging population on younger generations.  
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6.4 Unregistered (“mutodoke”) Elderly Homes: a Solution or a 
Problem? 
The problem of so-called “mutodoke” elderly homes received 
attention in March 2009, after a devastating fire in “Tamayura” 
unregistered elderly home in Shibukawa city, Gunma prefecture that took 
the lives of 10 aged persons.  None knows for certain how many 
unregistered elderly homes are out there and what their conditions are. It 
is certain, however, that the conditions are significantly worse than those 
of regular registered elderly homes, both in terms of living conditions for 
the aged and fire prevention standards. This home for the elderly was so 
isolated from the surrounding community that some municipal officials did 
not even know it existed. As revealed later, the existence of “Tamayura” 
was well known to the officials of Sumida-ward, Tokyo, who suggested 
“Tamayura” as a solution to individuals on welfare who could not find any 
place to go in Tokyo. As became known shortly after the incident, 6 of the 
victims moved to “Tamayura” by recommendation of Sumida-ward 
officials. Not surprisingly, Tokyo with its high land prices and still growing 
population cannot accommodate all the aged in elderly homes, 
therefore it is to be expected that Tokyo is trying to get rid of the elderly 
and pushes them somewhere else. The fact that elderly with low incomes 
find it harder and harder to live in Tokyo, combined with mass migration of 
the young who look for jobs in that area, is one reason why Tokyo‟s 
population stays relatively young for the time being. This will be discussed 
in detail in the last chapter. 
 
The problem of the unregistered elderly homes is that they are not 
bound by any regulations and restrictions. The Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare provides disaster prevention guidelines for elderly homes, in 
which such disaster-prevention standards as width of the corridors, 
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number of fire-extinguishers per floor, fire-proof door design, and so on, 
are defined. However, there is no way to check whether a particular 
facility conforms to the rules, unless it is registered.  Actually the reason 
why they do not register is that they do not conform to one or more 
standards. Unfortunately no one knows for certain how many homes like 
this are operating. Following the incident, Ministry of Health Labour and 
Welfare has announced at a press-conference that around 525 facilities in 
39 prefectures were found that “seem to be unregistered homes for the 
aged”.  Most of the unregistered facilities were found in Kanagawa (91) 
followed by Tokyo (48), Chiba (41), Gunma (31) and Okinawa (20). 
Realizing that given the circumstances, similar incident may occur again, 
MHLW requested those facilities to register and urged them to improve the 
living conditions and fire-prevention and fire-preventing measures. 
 
It is interesting to note that polarization of Japanese society can also 
be traced in the elderly home business. There are luxurious elderly homes 
with spacious rooms and high quality services available for unrealistically 
high prices or unregistered homes that people on welfare can afford, but 
with terrible living conditions. The problem of unregistered homes and 
living conditions in them deserves a separate comprehensive study to 
describe the living conditions in such places and the extent this 
phenomenon is diffused. 
 
There is one important cause of the problem of “mutodoke” facilities.  
Care Homes for Elderly and Special Care Homes for Elderly can only be 
created by local authorities, social welfare corporations or healthcare 
corporations. As there were not enough Care Homes for Elderly, many 
private or group-run facilities like Paid Homes for Elderly or “group homes” 
were organized, that provided the same services as Care Homes for 
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Elderly. These facilities are also covered by Care Insurance system. In 2005, 
amendments to the Long-term Care Insurance law were introduced that 
allowed local governments to deny organization and construction of such 
facilities. The local governments under pressure of rising Long-term Care 
costs competed with one another in “controlling the number” of the 
facilities. As a result – the construction of new facilities has de-facto 
stopped. The fight of MHLW with “social hospitalization” adds to the 
problem, because despite the fact that the number of beds was cut and 
the costs caused by “social hospitalization” went down, the people still 
need a place to get help with their daily activities.  
 
The case of “Tamayura” is only the tip of the iceberg and no MHLW 
orders or fines are going to solve the problem as long as there are elderly 
people who have no place to go. The problem of social hospitalization 
was partly solved by cutting the number of beds and limiting the periods 
of hospitalization covered by the insurance system (MHLW 2008b).  
However, the number of people who require help with their daily activities 
is growing together with the waiting lists of the elderly homes. The demand 
generates offers, and with the prices of private elderly homes going 
through the roof and waiting lists for special homes for elderly counting 
thousands of people, the problem of unregistered elderly homes is very 
likely to become more severe every year. 
 
6.5 “Export” of the Elderly 
While Japan is staying rather closed to the idea of allowing more 
immigrants to alleviate the problem of the aging population, the number 
of old-age emigrants, who look for a more affordable place to spend their 
last days grows.  The history of retiring emigrants can be traced back to 
1986 when the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry created 
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the so-called “Silver Columbia Plan „92”. This plan was a government 
driven attempt to promote a wealthy and joyful life abroad after 
retirement. But the plan was heavily criticized within Japan and from 
abroad on the basis that Japan was “exporting the elderly” and so the 
idea of “exporting the old” was transferred to private enterprises (Idei 
2007).   
 
South-Asian countries are regarded as attractive health care and 
retirement destinations for Japanese. Many notable Japanese companies 
like Sanyo Emeritus Co. Ltd or Tokushukai Medical Corp. have already built 
retirement residences in the Philippines.  Several trillions of yen are invested 
into new projects to build the infrastructure for Japanese retirees. Such 
countries as Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia are usually chosen as the most 
suitable places due to physical proximity to Japan, nice climate and high 
quality of health care. In 2004, according to Long Stay Foundation the 
most popular destinations for long-stay tourism were Australia, Malaysia, 
Hawaii and Thailand (Long Stay Foundation 2005). The companies market 
the retirement facilities as places where retirees can keep an active fruitful 
lifestyle, enjoy good housing conditions and make use of recreational and 
health care facilities. Some countries even established a new type of visa 
– Special Resident Retirees Visa in Philippines and non-immigrant pension 
in Taiwan, for the people who wish to spend their “second life” there. 
Unlike Japan‟s elderly homes with their small rooms sometimes shared by 
several residents, elderly homes in Philippines provide luxurious space in 
resort-like areas.  
 
The economic aspect is an important factor in Japanese long-stay 
tourism. In the countries of South Asia, the cost of living is about 60% lower 
in the than in Japan, which makes this “elderly export” business so 
137 
 
profitable. Many elderly Japanese migrants are seeking financial security 
for old age abroad (Toyota 2006) and even call themselves “economic 
refugees”. Some others would sell their houses and then move to South 
Asia, becoming “international homeless” (Chiba 2006).  
  
Many  of the retirement migrants chose to go abroad, because they 
are forced to chose between elderly homes abroad or so-called 
“unregistered elderly homes” (“mutodoke roujin ho-mu”).  
 
Japanese retired emigrants are from different economic 
backgrounds but it is common for them to express concern about 
sustainability of their life-styles. Moving to South Asian countries for them is 
an escape from anxiety about the Japanese social security and welfare 
system. The lower costs of living in South Asia allow them to engage in 
many leisure activities they would be unable to pursue in Japan for 
financial reasons. However, South Asia retirement option is also attractive 
to those whose financial situation is too bad to live in Japan at all. 
 
Following are few cases found on Internet discussion boards (see 
Appendix 2 for the list of URLs) of Japanese pensioners who moved 
temporarily or permanently to South-Asian countries. These examples 
illustrate the differences among those who left Japan, but they also 
summarize the problems that the demographic change creates for 
Japanese society. 
 
1) A 72 year old man from Japan lives alone in an apartment in 
Taiwan. His pension is less than 100.000 yen. He says the main 
reason he left Japan was economic problems. He asked for 
advice at the city office. Municipal officials suggested he applies 
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for a place in a facility for the elderly. He would have to share the 
room with one roommate and follow many, as he says, “prison-like” 
rules, for instance it was forbidden to go out after 22:00. He 
thought a lot about it but finally refused. He now pays about 
25.000 yen for his apartment and about 20.000 for food and 
products of daily use and saves the rest. He comes back to Japan 
once a year to enjoy and bring some food one cannot find in 
Taiwan. He also says he misses Sumo broadcasts.  
 
2) A lonely woman aged 65 moved to Malaysia 2 years ago and 
now lives in a multi-stored building. She says she really likes the 
place. After being dismissed from her job 5 years ago she worked 
as a care worker, but after breaking her arm, she had to quit. Her 
husband passed away and so she decided to move to Malaysia 
because as she explains “I would be alone in both Japan and 
here, but here life is much more affordable”. She says her basic 
monthly expenses amount to approx 70.000 yen – less than 50.000 
yen for a 3-room apartment and 20.000 yen for food. Also she 
does not have to pay for the insurance and taxes she would have 
to pay if she had lived in Japan. This allowed her to pursue some 
personal interests – she started playing golf, which would be too 
expensive in Japan for her budget. Malaysian government gives 
preference to relatively wealthy families or individuals to avoid 
any trouble. The woman says she heard about a man who 
became ill with dementia and was sent back to Japan.  
 
Unfortunately, it is very hard to find such problematic stories as 
people who a less well-off are much less likely to have PC, use 
internet and share their tough experience with others. The 
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problems like this do not seem to stop new emigrants as the lure is 
bigger than the deterrent. The woman says she was the only 
foreigner in her building when she came, but there are around 30 
households from Japan. Among them, an old couple whose 
business failed and so they look for a cheaper place for 
retirement and a man in his late 50s who was fired from his job 
and came to live here for a fraction of cost until he is 60 and starts 
getting pension benefits.  
 
3) A couple from Hyogo prefecture moved to Taiwan. The husband 
is a former worker of a private company and is 65 years old. His 
wife is 57. They spend half a year at a guest house in Taiwan and 
then go back home. That is their way to live on pension benefits 
(around 220.000 yen) without spending the savings. 100.000 yen a 
month is more than enough for both if the demands are not too 
luxurious. The biggest burden is travelling expenses back and forth 
to Japan. The husband would like to cut on that, but the wife 
would not sacrifice her time in Japan for even more economy.  
 
Unfortunately no statistics that accounts completely for all the elderly, 
who migrated abroad to spend their retirement are readily available. 
Many migrants do not register at the embassies and for various reasons 
and it is hard to keep track of everyone. Therefore it is difficult to argue to 
what extent retirement migration has developed. However the fact of 
building special retirement homes dedicated entirely to Japanese 
migrants speaks volumes.  In the Philippines alone, the number of 
Japanese who received Special Resident Retirees Visa (SRRV) issued by 
Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) amounts to 1200 persons. Every year, 
some 100 Japanese citizens receive this type of visa (MOFA 2010).    
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While international retirement emigration is growing, domestic 
migration to the countryside is also on the rise. Many retirees are going to 
villages and sometimes even become full-time farmers.  Local 
governments promote such de-urbanization to the places were cost of 
living is less expensive and where there are more opportunities for the 
aged people to pursue their interests (Oe 2006), and this is definitely a 
positive development for over-concentrated Japan.  
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
As a result of analyzing all the information presented above, it 
becomes clear that, for one, the problem of old-age care is not going to 
be self-solved magically thanks to improved health of the citizens. There 
are a number of reasons for that. First is that the shift of the population 
pyramid towards older ages is explained more by falling birth-rates than 
by improved health and longevity (although longevity also should not be 
underestimated). Second reason is that despite the improvement in 
health conditions in the early stages of old-age, the nature of illnesses that 
people suffer when they reach older ages are such that they require 
much longer periods of care, as shown and explained in this chapter. And 
finally, the work of the care workers, despite being exhausting, is not often 
rewarded enough to keep the workers on the career track. 
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Chapter 7 
Why Are Increasing Regional Differences Problematic for Japan’s 
Future? 
Interest in the problem of regional disparities in Japan started to 
increase in the mid-1960s. Japan was undergoing a period of rapid 
economic growth and the economic activity tended to be concentrated 
around the so-called “Pacific Belt” – Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka and 
some intermediate prefectures. Williamson (1965) suggested that regional 
inequality rises as country develops. After that, at a certain point, the 
disparities should level up. This means that a developing country will have 
a high level of regional inequality while a developed country would be 
more equal. Borts and Stein (1964) also predicted that regional disparities 
will disappear, because people are going to move to “better” regions, 
and business will move the regions where the labor costs are lower. As a 
result, the disparities among the different regions will converge. In this 
section I will try to evaluate if this proved to be true for Japan, focusing 
especially on the demographic aspect of regional inequality.      
 
There are tree contributions this chapter makes to the whole thesis. 
First, it refutes the arguments of researchers who argue that population 
decline is for the best by showing that population decline is very uneven 
across the regions, and thus population decline will not help anyone to 
secure more living space, jobs or clean air. The second argument of this 
chapter is that depopulation happens faster in those places that have 
relatively high birth-rates and still subsidize populations of Tokyo, Nagoya 
and Osaka, therefore depopulation of such regions will significantly 
increase the speed of population structure change. And third, regional 
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demographical differences lead to increasing income inequality and 
labor market dualism.  
 
7.1 How and Why Does Rural Depopulation Progress? 
Japan is known for its dense population and one point concentration. 
The population of the three most densely populated metropolitan areas – 
Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya has surpassed 50% of total Japan‟s population 
(Nikkei Shinbun 29 October 2007). Since 2005 the population of Japan has 
decreased, but population decline is happening very unevenly across the 
regions. Some regions will maintain or even increase population due to 
migration (See Appendix, Map 2).  
 
But in rural areas population loss is very serious. One extreme example 
is Yubari-shi in Hokkaido. A coal mining town, its population grew rapidly, 
reaching 116,908 in 1960. However, when the mining industry became 
obsolete in the 1980s, the city faced problems. An attempt was made to 
convert to tourism. Huge investments were made, but eventually the 
project failed and the city entered bankruptcy. Young people fled and 
by 2005 the population declined to roughly a tenth of what it was just 50 
years ago. Furthermore, 21 of 27 elementary schools, 7 out of 10 middle-
schools and 4 out of 6 high-schools closed. Factors in addition to aging, 
like mining industry downturn and unwise investments, also contributed to 
financial crisis. However, this example clearly shows us that we do not 
know anything about city planning and regional development under 
conditions of population aging and decline. All the experience in regional 
and city development is built on the premise of economic and population 
growth. As baby-boomers head for retirement and the number of old-
elderly (people over 75 years old) grows, more and more municipalities 
will face Yubari-shi‟s problems.  
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Table 7.1: Ratio of Population over 65 by Prefecture (%) 
2005 figures vs projections for 2035 
Rank 
(2035) 
 2005 2035 Rank 
(2035) 
 2005 2035 Rank 
(2035) 
 2005 2035 
1 Akita 26.9 41.0 17 Kagawa 23.0 35.9 33 Gunma 20.6 33.9 
2 Wakayama 24.1 38.6 18 Kagosima 24.8 35.9 34 Miyagi 20.0 33.8 
3 Aomori 22.7 38.2 19 Nagano 23.8 35.6 35 Saitama 16.4 33.8 
4 Iwate 24.6 37.5 20 Kumamoto 23.8 35.6 36 Tochigi 19.4 33.6 
5 Hokkaido 21.5 37.4 21 Oita 24.3 35.6 37 Gifu 21.0 33.6 
6 Yamaguchi 25.0 37.4 22 Fukushima 22.7 35.5 38 Mie 21.5 33.5 
7 Kouchi 25.9 37.4 23 Yamanashi 21.9 35.3 39 Okayama 22.5 33.4 
8 Nagasaki 23.6 37.4 24 Ibaraki 19.4 35.2 40 Osaka 18.7 33.3 
9 Shimane 27.1 37.3 25 Shizuoka 20.6 34.6 41 Fukuoka 19.9 32.6 
10 Ehime 24.0 37.0 26 Ishikawa 20.9 34.5 42 Kyoto 20.2 32.3 
11 Miyazaki 23.5 36.9 27 Tottori 24.1 34.5 43 Kanagawa 16.9 31.9 
12 Nara 20.0 36.8 28 Hiroshima 21.0 34.5 44 Tokyo 18.5 30.7 
13 Tokushima 24.4 36.7 29 Hyogo 19.9 34.3 45 Shiga 18.1 29.9 
14 Niigata 23.9 36.6 30 Chiba 17.6 34.2 46 Aichi 17.3 29.7 
15 Yamagata 25.5 36.3 31 Saga 22.6 34.2 47 Okinawa 16.1 27.7 
16 Toyama 23.3 36.0 32 Fukui 22.0 34.0     
Japan overall 20.2
% 
33.7
% Source: NIPSSR, Population projections for Japan (2006a), MIAC, National Census (2005)  
  
Table 7.1 estimates the uneven distribution of older population across 
prefectures in 2035 in comparison to actual aging levels. In the 1950s the 
difference between the regions with most aged population (Shimane 
7.6%) and youngest (Tokyo 3.5%) was around only 4%. After 1975 the 
difference grew to 7%. During the period of high economic growth, youth 
went out to big cities, abandoning rural areas, contributing to aging of 
population there. Since then, the difference between regions has 
gradually increased. Migration was also significant in the late 1990s. 
However, those young urban migrants will soon become part of the aged 
population themselves. Thus, it appears that during next 10-15 years the 
acceleration of aging might be as significant in big cities as it is in rural 
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areas.  Doteuchi (2003), for instance, claims that Tokyo and Osaka will be 
the next most rapidly aging areas. Does this mean that all of Japan‟s cities 
and villages will face the same problems as Yubari-shi? The answer is – no. 
As I will show in this chapter, there is significant inequality among 
prefectures/cities/villages in terms of aging population. Some remain 
relatively young, while in others the aging process is much faster than 
nationwide. Let‟s consider the possible reasons of this inequality.  
 
7.2 Differences in Birth Rates and Aging Ratio 
Two factors contribute to aging in Japan: long lifetime expectancy 
and decreasing number of births. Japan‟s total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen 
as low as 1.26 in 2005. The government efforts to improve the situation do 
not seem to be very effective so far. This is not the first time Japanese 
society has faced decline in birth rates. A significant decline took place 
from 1950 to 1956 when Japan‟s TFR was more than halved, from 4.54 to 
2.04, leading to a labor shortage in 1970s. Later TFR started falling again 
after 1973, although at a slower pace. The significant difference is that in 
1950-1956 declining birth rates were universal across all prefectures and 
households. The demographic change we see now differs from region to 
region (Fig. 7). For instance, TFR is around 1.0 in Tokyo and Hokkaido while 
other prefectures like Okinawa (1.7), Tottori (1.47) and Shimane (1.50) 
maintain a TFR significantly higher than average (MHLW 2006d).  
 
Sociologist Yamada Masahiro (2007), a government policy consultant, 
suggests that falling TFR is a problem requiring urgent and massive 
government intervention. He too notes that unlike previous birth rate 
declines, the decline after 1974 is very uneven across the regions of Japan, 
which suggests that some regions are more suitable for child-rearing than 
others (Figure 7.1). Furthermore, this regional gap continues to grow. Atoh 
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Makoto (2000) argues that there is a positive correlation between fertility 
and female employment rates. His analisys is based on data from 13 
OECD countries. The conclusion thus is that improving gender-equality 
policies and female employment would lead to increased birth rates. 
Sociologist Akagawa Manabu (2004) strongly opposes this interpretation. 
Akagawa believes that fall in the birth rates is inevitable and no policies 
can reverse the trend. Akagawa‟s critism of Atoh is based on the fact that 
including other countries would make the correlations statistically 
insignificant. Accordingly, government efforts should be directed to 
adapting to the new demographic environment rather than changing it.  
 
My point of view lies in between. Even if it is very difficult to boost birth 
rates above replacement level, it should be possible to create an 
environment where people‟s wishes for creating family are not thwarted 
by economic problems. New laws and regulations will not help resolve the 
problem of low birth rates unless they are powerful enough to change the 
reality of Japanese corporate culture. Maternal and paternal leave may 
be increased on paper, but Japanese employees do not take even half 
of the paid leave they have under current law (JIL 2002; MHLW 2004, 
2009b). Because traditionally in Japanese families the burden of child 
rearing falls almost exclusively on women, gender equality and female 
employment policies alone would not resolve the problem of low birth 
rates. Even though economic burdens are the top reason for not having 
children, young people do not use income statistics to decide whether to 
have children or not. Rather they make their decision based on 
confidence of being able to raise children. Such confidence may derive 
from full-time employment, for instance, as oppesed to irregular 
employment.    
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Figure 7.1: TFR by Prefecture
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Using cluster analysis I have classified all the prefectures of Japan into 
4 groups based on population structure and demographic behavior. First 
group includes Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Osaka, Miyazaki, and 
Hyogo that have youngest populations within Japan and at the same 
time below-average birth rates. The second group is represented by 
prefectures like Shiga, Mie, Hiroshima, Okayama and Okinawa that also 
have relatively young populations and higher than average birth-rates. 
Third are the prefectures with high birth rates and higher than average 
aging ratio: Yamagata, Fukushima, Shimane and others. These are the 
regions, which send their youth to metropolitan areas like Tokyo or Osaka. 
As a result the populations of these regions age faster, while metropolitan 
areas are able to maintain relatively young populations despite lowest 
birth-rates. Finally the fourth group is comprised of regions with low birth-
rates and high aging rates like Aomori, Niigata, Wakayama, Tokushima 
and others (Table 7.2, Figure 7.2).  
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Table 7.2: Classification of Prefectures by TFR and Aging Ratio 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Code Prefecture Code Prefecture Code Prefecture Code Prefecture 
1 Hokkaido 9 Tochigi 3 Iwate 2 Aomori 
4 Miyazaki 10 Gunma 5 Akita 15 Niigata 
8 Ibaraki 17 Ishikawa 6 Yamagata 30 Wakayama 
11 Saitama 19 Yamanashi 7 Fukushima 35 Yamaguchi 
12 Chiba 21 Gifu 16 Toyama 36 Tokushima 
13 Tokyo 22 Shizuoka 18 Fukui 38 Ehime 
14 Kanagawa 23 Aichi 20 Nagano 39 Kouchi 
26 Kyoto 24 Mie 31 Tottori   
27 Osaka 25 Shiga 32 Shimane   
28 Hyogo 34 Hiroshima 33 Okayama   
29  Nara 47 Okinawa 37 Kagawa   
40  Fukuoka   41 Saga   
    42 Nagasaki   
    43 Kumamoto   
    44 Oita   
    45 Miyazaki   
    46 Kagoshima   
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Thus, while low birth rates should normally influence the level of aging, 
it seems that Japanese regional differences in aging are in many cases 
explained by migration more than by differences in birth rates.  
 
What factors influence the birth rates? There are studies that take into 
account the effects of income and amount of debt on demographic 
behavior (Kojima 1993). One problem with this approach is that the 
influence of income should not be considered equal for every social class. 
For example, a person with monthly income of 120.000 yen may decide to 
postpone or not have children at all due to economic reasons, while the 
person who earns 320.000 yen may decide to have one child. The 
difference in income is 200.000 yen. But if the income of the first person is 
2.200.000 yen and the other‟s is 2.420.000, it is hard to believe that same 
difference in income of 200.000 yen can change something. I have 
considered several possible aspects, such as work-life balance, 
employment (regular vs irregular), and household size. In the first analysis 
TFR was found to be negatively correlated with the ratio of young people 
in irregular employment (Figure 7.3).  Okinawa with its high ratio of 
irregular employment and high birth rates was excluded from these 
calculations as an outlier. But historically, Okinawa seems to move into the 
same direction as other prefectures, although with some lag. 
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This finding supports the assumption already discussed in Chapter 4 
that labor dualism contributes to aging by boosting anxiety among young 
people. As the level of birth-rates and marriage rates is significantly higher 
among men who are in regular employment, employment inequality 
should be considered as one of the main causes of falling birth rates in 
Japan. On the other hand, aging within enterprises reduces employment 
opportunities for the young as discussed in Chapter 4, creating a vicious 
cycle.  
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Figure 7.3: Correlation of TFR and Ratio of Employees Aged 15-
34 in Irregular Employment  (arbaito and part-time)  by 
Prefecture
Source:
- TFR:  MHLW, Demographics Survey ,2007;  
- Irregular employment ratios:  Cabinet Office, Basic Employment Structure Survey,  2007
* Note: every dot in the graph represents one of 46 prefectures of Japan. Okinawa is 
excluded from this analysis as an outlier
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As only about 2% of children are born outside of wedlock, it is worth 
considering the relation of irregular labor and marriage rates (Fig.7.4).  
 
It is clear from the graph above that more irregular labor is strongly 
associated with lower marriage rates and thus lower fertility.  
One more interesting thing is that TFR is positively correlated with the 
ratio of 3-generation households (Figure 7.5). Again, in this case Okinawa 
seems to be an exception to the rule.  
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Figure 7.4: Correlation of Irregular Employment of People Aged 
15-34 and Ratio of Unmarried Women at Age 28
Source:
- Unmarried women ratio:  MHLW, National Cencus, 2005;  
- Irregular employment ratios:  Cabinet Office, Basic Employment Structure Survey , 2007
irregular employment among 
people aged 15-34 (%) 
ratio of unmarried
women aged 28 (%) 
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One more significant factor that was found to be in negative relation 
with the birth rates is the average number of hours men spend at work. 
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Figure 7.5: Correlation of TFR with Ratio of 3-generation 
Households
Source:
- 3-generation households: MHLW, National Cencus,2005;  
- Irregular employment ratios:  Cabinet Office, Basic Employment Structure Survey ,  2007
* Note: Okinawa is excluded from this analysis as an outlier
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In Japan, the amount of time spent at work is the highest among 
developed countries. Long working along with short holidays, hours is one 
of the factors that prevent people from balancing their work with private 
lives, and child rearing in particular (MHLW 2006e, McDonald 2008).  
It is obvious that there are many more possible reasons for the 
decisions of young people regarding marriage and having children. This 
may include availability of child-care services, education costs, people‟s 
personal values (McDonald 2005). However, from the analysis above we 
learn general trends observed throughout the country. The difference in 
birth rates among Japan‟s prefectures is significantly related to 1) 
employment stability (increased irregular employment is associated with 
lower birth rates); 2) increased irregular labor also is related to lower 
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Figure 7.6: Correlation of TFR with Average Time of Work for 
Men (prefectural average, including commute; in minutes )
Source:
- TFR:  MHLW, Demographics Survey, 2006;  
- Average time spent at work:  MHLW (2006g), National Livelyhood Survey
** Note: Okinawa is excluded from this analysis as an outlier
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marriage rates of women of child-bearing age;   3) Household types (ratio 
of 3-generation households seems to be positively associated with birth 
rates); 4) Work-life balance (the longer is the time spent at work the lower 
are the birth rates). Indeed, prefectures with the lowest birth rates Tokyo, 
Osaka, Hyogo have long working hours, lowest ratio of 3-generation 
households, and highest ratios of irregular labor among young people.  
7.3 Why Population is Still Growing in Certain Regions? – Subsidizing 
Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya 
Aging is strongly correlated with shrinking of the population (Hattori 2009, 
Nishioka et al. 2010c). At first glance, this is too obvious to even mention, 
because mortality among older people is higher and older people are 
unlikely to bear children. However, closer analysis shows that it is not that 
population is shrinking in regions with higher ratio of older people because 
the mortality is so high and birth rates so low, but because people just 
move from such regions. Although, the population of Japan started 
declining in 2005, the population of three metropolitan areas around 
Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya is still one the rise due to migration (Figures 7.7-
7.8).  
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The Figure 7.7 above represents a general trend of urbanization. Urban 
population has been growing and rural or regional population has been 
declining since 1970. Migration to metropolitan areas is so important that 
their population continues to grow despite the fact that overall 
population started declining in 2005. 
More detailed trends in population growth are presented on Figure 7.8. 
It is clear that most densely populated areas are becoming even more 
densely populated. On the other hand, least populated areas are 
becoming even more depopulated (see also Appendix, Map1, 2). The 
argument expressed by some researchers that low birth rates are good 
because they will allow for overcrowded Japan to have more space and 
thus improve living standards does not hold when one consider this 
unequal distribution of the population. Overall population growth has 
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Source: Cabinet Office, National Census, 2005 
Figure 7.7: Distribution of Japan's Population between 3 Metropolitain 
Areas and Other  Regions %
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nothing to do with population density in Tokyo and other metropolitan 
areas. It seems like all rural areas have to be completely depopulated for 
population of Tokyo to decline.  
 
 
There is a significant negative correlation between city and level of 
aging expressed by the ratio of citizens over 65 years old (Figure 7.9). My 
interpretation of this data is pretty straight forward – rural areas with 
above-average birth rates still send their young people to metropolitan 
areas. This data confirms that big cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka 
benefit from population inflow.  
 
100%
105%
110%
115%
120%
125%
130%
135%
140%
145%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Minami-Kanto
Tokai
Kita-Kanto
Kinki
Kyushu, Okinawa
Chugoku
Hokuriku
Tohoku
Shikoku
Hokkaido
Source: Cabinet Office, National Census, 1970-2005 
Figure 7.8: Population Growth Across Regions. 1970 = 100%
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Meanwhile prefectures like Shimane, Fukui, Kagoshima, Fukushima 
and others that send their youth to big cities continue to age rapidly. The 
situation is even more serious for prefectures that already have high ratios 
of older people and low birth rates, such as Tokushima, Akita, Kochi and 
Hokkaido. The policies to alleviate the situation rarely seek global solutions. 
Instead they are often focused on things like attracting tourists and 
migrants to live. Advocates of “natural selection” both in Japan and 
outside suggest that there is no problem with letting the unattractive 
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Figure 7.9: Municipality Population Size vs Aging Ratio
(% of people older than 65)
%
Source: Cabinet Office, National Census, 2005
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regions deteriorate and disappear, because it is natural for strong 
economies to survive and for weak ones to die out. (Herve le Bras 1998; 
Akagawa 2004; Wada 2007). However, such ideas do not take into 
account one very important thing – that “economically healthy” regions 
draw human resources from “economically ill” and aging regions. If the 
regions with above average birth-rates are allowed to fail, there will be no 
migration boost for Tokyo, Saitama and Osaka populations as their TFRs 
are far below national average – 1.0; 1.22; 1.22 respectively.  
  
7.4 Concluding Remarks  
As discussed in Chapter 4, aging of the labor force is associated with 
higher labor costs. Therefore, enterprises try to cut labor costs by relying 
more heavily on irregular workers. So it can be assumed that prefectures 
with higher levels of aging would also have higher levels of irregular 
workers.  But relationship is not that simple. The motivation to hire more 
irregular workers is stronger at enterprises where the share of older 
employees among regular employees is high. Consequently, the fact that 
aging contributes to increase in irregular labor is a matter of demand for 
young full-time employees on the enterprise side. This explains why the 
prefectures with relatively young populations have highest ratios of 
irregular workers and lowest birth rates. Young people move to 
metropolitan areas in hope to find a job, but often settle for irregular 
employment and this decreases their chances to have family and 
children. 
The demographics of Japan differ significantly on the regional level. 
There are prefectures with relatively young urban populations but most of 
them have the lowest birth rates as well. They maintain their population 
growth at the expense of “donor” prefectures that have higher than 
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average birth rates. The problem with migration is that young people 
migrate to densely populated areas not well-suited for child-
bearing/rearing. Increasing instable employment patterns and absence 
of day-care services make the birth rates plummet in places where there 
are a lot of young people of child-bearing age.  
Obviously, the differences in old-age dependency ratios will cause 
differences in regional tax rates, number of schools, tax revenue levels, 
welfare and regional development (NIPSSR 2008a, 2008c, Nishioka et al. 
2010c). Regions with larger old-age dependency ratio will have to spend 
more of their smaller budgets on support rather than development. The 
way to change the situation – government supported incentives and 
promotion of regions – seems to be a rather difficult issue in Japan. So far, 
governmental initiatives for offsetting rural-urban differences have not 
given significant results.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
Japan has entered the era of hyper aging society. The speed and the 
extent of demographic change experienced by Japan were never seen 
anywhere else before. It is obvious that the changes in population 
structure are going to affect Japan‟s economy and position in the 
international arena for quite a long period. It is thus important for Japan‟s 
government to find its own solutions to the new challenges.  
 
8.1 Summary of Thesis Findings 
In this paper I have analyzed four important aspects of social change 
that to more or less extent were caused by aging population. First of all, 
the population aging is caused by longer life expectancy and lower birth 
rates. Up until the 1960s falling birth rates as a result of second phase of 
demographic transition played most important role. Later, during 1960-
1980s the situation changed and increasing life expectancy became an 
important contributing factor. Since then, the role of the falling birth rates 
has been increasing again. This is an important issue for Japan, because 
unlike increased life expectancy, low birth rates contribute to aging 
without a corresponding increase in physical ability to contribute to the 
economy for longer periods. Furthermore, population aging caused by 
low birth rates squeezes the population pyramid and changes the 
household patterns, so that more people are likely to live alone, especially 
when they reach old age. Therefore population aging caused by low birth 
rates has more ramifications and is a more pressing issue than population 
aging caused by longer life expectancy. A crucial task for Japanese 
society in the near future is to make sure the welfare system, including 
pensions, old age care and health care systems remain sustainable. The 
task for a longer period is to ensure sufficient work-life balance and family 
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support, to make it possible for everyone who wishes to create a family 
and have children to be able to so. In the very beginning of the paper I 
described the growing importance of low birth rates. As the government 
considers various schemes to deal with aging population, it is important to 
slow down the speed of societal aging by promoting family friendly 
policies.  
 
The next important issue addressed in this paper is the influence of 
demographic change on labor environment.  In Japan‟s particular case, 
partly due to its age seniority system, aging society did not increase 
demand for young workers and did not solve the problem of 
unemployment. Instead, as skewed population structure caused an 
increase in labor costs, the demand for young workers in large enterprises 
decreased. It was confirmed that the more aged workers employed by 
the enterprise, the less likely the enterprise is to employ new younger 
workers and more likely to employ irregular workers. Consequently, 
population aging is responsible for labor dualism – a situation when 
people are very unequally rewarded for doing basically same amount of 
work. Japan‟s age seniority system with a high degree of protection for 
regular workers became an unsustainable pyramid scheme due to 
demographic change and caused the labor environment to be polarized. 
The enterprises being unable to change the rules of employment of 
permanent workers addressed the issue of rising labor costs by lobbying 
for deregulation of labor laws and hiring more irregular employees. The 
enterprises also do whatever is possible to cut the older employees, and 
this fact also contributes significantly to deepening the gap between 
those who worked till they are 65 and those who were dismissed at the 
age of 55.   As a result, the new demographics of Japan contributed 
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significantly to establishment of a new class division – the class of regular 
and irregular workers and those with and without retirement benefits.  
 
The reverse aspect of interaction between employment and 
demographics is no less important. As demographics influence the labor 
market, unstable employment also influences the demographic behavior.  
It was confirmed that men who are in irregular employment are less likely 
to get married and have children than those with stable employment. 
Thus, labor market dualism contributes to demographic aging by 
depressing the chances of people to create families.   
 
From the life-course perspective, aging population caused the period 
people spend living alone to increase. There are 2 factors I have 
considered. First is that as people are less likely to get married and have 
children, naturally, the size of the household they belong to is smaller. 
More people end up living alone, especially when they reach old age. 
Second factor is migration to metropolitan areas. While the role of 
demographics is not obvious at the first glance, I suggest that 
demographic aging is also responsible for migration to some extent, as 
people tend to move from places with older population to places with 
younger population.  The traditional family-based social security system 
has been modified significantly as a result of demographic change. As 
the number of persons in a household decreases drastically, people no 
longer feel like they can rely on their relatives for support in case of illness 
or when they reach old-age. Furthermore, as family played a role of a 
basic network to create new social ties, decreasing number of family 
members decreased the number of starting points for an individual to 
build new social ties. The government had to assume the responsibility of 
caring for the elderly, but the expenditures on social security are a heavy 
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burden. While the government is struggling with the problem of elderly 
support, the problem of child care support seems to be overlooked. 
Therefore, the inequality of living standards between people who have 
children and those who do not is expected to increase.  
 
How is the change in population age-structure affecting the situation 
in old-age care? The number of persons eligible for care services is 
growing much faster than the number of the facilities and services. 
Furthermore, along with life-expectancy increases, the average period of 
care giving increases as well at a rapid pace. The discrepancy between 
demand and supply of old-age care services creates a number of urgent 
issues. Government and NPO-run homes for the elderly are overcrowded 
and waiting lists are so long people have to wait for several years to 
receive the services they paid for during the years they participated in the 
Long Term Care insurance system. On the other hand, the fact that the 
government fails to satisfy the demand for old-age care services creates 
a niche for private sector. Privately run elderly homes are often so 
expensive that vast majority of the citizens are not able to afford the 
services they offer.  Other un-registered elderly homes provide more 
affordable but low-quality solutions, and at times even put the heath and 
lives of their clients at risk. The division of private-run elderly homes into 
very expensive and very bad reflects inequality of income and wealth 
among the older cohorts. As a result of this ill supply-demand relation in 
Japan many people started to look for solutions to their problems abroad. 
A lot of elderly move from Japan to South-Asian countries to avoid 
bankruptcy or to have a better living than they can afford in Japan or just 
to keep more of their savings for their children.  
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Although the problems discussed are affecting all territory of Japan, 
the extent to which they influence social life differs across the regions. 
How do the demographics differ around the country? There are 
prefectures with relatively young populations that are still growing despite 
below replacement level of the birth rates. These prefectures are young 
due to migration. Other prefectures have older populations. The problem 
here is that the older a municipality is the faster its population ages. The 
youth moves from depopulating rural areas to metropolitan areas. Birth 
rates in densely populated areas tend to be significantly lower, despite 
younger population. Fast rural depopulation is not only an urgent problem 
because of shrinking economies and abandoned municipalities in those 
areas but also because rural areas are the main source of migrants who 
maintain the populations of the large cities. Take that away, and the 
populations of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and surrounding areas will age at 
even faster pace than rural areas did.  
 
8.2 Aging Population in Japan and Demographic Theories 
From the theoretical perspective, Japan‟s experience offers a lot of 
information and evidence for verifying how existing population doctrines 
and theories relate to modern world. Perhaps the most important lesson 
that we can learn from Japan, is that the focus of demographic theories 
should be shifted from population size to population structure. That is to 
say, the case of Japan is the best illustration of the fact that sustainable 
population theory is irrelevant in the modern world unless the population 
structure and distribution is considered. Furthermore, the fact that the 
most overcrowded regions of Japan have lowest birth-rates may suggest 
people themselves make unconscious decisions about the “sustainability” 
just as it happens in natural world. The problem is that those decisions are 
made on the basis of what is good for an individual or his/her offspring. 
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The right decision for an individual (for example to sacrifice family for the 
career) may, however, turn to be a harmful one for the society as a whole 
(aging because of low birth-rates). Japan‟s experience teaches that in 
order to understand the influence of various demographical processes on 
a given society, we need a theoretical approach that would consider not 
only size of the population, but population structure, structural changes 
over long periods of time, and the demographic determinants behind 
such changes (as attempted in chapter 3).  
 
Some of the existing theories of population can and should be 
modified in order to include and explain the new realities we now observe 
in Japan. Demographic trap theory should expand its focus from youth 
bulges to theoretical explanations of what is happening when the ratio of 
individuals in a given age group is growing or decreasing rapidly.  
 
Perhaps the newest concept that Japan‟s experience brings to the 
population theory is the understanding that not only the population itself 
with its size and structure, but also population distribution should be 
variable that receives a lot of attention.    
 
The mechanism of some processes caused by demographic shift is 
already clear today. Demographic aging, if caused by low birth rates, 
may lead to economic downturn due to low demand and shrinking ratio 
of economically active population. It is a nature of human being to do 
his/her best to keep the present amount of wealth, no matter what are 
the economic conditions. As a result people of all social backgrounds 
spend more time and efforts so that the effect of the economic downturn 
on their financial situation is minimal. However, higher classes are in a 
better position to defend their financial situation than others. 
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Consequently, the burden of the economic downturn will lie down on the 
shoulders of the lower class, thus increasing inequality.   
 
Natural population shrinking is a recent phenomenon. For centuries 
humanity accumulated experience and knowledge about development 
and urban planning under the conditions of population growth. It has 
become a tradition in many cultures for younger generations to care for 
the old. Temporary population declines due to wars or disease are known, 
but such events did not turn the population pyramid up-side down. 
Population decline is very new, and a little is known how it could change 
living arrangements. Thus, it is important to monitor the changes and draw 
from Japanese experience to learn how aging and population shrinking 
changes the society. 
 
8.3 Reforming the Society: What can or should be done?  
First, it is obvious that Japan has to find policies to adequately deal 
with aging and decreasing population. The current social system is 
premised on a pyramid that can only be maintained under conditions of 
high economic and population growth. Currently the government is 
considering partly financing public pensions through taxes, because the 
pension funds are dwindling. Similar to pensions, health insurance 
depends on newcomers. It is just a matter of time before aging and 
shrinking population cause collapse of such systems. Japan has already 
taken measures to alleviate the situation by gradually increasing 
pensionable age to 65 and, reforming pension and insurance system. 
However, these are only temporary solutions, and unless population aging 
does not stop, other measures will be necessary. 
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Unfortunately, many government policies designed as remedies for 
aging population burden the most vulnerable members of society. Recent 
examples are: The New “Medical care system for the elderly”, which 
means less medical care for more money for persons aged over 75 years 
old, Postponing retirement age (Takayama 2004), possibly increasing the 
consumption tax.  
 
Finally, perhaps the most important issue is stratification of Japanese 
society. Both, the pressure to conserve and the pressure to change the 
age-seniority and life-time employment principle are so strong, that 
enterprises decided to keep it for some people and changed it for others. 
This created 2 separate classes – regular and irregular workers. This 
stratification deepened as many new types of irregular workers (arubaito, 
contract-workers, part-timers, dispatched workers etc.) were invented. 
Breaking the working class into smaller classes suppresses class 
consciousness and makes it much more difficult for people to stand for 
their rights. It is perhaps fair to say that aging was used by the state and 
enterprises as an excuse to do what they wanted to do – reduce labor 
costs and justify shrinking the welfare state. 
 
The key to reducing inequality caused by aging population is to treat 
it as a problem rather than as an excuse to sacrifice the welfare state and 
social justice. Instead of dividing society into winners and losers (read 
regular and irregular workers) and designating a part of society as shock 
absorbers, it is necessary to create an environment where anyone willing 
to work could exercise his or her potential. A possible solution to increasing 
labor dualism and inequality is to grant the same social security protection 
(including minimal wage, health insurance, maternal/paternal leave and 
holidays) to every employee regardless status. Similar policies were 
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implemented in Netherlands that granted all workers same social security 
rights as full-time workers. At the same time, full-time working hours were 
made more flexible, which narrowed the gap between full and part time 
workers (Bleijenbergh, Bruijn, Bussemaker 2004). The results were reduced 
unemployment and increasing birth rates.  
 
Japan has a long way to go in improving childcare services and work-
life balance – most important issues related to low birth rates. It is 
necessary to draw attention to people‟s feelings and aspiration for life. 
People do not make their life choices based on statistics, but in 
comparison with others around them. If one sees people having a hard 
time raising children and working, one is less likely to have children. On the 
other hand, if one sees other happy families with children, who are able to 
balance work and childcare regardless of their status, then it is very 
possible that many people who wish to have children will do so. 
 
Despite the fact that the situation is very serious, Japan has all the 
resources and means to deal with all the challenges caused by 
demographic change. Ensuring better child care and improving work-life 
balance would make it possible to boost the birth rates, so that speed of 
demographic change is reduced. Although, allowing people to have 
more children will not have an immediate effect, this will be important for 
Japan‟s economy in the long run. Improving the gender equality will allow 
more female labor participation, which will boost the economy. As the 
experience of European nations proves, under condition of gender 
equality, female labor participation does not cause decreases in birth 
rates. Finally, ensuring development of regional economies will allow 
increasing living standards for Japanese families and remove the regional 
disparities that currently exist. It will not be easy for Japan to deal with all 
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the challenges caused by demographic aging, but later, Japan has all 
chances to become a mentor and an example for other countries with 
aging populations.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
APPENDIX: 
Demographic Atlas of Japan 
 
 
172 
 
 
173 
 
 
174 
 
 
175 
 
 
176 
 
 
177 
 
 
178 
 
 
179 
 
 
180 
 
 
181 
 
 
182 
 
References:  
1. Akagawa, Manabu. 2004. 『子どもが減って何が悪いか! 』, (What’s wrong 
with having less children?)  Tokyo: Chikumasyobo.  
2. All About Japan and Goo Research. 2008. Survey on security issues 
for young Japanese living alone.  
available online at 
http://research.goo.ne.jp/database/data/000772/ 
3. Amaki, Naoto. 2004. 『さらば外務省』, (So long MOFA). Tokyo: Kodansha.  
4. Aratame, Natsumi. 2006. “Aging of the Population in Asia and 
Japan‟s Community-Based Welfare.” In Facing Up to the Problem of 
Population Aging in Developing Countries: New Perspectives for 
Assistance and Cooperation, ed. Keiichiro Oizumi , Hirokazu Kajiwara 
and Natsumi Aratame, Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, 
JICA. 
5. Aristotle. 1986. The politics. Translated by William Ellis, Prometheus 
Books. 
6. Aritake, Toshio. 2005. Japan's elder power: most Western CEOs have 
yet to discover the nation's imminent spending boom. Chief 
Executive Publishing  
7. Atoh, Makoto. 2000. “Social Policies in Low-Fertility and Rapidly Aging 
Societies-the Case of Japan.” In Studies of Social Security System in 
Japan and Europe, ed. Bernd von Maydell, Berlin: Duncker and 
Humbolt. 
8. Atoh, Makoto. 2001. “Very Low Fertility in Japan and Value Change 
Hypotheses”, Review of Population and Social Policy, #10, 1-21. 
Tokyo: NIPSSR. 
9. Atoh, Maokoto. 2008. “Japan's Population Growth during the Past 
100 Years.” In The Demographic Challenge: A Handbook about 
Japan.  ed. Florian Coulmas. Leiden: Brill. 
10. Auerbach, Alan and Laurence Kotlikoff. 1987. Dynamic Fiscal Policy, 
Cambridge University Press.   
available online at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/tokei/hojin/10/pdfs/1.pdf 
(accessed 14 March 2010). 
183 
 
11. Bank of Japan. 2006. Public Opinion Survey on Household Financial 
Assets and Liabilities. The Central Council for Financial Services 
Information. 
available online at www.shiruporuto.jp/finance/chosa/yoron/ 
(accessed 14 March 2010). 
12. Baudelle, Guy and David, Olivier. 2006. “Changement Global, 
Mondialisation et Modele De Transition Demographique: Reflexion 
Sur Une Exception Française Parmi Les Pays Developpes”. Historiens 
et Géographes, 98(395), pp177-204. 
13. Belsky, Jay and Michael Rovine. 1984. Social network contact, family 
support, and transition to parenthood, Pennsylvania State University 
Press 
14. Blackledge, Paul. 2006. Reflections on the Marxist Theory of 
History, Manchester University Press. 
15. Bleijenbergh, Inge, Jeanne de Bruijn, and Jet Bussemaker. 2004. 
“European Social Citizenship and Gender: The Part-time Work 
Directive”, European Journal of Industrial Relations. #10, pp309-328. 
16. Borts George H. and Stein Jerome L. 1965. Economic development 
and Free Market, Columbia University Press, New York. 
17. Boscaro Adriana, Gatti Franco and Raveri Massimo. 1990-1991. 
Rethinking Japan. New York, St. Martin's Press.  
18. Bras, Hevre Le. 2002. L’adieu aux masses, Démographie et politique, 
La Tour d‟Aigues, Editions de L‟Aube. 
19. Burch, Thomas K. 2003. “Demography in a new key: A theory of 
population theory”, Demographic Research, # 9, pp 263-284), 05 
December 2003.  
available online at  
www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol9/11/ 
20. Cabinet Office, 2008. 『全国消費実態調査』, (Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey), Tokyo. 
21. Cabinet Office, 2010. 『高齢社会白書」, (White Paper on Aging Society), 
Tokyo. 
184 
 
22. Caldwell John C. 1976. “Toward a restatement of demographic 
transition theory”, Population and Development Review #2 pp321-
366. 
23. Caldwell, John Creighton, Bruce K. Caldwell, Pat Caldwell, Peter F. 
McDonald, Thomas Schindlmayr. 2006. Demographic Transition 
Theory. The Netherlands, Dordrecht: Springer.  
24. Campbell, John Creighton. 1992. How Policies Change: The 
Japanese Government and the Aging Society, Princeton University 
Press. 
25. Charles Yuji Horioka. 2006. “The Dissaving of the Aged Revisited: The 
Case of Japan”, NBER Working Papers #12351, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
26. Chiavacci, David. 2008.  “From Class Struggle to General Middle-
Class Society to Divided Society: Societal Models of Inequality in 
Postwar Japan”, Social Science Japan Journal Advance Access 
published online on May 13, 2008. 
http://ssjj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/1/5 (accessed 
2 February 2010).  
27. Chiba, Chieko, 2006. 『ハッピーロングステイするために』,  (For a happy long-
stay), Rashin.  
28. Clark, Robert L, Naohiro Ogawa, Makoto Kondo and Rikiya 
Matsukura. 2009. “Population Decline, Labor Force Stability, and the 
Future of the Japanese Economy”, The WDA – HSG Discussion Paper 
Series on Demographic Issues #1,  
available online at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/p7wh458n307849m2/ 
29. Coale, Allen J. 1957. “How the Age Distribution of a Human 
Population is Determined”, Symposium on Quantitative Biology, #22 
pp83-89. 
30. Conrad, Harald. 2009. “From Seniority to Performance Principle: The 
Evolution of Pay Practices in Japanese Firms since the 1990s”, Social 
Science Japan Journal Advance Access published online on 
November 30, 2009. 
http://ssjj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jyp040 (accessed 
2 April 2010). 
185 
 
31. Cummins, R., Eckersley, R., Pallant, J., Okerstrom, E. and Davern, M., 
2002. “The impact of personal relationships and household structure 
on the wellbeing of Australians” Australian Unity Wellbeing Index 
Report #3.2, Australian Centre on Quality of Life, Deakin University, 
Melbourne.  
32. Curnow, Jill. 2000. Myths and the Fear of an Ageing Population, AESP 
Occasional Paper, Australia. available online at 
http://www.mnforsustain.org/curnow_j_australia_aging_myths_and_t
he_fear.htm 
33. De Carbon, Philippe Bourcier. 1997. “Le vieillissement dans les pays 
de l'OCDE. Un défi fondamental pour la politique.”  Population, vol. 
52, #6 pp.1579 -1585.  
34. Dhillon, Navtej. 2008. Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or 
Opportunity?  Washington, Brookings: The Brookings Institution 
available online 
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0522_middle_east_youth_
dhillon.aspx 
35. Doteuchi, Akio. 2003. “Building a Welfare Infrastructure to Support 
Independent Living for the Aging Population”, Ageing In Japan. 
Research Booklet, NLI Research Institute, AGHE Annual Conference, 
St. Petersburg. pp 221-229, NLI Research Institute, Tokyo.  
36. Easterlin, R.A. 1987. Birth and Fortune. University of Chicago Press. 
37. Easterlin, Richard A., Christine Macdonald, and Diane J. Macunovich 
1990. "How have the American baby boomers fared? Earnings and 
well-being of young adults 1964–1987” Journal of Population 
Economics, Vol.4, pp277-290. 
38. Ehrlich, Paul R. 1971. The Population Bomb. 1st ed. Cuthogue, New 
York: Bucaneer. 
39. Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. and Robert F. Hébert. 1997. A History of 
Economic Theory and Method (4th ed.), Long Grove, Illinois: 
Waveland Press.  
40. Feeney Griffith. 1990. "The demography of aging in Japan: 1950-
2050", NUPRI Research paper series, n°55, p.46. 
41. Fries James. 2001. “Aging, cumulative disability, and the compression 
of morbidity”, Comprehensive Therapy #27(4) pp.322-329.  
186 
 
42. Fujimori Katsuhiko. 2010. 『単身急増社会の衝撃』 (The drama of a 
society of growing loneliness), Nihonkeizai Syuppansya 
43. Fuller, Gary. 1995. “The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: a 
Geographic Overview.” In CIA, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to 
National and International Order in the 1990s, pp.151-154, 
Washington. 
44. Fuller, Gary. 2004. The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society. 
Michigan: The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. 
available online at 
http://www.strategicinspirations.com/ispu/go/images/F000180/Grah
am+Fuller+paper.pdf 
45. Furukawa, Tetsuo. 2008. “Public-Health Care System – A Financial 
Perspective”. In The Demographic Challenge: A Handbook about 
Japan.  ed. Florian Coulmas. Leiden: Brill. 
46. Furuta, Takahiko, 1993.『人口減少ショック』, (Declining Population Shock), 
Tokyo: PHP Institute. 
47. Galasso, Vincenzo, 2008. The Political Future of Social Security in 
Aging Societies, Mit Press. 
48. Gavrilov, Leonid A., Heuveline, Patrick. 2003. “Aging of Population.” 
In The Encyclopedia of Population. ed. Paul Demeny and 
Geoffrey McNicoll, vol.1, pp32-37. New York: Macmillan Reference. 
available online at: 
http://www.galegroup.com/servlet/ItemDetailServlet?region=9&impr
int=000&titleCode=M333&type=4&id=174029 
49. Gavrilov, Leonid A., and Natalia S. Gavrilova. 1991. The Biology of 
Life Span: A QuantitativeApproach.  New York: Harwood 
Academic Publishing.  
50. Genda Yuji, Teruyama Hiroshi, Ohta Souichi. 2007. “Aging and 
unemployment in Japan”. In Ageing and Labor Market in Japan. ed. 
Hamada Koichi and Kato Hiromi, Cornwall: MPG Books.  
51. Genda, Yuji and  Kondo, Ayako. 2003. “Review of Structural 
Unemployment - Background of the Rising Unemployment Rate”. 
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.53, Tokyo.  
187 
 
52. Genda, Yuji, Teruyama Hiroshi, Ohta Souichi, 2008. 「1990 年代以降の
日本の失業：展望」, (The Japanese Unemployment after 90’s)  , Bank 
of Japan Working Papers, Vol.08-J-4. 
53. Genda, Yuji. 2005. A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New 
Reality Facing Japanese Youth. Tokyo : International House of Japan. 
54. Gironda, Melanie, James E. Lubben, Kathryn A. Atchison. 1999. 
“Social Networks of Elders Without Children”, Journal of 
Gerontological Social Work, Vol.31 pp63-84.  
55. Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early 
Modern World, Berkeley.  
56. Goldstone, Jack A. 2010. The New Population Bomb. The Four Mega 
Trends That Will Change the World, Foreign Affairs.  
57. Gordon, Andrew. 1993. Postwar Japan as History. University of 
California Press 
58. Grundy, Emily. 2006. Population Ageing: Causes and Consequences 
London.  
59. Grusky, David B. 1993. “Social Stratification”. In The Blackwell 
Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought, ed. William 
Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore. pp. 610-613, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
60. Handwerker, W. Penn. 1986. Culture and Reproduction: An 
Anthropological Critique of Demographic Transition Theory, 
Westview Press 
61. Hara ,Junsuke and Kazuo Seiyama. 1999. Social stratification: 
Inequality in an affluent society. University of Tokyo Press 
62. Hara, Junsuke and Kazuo Seiyama, 1999.『社会階層豊かさの中の不平等』 
(Social Stratification Inequality in an Affluent Society), Tokyo 
University Press.  
63. Hara, Junsuke and Kazuo Seiyama. 2005. Inequality amid Affluence: 
Social Stratification in Japan. Melbourne: Transpacific Press. 
64. Harada, Yutaka and Hitoshi Suzuki, 2005. 『人口減少社会は怖くない』 (A 
Society with Declining Population is Nothing to be Afraid of), Nippon 
Hyoronsha.  
188 
 
65. Hashimoto, Kenji. 2003. Class Structure in Contemporary Japan. 
Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. 
66. Hassard, John and Jonathan Morris. 2008. “Managing in the New 
Economy: Restructuring White-Collar Work in the USA, UK and Japan.” 
In 21st Century Management: A Reference Handbook, ed. Charles 
Wankel, pp65-75. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
67. Headey, Bruce. 1999. “Old age is not downhill: the satisfaction and 
well-being of older Australians”. Australian Journal on Ageing, Vol.18 
pp.32-37. Sydney. 
68. Healy, Judith. 1998. Welfare options: delivering social services, 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin 
69. Healy, Judith. 2004. The benefits of an ageing population. Sydney. 
70. Heer, Friedrich. 1966. The Intellectual History of Europe, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company.  
71. Heinsohn, Gunnar Söhne and Weltmacht. 2003. Terror im Aufstieg 
und Fall der Nationen. Bern: Orell Füssli.  
available as online e-book at http://www.pdf4ebook-
verlag.de/LinkedDocuments/Heinsohn%20S%F6hne%20und%20Welt
macht%20kommentierbar.pdf 
72. Hewitt, Paul. 2003. “The Grey Roots of Japan‟s Crisis”,  Asia Program 
Special Report, (#107), Woodrow Wilson Center, January 2003. 
73. Hewitt, Paul. 2004. “Depopulation and Aging in Europe and Japan 
(Wreck Welfare State?)”. Social Contract Journal Issues, summer 
2004 Vol. 14, #4. The Social Contract Press.  
available online at http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/fourteen-
four/xiv-4-282.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2010)  
74. Higuchi, Yoshio. 2004.「デフレが変えた女性の選択」 (Women’s choices 
Affected by Deflation), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 28 September. 
75. Hippo, Yasuyuki. 1993. “The reduction in working time - an unfinished 
cultural revolution”. Futures, June. London: Butterwothr-Heinemamn. 
76. Horioka, Charles Yuji, Wataru Suzuki, Tatsuo Hatta. 2007.  “Aging, 
Savings, and Public Pensions in Japan”, Asian Economic Policy 
Review, Vol. 2, #2, pp 303–319 
189 
 
77. Horiuchi, Shiro. 2000. “Demography: Greater lifetime expectations”. 
Nature #405, pp744-745, June. 
78. Horlacher, David E. 2002. Aging in Japan: Causes and 
Consequences Part I: Demographic Issues. Austria, Laxenburg: IIASA  
79. Howe, Anna, Sue Donath. 1997. Wellbeing and outlook on ageing: a 
study of attitudes of Australians aged 55-75, Melbourne: National 
Ageing Research Institute. 
80. Ichibangase, Yasuko. 1996. “Feminization of Poverty in the Aging 
Society”, Voices from Japan, #02 Japanese Economic 
Development: Feminization of Poverty and Ecological Crisis, August, 
Tokyo: Asia-Japan Women‟s Resource Center. 
81. Idei, Yasuhiro. 2007.「老人輸出 「愛人付きゴルフ三昧」から「孤独死」まで東南ア
ジア「シルバーリゾート」の光と影 (高齢社会の徒花か 暴走老人、超老人が跋扈す
る)」, (Export of the Elderly: From Golf to Lonely Death – South-East 
Asia Silver Resort), Syogakukan, Sapio 19(23), pp.98-100 
82. Ihara, Kazuhito. 2000. Japan's Policies on Long-Term Care for the 
Aged: The Gold Plan and the Long-Term Care Insurance Program, 
New York: International Longevity Center.  
83. Iida, Tetsuya and Jonathan Morris. 2008. “Farewell to the Salaryman? 
The Changing Roles and Work of Middle Managers”, International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 19: 1074-89. 
84. Ikegami, Naoki and Shunya Ikeda. 1996. “Waiting lists in Japanese 
hospitals”, In Containing Health Care Costs in Japan ed. Ikegami, 
Naoki and John C. Campbell. University of Michigan Press. 
85. Ikegami, Naoki, 2006. “Should providers be allowed to extra-bill for 
uncovered services? Debate resolution and sequel in Japan” 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law #31(6) pp1129-1149. 
86. Ikegami, Naoki, 1995.「医療機関の構造的要因と診療特性ならびにその費用関
連の日米比較」 (US and Japan Comparison on Structural Factors, 
Practice Characteristics and Related Costs of Medical Facilities) in 
『ヘルスリサーチは医療にどう貢献するか？』 (How health research helps in 
medical practice?) Tokyo: Pfizer Health Research Foundation.   
190 
 
87. Inoue Toshitaka, Takao Shigematsu, Zenji Nanjo.  1997. Healthy life 
tables in Japan, 1990: a quality of the longest life expectancy in the 
world, Minzoku Eisei.  
88. Ishida, Hiroshi. 1993. Social Mobility in Contemporary Japan: 
Educational Credentials, Class and the Labor Market in a Cross-
National Perspective. London: MacMillan.  
89. Ishida, Hiroshi. 2001. “Industrialization, Class Structure, and Social 
Mobility in Postwar Japan”. British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 52, #4, 
pp. 579-604, December. 
90. Ishida, Hiroshi. 2002.「社会移動からみた格差の実態」 (“Inequality from 
Social Mobility Perspective”), in 『日本の所得分配と格差』 (Income 
Distribution and Inequality in Japan), ed. Hiroshi Miyajima, Research 
Institute for Advancement of Living Standards. pp.65-98, Toyo Keizai 
Shinposha  
91. Ishii Futosi. 2008. 「人口変動要因が将来推計人口の年齢構造に与える影響—老
年従属人口指数を中心として」 (On the Effect of Each Component of 
Population Change on the Age Structure -Focusing on old-age 
Dependency Ratio), 『人口学研究』, (Journal of Demography) #43, 
pp.1-20. NIPSSR.  
92. Ishikawa, Tetsuo. 1991. 『所得と富』 (Income and Wealth), Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten. 
93. Ishikawa, Tetsuo. 1994. 『所得と富』 (Income and Wealth), Tokyo 
University Press. 
94. Ishizaki, Tadao. 1983. 『日本の所得と富の分配』, (Distribution of income 
and wealth in Japan), Toyo Keizai Shinposha. 
95. Iwamoto, Yasushi. 2004.『ライフサイクルから見た不平等』 (Inequality from 
Life-cycle perspective). Tokyo University Press. 
96. JICA. 2006. Facing up to the Problem of Population Aging in 
Developing Countries: New Perspectives for Cooperation, Institute 
for International Cooperation, Tokyo 
191 
 
97. JICA. 2007. Aging Population in Asia: Experience of Japan, Thailand 
and China. Seminar Report on the Parallel Session at the 8th Annual 
Global Development Conference Beijing, China, 17 January. 
98. JIL. 2002. (Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training). Research 
on annual Paid Holidays. 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jil-
research/no152.pdf (accessed on 1 April 2010) 
99. JILI (Japan Institute of Life Insurance), 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010. 「生活保
障に関する調査」 (Life Security Survey) available online at 
http://www.jili.or.jp/research/report/chousa10th.html 
100. Jones, Randall S. 2008. Reforming the labor market in Japan to cope 
with increasing dualism and population ageing. Official Unclassified 
OECD Documents 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2008doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2008)60 
(accessed 02 April 2010)  
101. JSPN (Japan Society for Dementia Research) website accesses on 
October, 2010 http://dementia.umin.jp/about.html;  
http://dementia.seesaa.net/article/9908981.html 
102. Jyo Sigeyuki, 『若者はなぜ 3年で辞めるのか? 年功序列が奪う日本の未来』 
(Why do the young quit within 3 years? Age-seniority Rips of Japan of 
its Future)  Tokyo: Kobunsya. 
103. Kawase, Akihiro, Yoshiaki Kitaura, Shin Kimura, Satoko Maekawa. 
2005. Public Pension Reform of 2004 in Japan: A Simulation Analysis. 
HIA Discussion PaperNo. 10,  
104. Kawase, Akihiro, Yoshiaki Kitaura, Shin Kimura, Satoko Maekawa. 
2007. “Public Pension Reform of 2004 in Japan: A Simulation Analysis”. 
In JCER Economic Journal, (56),  
105. Kawase, Akihiro, Seiritsu Ogura. 2006. Macroeconomic Impact and 
Public Finance Perspectives of the Aging Society. Hosei University, 
Tokyo 2006 available online at http://www.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/pie/Japanese/discussionpaper/dp2006/dp309/text.pdf 
106. Keidanren. 2002.  (Japan Business Federation) Tripartite Agreement 
on Employment Issues. December 4, 2002. Tokyo: Keidanren.  
192 
 
107. Keidanren. 2007.  Directions for the Japanese-Style Employment 
System. December 19. Tokyo: Keidanren 
108. King, Maurice, Charles Elliott. 1993. “Legitimate Double-
Think”. Lancet, #341, pp669–672. 
109. Knight, Kelvin. 2007. Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics and Politics from 
Aristotle to MacIntyre, Polity Press.  
110. Kohler, Hans-Peter, Francesco C. Billari and José Antonio Ortega, 
2002. “The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 
1990s.” Population and Development Review Vol.28, #4, pp641–681. 
111. Kojima, H. “A Policy-Oriented Analysis of Fertility Behaviors and 
Attitudes in Japan”, Journal of Population Problems #49, pp29-50 
112. Korotayev, Andrey, Artemy Malkov,  Daria Khaltourina. 
2006. Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact 
Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow:URSS.  
113. Kosaka Kenji. 2000. “Social change seen from social stratification in 
post-war Japan.”  Kwansei Gakuin University School of Sociology 
Journal #86, pp145–179. 
114. Kotlikoff, Laurence. 2005.  Aging, the World Economy and the 
Coming Generational Storm, NCPA Policy Report No. 273  
available online at  
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st273.pdf 
115. Kramer, Morton. 1980. “The rising pandemic of mental disorders and 
associated chronic diseases and disabilities”. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, #62 (Suppl. 285), pp382-397. 
116. Kramer, Morton. 1983. “The Continuing Challenge: The Rising 
Prevalence of Mental Disorders, Associated Chronic Diseases and 
Disabling Conditions”. American Journal of Social Psychiatry, #4, 
pp13-24. 
117. Kyougoku Takanobu, Takahashi Shigesato, 2008. 『日本の人口減少社会
を読み解く:最新データからみる少子高齢化』 (Understanding population 
Decline in Japan: Aging and Low Fertility in Japan: Latest Data), 
Tokyo: Chuohouki. 
193 
 
118. Lee, Ronald. 2003. “The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of 
Fundamental Change.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, #17(4), 
pp167–190. 
119. Long Stay Foundation. 2005. 『ロングステイ調査統計』 (Statistical Report 
on Long Stay), Tokyo. 
120. Long, Orpett Susan. 2008. “Social Change and Caregiving of the 
Elderly.”  In In The Demographic Challenge: A Handbook about 
Japan.  ed. Florian Coulmas. Leiden: Brill.  
121. Lonien, Claude. 2003. The Japanese economic and social system: 
from a rocky past to an uncertain future. Amsterdam: IOS. 
122. Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discorsi (in Italian), Bibliotheca Philosophica. 
available online at 
http://www.latinamericanhistory.net/discorsi1.html accessed on 
2010 may 9 
123. Macunovich, Diane J. 1998. “Fertility and the Easterlin hypothesis: an 
assessment of the literature”, Journal of Population 
Economics #11, 1–59. 
124. Makino Katsuko. 2001. 「家族の変化と子どもの育ち」, (Changes in Family 
and Children), In『 青少年問題』, (Problems of youth), 48(5), pp10-15．  
125. Makino Katsuko. 2010.『国際比較にみる世界の家族と子育て』, (Child 
rearing International Comparison), Tokyo: Minerva. 
126. Malthus, Thomas Robert. 2007. An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, Dover Publications (Reprint of J. Johnson, London, 1798 
edition.) 
127. Manton KG. 1982. “Changing concepts of morbidity and mortality in 
the elderly population”. Milbank Quarterly, #60 pp183-244. 
128. Martin, Linda and Suzanne Culter. 1983. “Mortality Decline and 
Japanese Family Structure.” In Population and Development Review 
9, #4, pp633-649.  
129. Marx, Karl. 1970. Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Edited by 
Joseph O'Malley. Translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley. 
Cambridge University Press 
194 
 
130. Marx, Karl. 1992. The Capital, Volume 2, translated by David 
Fernbach, Penguin Classics.  
131. Matsushita, Keiichi. 1956.「集団観念の形成と市民政治理論の構造転換－１」 
(“The Formulation of the Idea of Group and the Structural 
Transformation of Civic Political Theory: Part 1”).  Review of Law and 
Political Sciences, Vol. 53, #3/4. Housei University 
132. McDonald, Peter. 2005. “Fertility and the state: The efficacy of policy,” 
paper presented at the XXV International Population Conference, 
July 18-23, in Tours, France. 
133. McDonald, Peter. 2008. “Very low fertility: Consequences, causes 
and policy approaches.” The Japanese Journal of Population vol.6 
(1), pp19-23. 
134. McFalls, Joseph A. Jr. 1991.  “Population: A Lively Introduction.” 
Population Bulletin, #46 p.36, October, Washington: Population 
Reference Bureau. 
135. MHLW. 1990-2005 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare).「国民生活
基礎調査」, (National Livelihood Survey), Tokyo. 
136. MHLW. 1992.  「患者調査」, (Patient survey), Kousei Toukei Kyoukai, 
Tokyo.  
137. MHLW. 1995. Study for Development and Application of Indicators of 
Regional Healthcare, Tokyo. 
138. MHLW. 2000a. 「介護保険事業状況報告」, (Report on Long Term Care 
Insurance Situation), Tokyo.  
available online at 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/kaigo/toukei/joukyou.html 
139. MHLW. 2000b. 「介護サービス世帯調査」, (Survey of Households Requiring 
Care) Tokyo. 
140. MHLW. 2004. General Survey on Working Conditions. Tokyo. 
141. MHLW. 2005a. 「介護保険制度改革の最新動向」, (Most Recent Trends in 
Long Term Care Insurance), Tokyo. 
142. MHLW. 2005b. 「第 20回生命表」, (2005 Life Tables), Tokyo. 
195 
 
143. MHLW. 2006a. General Survey on Part-time Workers. Tokyo. 
144. MHLW. 2006b. 「介護保険現状報告」, (Report on Long Term Care 
Insurance Situation), June, 2006. Tokyo.  
145. MHLW. 2006c. Basic Survey on Wage Structure (also known as Wage 
Census). Tokyo.  
available online at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-
l/index.html 
146. MHLW. 2006d. 「人口動態調査」, Population Survey Report. Tokyo. 
available online at 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/kakutei06/index.html 
(accessed on 13 March 2010) 
147. MHLW. 2006e. Survey on Employment Structure. Tokyo. 
148. MHLW. 2006f. 「社会保障給付と負担の見通し」, (Prospects on Social 
Security Benefits and Burdens as of May 2006). Tokyo. 
149. MHLW. 2007.「社会福祉行政業務報告結果」, (Welfare Services Report), 
Tokyo 
150. MHLW. 2008a. Basic Survey on Wage Structure (also known as Wage 
Census). Tokyo.  
available online at  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/index.html 
151. MHLW. 2008b. Outline of Medical care system for the elderly, 
available online at  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2006/10/dl/s1005-4c.pdf (accessed on 
12 December 2009). Tokyo. 
152. MHLW. 2009a. 「国民生活基礎調査」, (National Livelyhood Survey), 
Tokyo http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-
tyosa09/index.html (accessed on 12 November 2010). 
153. MHLW. 2009b. General Survey on Working Conditions. Tokyo. 
154. MHLW. 2009c, 「２１世紀成年者縦断調査」, (21st century Full-age 
Survey). Tokyo 
196 
 
155. MHLW. 2009d.「国民生活基礎調査」, (National Livelyhood Survey), 
Tokyo http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-
tyosa09/index.html (accessed on 12 November 2010). 
156. MHLW. 2010. 「介護保険事業状況報告」, (Report on Long Term Care 
Insurance Situation), April, 2010 available online at 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/kaigo/osirase/jigyo/m10/1003.html 
157. MIAC. 1970-2005 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications),. 
Bureau of Statistics. 「国勢調査」, (National Census). 
available online at  
www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2005/index.htm 
158. MIAC. 2005. 「統計で見る市町村の姿」, (Shape of municipalities in 
statistics). Tokyo.  
available online at  
www.stat.go.jp/DATA/kokusei/2005/index.htm (accessed on 15 
October 2009). 
159. MIAC. 2009. Statistics Bureau, Annual Report on the Labor Force 
Survey, Tokyo. 
160. Miyamoto, Masao. 1995. 『お役所の掟―ぶっとび霞が関事情』, Tokyo: 
Kodansha.   
also published in English as  
Miyamoto, Masao. 1995.  Straightjacket Society. Tokyo, New York: 
Kodansha International. 
161. MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). 2010. Annual Report of 
Statistics of Japanese Nationals Overseas. 
162. MOJ (Ministry of Justice). 2008. White paper on crime 
available online at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housouken/houso_2008_index.html 
163. Montevecchi, A.  Machiavelli. 1972. La vita il pensiero i testi 
esemplari, Milano. 
164. Moriguchi, Chiaki and Emmanuel Saez. 2006. The Evolution of 
Income Concentration in Japan, 1885–2002: Evidence from Income 
Tax Statistics. Berkeley: University of California Press,  
165. Morris, Johnatan, John Hassard, and Leo McCann. 2008. “The 
Resilience of „Institutionalised Capitalism‟: Managing under 
197 
 
„Shareholder Capitalism‟ and „Managerial Capitalism‟” Human 
Relations, #61, pp687-710.  
166. Murakami, Yasusuke. 1977. 「 新中間階層の現実性」, (The reality of the 
new middle class). Asahi Shibun: 20 May 1997 (evening edition). 
167. Murakami, Yasusuke. 1979. 『新中間大衆の時代』,  (The Era of New 
Middle-Class Masses), Tokyo: Chuou Koronsha. 
168. Murakami, Yasusuke. 1981. “The Age of New Middle Mass Politics: 
The Case of Japan”, Journal of Japanese Studies, #8(1), pp29-72. 
169. Muto, Ichiyo. 1987. IIRE Notebook for Study and Research no. 5, Class 
Struggle and Technological Innovation in Japan since 1945. 
Amsterdam 
170. Myrskyla, Mikko, Hans-Petter Kohler, and Francesco Billari. 
2009.  “Advances in development reverse fertility declines”. 
Nature #460, 741-743, 6 August.  
available online at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v460/n7256/full/nature08230.
html 
171. Neurath, Paul. 1994. From Malthus to the Club of Rome and Back. 
London: M.E.Sharpe. 
172. NIPSSR. 2002. Population projections for Japan. Tokyo. 
available online at  
http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/top.html 
173. NIPSSR. 2006a. Population projections for Japan. Tokyo.  
available online at  
http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-
ad/webjournal.files/population/2008_4/05population.pdf 
174. NIPSSR. 2006b. The Cost of Social Security in Japan, Tokyo.   
available online at  
http://www.ipss.go.jp/ss-cost/e/cost04/cost04.asp (accessed on 2 
April 2010) 
175. NIPSSR. 2008a. Population Statistics of Japan  
available online at 
http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2008/PSJ2008-01.pdf (accessed 20 
December 2009)  
198 
 
176. NIPRSS. 2008b. Projections of Changes in Japan's household types  
available online at 
http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-ajsetai/j/HPRJ2008/t-page.asp 
177. NIPRSS. 2008c, The Cost of Social Security in Japan - Fiscal Year 2007 
(April 2007 to March 2008) ,  
available online at http://www.ipss.go.jp/ss-
cost/e/cost07/data/cost2007.pdf 
178. Nishioka, Hachiro, Toru Suzuki, Yasuyo Koyama, Masato Shimizu, and 
Masakazu Yamauchi. 2010b, “The Household Changes in 
Contemporary Japan: Overview of the Results of the Fifth National 
Survey on Household Changes” The Japanese Journal of Population, 
Vol.8, #1, March 
179. Nishioka, Hachiro, Yasuyo Koyama, Atsushi Hoshi, and Sawako 
Shirahase. 2010a. “The Family Changes in Contemporary Japan: 
Overview of the Results of the Third National Survey on Family in 
Japan.” The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.8, #1, March 
180. Ochiai, Emiko. 1997. The Japanese Family System in Transition: A 
Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan. Tokyo: 
LTBC International Library Foundation.   
181. Ochiai, Emiko. 2005. The postwar Japanese family system in global 
perspective: Familism, low fertility, and gender roles. Tokyo: Josai 
University Press.   
182. Oded, Galor. 2005. “The Demographic Transition and the 
Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth”. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, #3, pp 494-504. 
183. Oe, Yasuo, 2006. 「農業の新たな機能と農村の可能性：定年帰農者によ農林漁
業体験民宿を事例として」, (A new function of agriculture and the 
possibility of green tourism: the case of an inn for experimental 
agriculture, forestry, and 162 fisheries by those who return to farming 
after retirement).  In 『競争時代における観光からの地域づくり戦略』 (A 
Strategy for Rural Development from Tourism in the Age of 
Competition). Sogo Kanko Gakkai, pp. 73–88.  Tokyo: Dobunkan. 
184. OECD. 1988a. Reforming Public Pensions, Paris.  
185. OECD. 1988b. Ageing Populations: The Social Policy Implications, 
Paris. 
199 
 
186. OECD. 1986. Employment Outlook, (Chapter V), Paris.  
187. OECD. 1996. “Le vieillissement dans les pays de l'OCDE - Un défi 
fondamental pour la politique”, Études de Politique Sociale, n°20, 
p126 
188. OECD. 1996. “Le vieillissement dans les pays de l'OCDE - Un défi 
fondamental pour la politique“.  Études de politique sociale  Paris 
189. OECD. 2005. Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), Paris  
190. OECD. 2006a.  Economic Surveys: Japan 2006 , Paris,  
191. OECD. 2006b. Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, 
Paris.  
192. OECD. 2008a. OECD Economic Survey of Japan.  
published online on 7 April 2008, at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3343,en_2649_33733_40353553
_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed on 2 April 2010). 
193. OECD. 2008b. Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in 
OECD Countries, Paris.  
194. Ogawa, Takeo. 2007. Aging Society and Active Aging. Paper 
presented at the Fukuoka Symposium hosted by Kyushu University, 
Fukuoka, Japan.  1-2 February.  
195. Ogawa, Takeo. 2008. “Changing Social Concepts of Age.”  In The 
Demographic Challenge: A Handbook about Japan.  ed. Florian 
Coulmas. Leiden: Brill. 
196. Ogawa, Naohiro and Robert D. Retherford. 1997. “Shifting costs of 
caring for the elderly back to families in Japan”. Population and 
Development Review, #23, pp59-94 
197. Ogawa, Naohiro, and Rikiya Matsukura. 2005. The Role of Older 
Persons’ Changing Health and Wealth in an Aging Society: The Case 
of Japan. Paper presented during United Nations Expert Group 
Meeting on Social and Economic Implications of Changing 
Population Age Structures, Mexico City, August 31 - September 2, 
Mexico. 
198. Ogoshi, Yonosuke. 2006. 『終身雇用と年金の転換』, (Changes in life-time 
employment and pensions). Toyko: Minerva. 
200 
 
199. Ogura, Seiritsu. 1994. “The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives 
for Japan”, In Aging in the United States and Japan, ed. Yukio 
Noguchi and David Wise, pp.139-173., The University of Chicago 
Press. 
200. Ohbuchi, Hiroshi. 1976. “Demographic transition in the process of 
Japanese industrialization” in Japanese Industrialization and Its 
Social Consequences, ed. Hugh Patrick. pp 329-361 Berkeley: 
University of California Press 
201. Ohta, Kiyoshi. 2005. 「日本経済格差は広がっているか？」 (Is Economic 
Inequality Increasing in Japan). Keizai Seminar #607 pp 14-17. 
202. Ohtake, Fumio and Makoto Saito. 1996. “Aging of the Population 
and the Induced Inequality of Consumption”, Nihon Keizai Kenkyu, 
#33, pp11–35.  
203. Ohtake, Fumio and Makoto Saito. 1998. “Population Aging and 
Consumption Inequality in Japan”.  Review of Income and Wealth, 
Series 44, #3, September, pp 361-381, Osaka University Press. 
204. Ohtake, Fumio and Makoto Saito. 1999.  Aging of the Population 
and the Induced Inequality of Household Income, Kikan 
Shakaihoshou Kenkyu.  
205. Ohtake, Fumio. 1999. “Aging Society and Inequality”. Japan Labor 
Bulletin, Vol. 38, # 7, pp. 5-11, July  
206. Ohtake, Fumio. 2000.  「90年代の所得格差」, (Income Differentials in 
the 1990s). Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, pp2-11,  
available online at  
http://w3iser.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/~ohtake/paper/90kakusa.pdf  
207. Ohtake, Fumio. 2005. 『日本の不平等：格差社会の幻想と未来』, 
(Japanese Inequality: The Gap Society Illusion and the Future).  
Tokyo: Nippon Keizai Shinbunsha.  
208. Olshansky, Stuart Jay, Bruce Carnes, Aline Désesquelles. 2001. “Still in 
search of Methuselah: Prospects for human longevity in an aging 
world.” Science, #291, pp1491–1492 
209. Olshansky, Stuart Jay, Bruce Carnes. 2009. “The Future of Human 
Longevity”, In Peter Uhlenberg, ed. International Handbook of the 
Demography of Aging. pp 731-745. New York: Springer. 
201 
 
210. Osamu, Nariai. 2008. “Social security in an anging Japan”. Japan 
Echo. Vol. 35, #5, October,  
available online at   
http://www.japanecho.com/sum/2008/350503.html  
(accessed 14 March 2010). 
211. PAI. 2007 (Population Action International) The Shape of Things to 
Come - Why Age Structure Matters To A Safer, More Equitable World 
2007.  
available online at 
http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Shape_
of_Things_to_Come/SOTC.pdf (accessed on 11 May, 2010) 
212. Pampel, Fred C. and Elizabeth H. Peters. 1995.  “The Easterlin 
effect”. The Annual Review of Sociology, #21, pp163-194 
213. Peng, Lam Er. 2009. Declining Fertility Rates in Japan: An Ageing 
Crisis Ahead, Singapore. 
214. Peterson, William, 1999. Malthus, Founder of Modern 
Demography. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
215. Preston, Samuel H., Patrick Heuveline, and Michel Guillot. 2001. 
Demography. Measuring and Modeling Population 
Processes. Oxford: Blackwell,  
216. Price, John. 1997. Japan Works: Power and Paradox in Postwar 
Industrial Relations. Cornell University Press 
217. Rebick. Marcus. 2005.  The Myth of the Middle-Mass Society: 
Inequality and Emerging Divisions in Japanese Society.   Oxford 
University Press. 
218. Retherford, Robert D., and Naohiro Ogawa. 2006. “Japan’s baby 
bust: causes, implications, and policy responses”. In The Baby Bust: 
Who Will Do the Work? Who Will Pay the Taxes? ed. F. Harris, pp5-47. 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
219. Richman, Louis S. 1990. The Coming World Labor Shortage. CNN 
Money April 9,  
available online at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1990/04
/09/73363/index.htm (accessed on 12 December 2009). 
220. Rosen, Harvey S. 2002. Public Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill.  
202 
 
221. Rossi, Alice. 1968. “Transition to parenthood.” Journal of Marriage 
and the Family, #30, pp26-39 
222. Russel, Candyce. 1974. “Transition to parenthood: Problems and 
gratifications.” Journal of Marriage and the Family, #36, pp294-302  
223. Saito, Osamu. 1996. “Historical Demography: Achievements and 
Prospects.” In Population Studies, #50(3), pp537-553  
available online at  
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2174646 
224. Sakai, Hirotsugu and Hitoshi Asaoka. 2007. “Factors affecting Labor 
Force Participation in Japan: Emprical Study of labor Supply of the 
Elderly and Females.” In Aging and the labor market in Japan, ed. 
Koichi Hamada and Hiromi Kato, Cornwall: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
225. Sako, Mari and Hiroko Sato. 1997.  Japanese Labor and 
Management in Transition. London: Routledge.  
226. Sato, Toshiki. 2000a. 『不平等社会日本』, (The Inequality of Opportunity 
in Contemporary Japan). Tokyo: Chuo Kouronshinsya. 
227. Sato, Toshiki. 2000b. 『「新中間大衆」誕生か 20年』, (Twenty years after 
the “New Middle-mass”). Tokyo: Chuo Kouronsya. 
228. Sawyer, Malcolm C. 1976. “Income Distribution in OECD Countries.” 
In OECD Economic Outlook Occasional Studies. Paris. 
229. Seike, Atsushi and Atsuhiro Yamada. 2004. 『高齢者就業の経済学』 
(Economics of Employment of the Elderly), Nihon Keizai Shinbunsya  
230. Seitz John L. 2007. Global Issues: An Introduction, Wiley-Blackwell. 
231. Sen, Amartya. 1989. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Blackwell.  
232. Shirahase, Sawako. 2002.「日本の所得格差と高齢者世帯：国際比較の観点
から」, (Income Inequality and the Households with Elderly in Japan 
from International Perspective). The Japanese Journal of labor 
Studies, #500, 72-85pp 
233. Shirahase Sawako. 2005. 『少子高齢社会のみえない格差: ジェンダー・世代・階
層のゆくえ』, (Unseen Gaps in an Aging Society: Gender, Generation, 
Class), Tokyo University Press.  
203 
 
234. Shirahase, Sawako. 2006. 『変化する社会の不平等』, (Inequality in a 
Changing Society), Tokyo University Press.  
235. Shirahase, Sawako. 2008. Changes in family structure and income 
inequality in Japan. Paper presented at the Trilateral Social Policy 
Research Conference, Health Care, Work-Family Responsibilities and 
Income Redistribution in Diversified and Aging Societies. February 16-
17, Tokyo.  
236. Suzuki, Toru. 2008. “The Latest Development in Population of Japan: 
The 2008 Revision.” The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.8, #1, 
March 
 available online at  
http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-
ad/WebJournal.files/population/2010_Vol.8/Web%20Journal_Vol.8_0
4.pdf 
237. Tachibanaki, Toshiaki. 1998. 『日本の経済格差』, (Economic Inequality in 
Japan). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 
238. Tachibanaki, Toshiaki. 2000. “Japan was a Welfare State, But…” In 
From Austerity to Affluence, ed. Richard Griffits and Toshiaki 
Tachibanaki, London. 
239. Taeuber, Irene B. 1962. “Japan's population: Miracle, model or case 
study?” Foreign Affairs, July, pp595-603 
240. Taira, Koji. 1993. “Dialectics of Economic Growth, National Power, 
and Distributive Struggles”. In Postwar Japan as History. ed. Gordon, 
Andrew.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
241. Takayama, Noriyuki. 2002. Never-ending Reforms of Social Security in 
Japan, Hitotsubashi University Repository,  
available online at  
http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-
u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/14492/1/pie_dp92.pdf 
242. Takayama, Noriyuki. 2004. “The Japanese Pension System: How It 
Was and What It Will Be”. Paper presented at International 
Conference on Pensions in Asia: Incentives, Compliance and Their 
Role in Retirement. 23-24 February. Hitotsubashi Collaboration Center, 
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo.  
204 
 
243. Takayama, Noriyuki. 2008. “The search for more Equitable Pensions 
between Generations”, In The Demographic Challenge: A 
Handbook about Japan.  ed. Florian Coulmas. Leiden: Brill. 
244. Takayama, Noriyuki, Saito Osamu. 2006. 『少子化の経済分析』, 
(Economic Analysis of Low Fertility). Tokyo.  
245. Tang, Zongli. 1995. “Confucianism, Chinese culture, and 
reproductive behavior”. Population and Environment, Vol.16, #3, 
January. 
246. Tanikawa, Miki. 1999. Companies Target the Growing Class of 
Affluent, Elderly Japanese: Mining for Gold in the 'Silver' Market. The 
New York Times, September 4. 
247. Toyota, Mika. 2006.  “Ageing and transnational householding: 
Japanese retirees in Southeast.” International Development Planning 
Review, Vol28, #4, pp. 515-531, Liverpool University Press. 
248. Traphagan, John. 2003. Contesting coresidence: Women, in-laws 
and healthcare in rural Japan. In Demographic Change and the 
Family in Japan's Aging Society. ed. John Traphagan and James 
Knight, State University of New York Press.  
249. Ueno Chizuko. 1991.『1.57 ショック 出生率・気にしているのはだれ? 』, (1.57 
Shocking Birth Rates. Who cares?), Women Bookstore Shokadou. 
250. United Nations. 1956.  The Aging of Populations and its Economic 
and Social Implication. New York. 
251. United Nations. 2001. World population prospects: the 2000 
revision. New York. 
252. United Nations. 2008. World Population Prospects: The 2008 revision 
population database. New York.  Available online at 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/,  (accessed on 2 February 2010)  
253. Usui, Chikako. 2004. “Demographic Change and the Family in 
Japan's Aging Society” Social Forces, Vol. 82, #3, pp1232-1233, 
March.  
254. Usui, Chikako, 2008. “Aging Society and the Transformation of Work 
in the Post-Fordist Economy”. In The Demographic Challenge: A 
Handbook about Japan.  ed. Florian Coulmas. Leiden: Brill.  
205 
 
255. Véron Jacques. 2008. “Le Japon face au déclin annoncé de sa 
population”. Populations Sociétés, #449, pp77-83, October, Paris: 
INED.  
256. Vogel, Ezra F. 1965. Japan’s New Middle Class: The Salary Man and 
His Family in a Tokyo Suburb. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
257. Wada, Hideki. 2007.『少子化対策が日本をダメにする』, (Policies designed 
to Fight Low Fertility are Destroying Japan), Tokyo: Graphsha. 
258. Weathers, Charles. 2009. “Nonregular Workers and Inequality in 
Japan”, Social Science Japan Journal. #12, pp143-148  
available online at  
http://ssjj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/12/1/143 (accessed on 1 
March 2010) 
259. Weil, David N., “Population Aging.” In Palgrave Encyclopedia of 
Economics, second edition, Brown University.  
260. Weizsäcker, Robert K. von. 1999.  Distributive implications of an aging 
society. Germany, Mannheim: University of Mannheim Press. 
261. Williams, Walter. 1999. “Population control nonsense.” Jewish World 
Review,#,7 February, 24 
262. Williamson, Jeffrey G. 1965. “Regional Inequality and the Process of 
National Development.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, XII, #4, pp3-84． 
263. Wood, Christopher. 1992. The Bubble Economy: Japan's 
Extraordinary Speculative Boom of the '80's and the Dramatic Bust of 
the '90', The Atlantic Monthly Press.  
264. Wood, Christopher. 1994. The End of Japan Inc. and How Japan will 
Look, Simon & Schuster. 
265. Yamada, Masahiro. 2007.  『少子社会日本：もう一つの格差の行方』, 
(Japan – society with few children: one more expression of 
inequality). Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. 
266. Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 August, 2008  
available online at http://kikikanrikenkyukai1.blog.so-net.ne.jp/2008-
08-23-2 
206 
 
267. Yves Charbit. 2002. “The Political Failure of an Economic Theory: 
Physiocracy.” Population, (translated by Arundhati Virmani) vol. 57, 
#6. November - December, pp. 855-883. 
